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Soviet Statement on ABM Review Talks

PM0209095688 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Sep 88 Second Edition p 6

["Statement of the USSR Delegation on the Results of the Review of the Operation of the ABM Treaty"]

[Text] In accordance with the provisions of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, talks were held in Geneva 24-31 August 1988 between representatives of the USSR and the United States to review the treaty after another 5 years of its operation.

The Soviet side proceeded on the basis that the review should lead to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which is of key significance for ensuring further progresss in the disarmament sphere and strengthening strategic stability and international security. The preservation and strengthening of this treaty is the common concern of its participants—the USSR and the United States.

The USSR delegation conducted all the discussions in a nonconfrontational spirit, with the aim of seeking mutually acceptable decisions both as regards the political reaffirmation of the sides' commitment to the objectives and tasks of the treaty, and as regards the quest for concrete technical decisions that could lead to the removal of mutual concerns in unclear situations that have arisen in the exchange of opinions between the sides.

The Soviet delegation sought to ensure that the reaffirmation of commitment to the treaty and the agreed outlines concerning ways of eliminating the two sides' concerns would be reflected in a joint statement or communique, which would be published as a result of the review of the treaty's operation. Unfortunately, this proved impossible because of the American side's reluctance to give practical consideration to the Soviet side's concerns and its desire to reduce the entire review of the operation of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance by the Soviet side of the American demand for the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar station, which does not yet exist.

On the basis of the results of the discussion, the American side published a unilateral statement which gives an unobjective assessment of the existing situation.

The present statement by the USSR delegation sets forth the facts that give a true picture of the situation as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty and the nature of the discussions that took place.

On the question of the radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region, the Soviet side once again confirmed that this station is intended for the tracking of space objects and does not come under the ABM Treaty restrictions. Despite this, the United States continues to attribute missile attack warning functions to it. These American claims are based not on facts, but on assumptions and subjective evaluations.

In order to show goodwill and in the attempt to remove the concern that had arisen on the part of the United States, we expressed readiness to dismantle the equipment of this station in a way that would be verifiable and would cause the United States no doubts, if an accord were reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

The American side also expressed concern in connection with the relocation of individual components of radar stations known in the United States as "Pawn Shop" and "Flat Twin" from the Sary-Shagan testing range to the Gomel region, which the American side regards, without foundation, as the start of the deployment of ABM radar stations.

On the basis of the facts we cited and a visit by U.S. official representatives to the Gomel region, the American side saw for itself that in fact the individual components of the "Flat Twin" radar station and the "Pawn Shop" truck are being used in the region in question in order to set up measurement testing grounds for the testing and tuning of mirror antennas that are used widely in the country's national economy. These operations are in no way contrary to the ABM Treaty.

At the same time we stated that in the context of removing the two sides' concerns over questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side would be prepared for a radical solution to the question of the individual remaining components of the "Flat Twin" radar station and the "Pawn Shop" truck to which the American side refers.

The American side once again raised the question that the Soviet Union could be preparing an ABM defense system for its territory. Here the assertions cited earlier were enumerated, assertions to which the Soviet side had supplied the necessary replies. Neither any one of the questions raised individually nor all of them together provide grounds for the expression of such concern by the United States.

The Soviet side also submitted a number of constructive proposals which, in the event of their implementation, would promote the resolution of other questions raised on both sides, namely:

—to draw up an accord to the effect that the sides would inform each other beforehand about plans for the construction of large phased-array radar stations and indicate their purpose;

—to agree on features making it possible to distinguish ABM radar stations from other radar stations;

—to draw up procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ABM radar stations on testing ranges;

—to permit Soviet representatives to visit the American radar station in Greenland and the construction of a launch site for "balloon rockets" on Shemya Island, to enable the Soviet Union to study on the basis of factual material U.S. actions which, according to the information available, it assesses either as a violation of the treaty (the Greenland radar station) or as a situation causing concern (the Shemya Island construction site).

Unfortunately our proposals did not meet with a positive response from the American side. Contrary to the true state of affairs, it continues to issue unfounded denials or to claim that it does not see that serious Soviet concerns exist with regard to U.S. compliance with treaty commitments. The American side did not respond to some of our proposals, and its answers on the other questions cannot be deemed satisfactory.

Nor did the American side show willingness to take any steps to rectify the violations of the ABM Treaty which it has committed.

Since 1975 the Soviet side has been expressing concern over the U.S. deployment of large phased-array radar stations of the "Pave Paws" type on U.S. territory and elsewhere. The essence of our concern is that these large radar stations have parameters sufficient to carry out the tasks of ABM radar stations. In conjunction with the radar station at the Grand Forks base, these stations could provide a radar base for an ABM defense of U.S. territory, which is incompatible with the provisions of Article I of the ABM Treaty prohibiting the creation of a base for ABM defense of the country's territory.

Particular concern is caused the Soviet side by the U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty in the deployment of a new "Pave Paws" large phased-array radar station in Greenland after the treaty came into force, and the construction of a similar radar station in Britain. Under the ABM Treaty, the deployment of large phased-array radar stations having a potential exceeding 3 million watts is strictly regulated, taking into account the purpose of such radar stations. Missile attack warning radar stations with the above characteristics are permitted to be deployed only on the periphery of the national territory, oriented toward the outside.

The American large phased-array radar station at Thule (Greenland) has a potential considerably in excess of 3 million watts. The Thule region does not constitute a position on the perimeter of U.S. national territory. The American side itself has indicated that the radar station at Thule is intended for missile attack warning. Consequently the deployment of a large phased-array radar station in the Thule region is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

The construction that has begun of a similar radar station at Fylingdales (Britain) is a similar violation.

The Soviet side also expressed other concerns with regard to U.S. compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Seeking to find solutions to the specific issues that have arisen, the Soviet side demonstrated in practice its readiness to eliminate the two sides' concerns. Naturally, the quest for solutions should take place on a reciprocal basis and should not distract attention from the most important thing—the sides' reaffirmation of their commitment to the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Through no fault of ours, it proved impossible to achieve positive solutions to the questions examined at the talks. However, the Soviet side believes that joint efforts with the aim of seeking fundamental solutions could be continued, and we will work toward this. In particular, a mechanism established by the treaty exists for the examination of concerns expressed by the sides—the Standing Consultative Commission. The next session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva in the fall of this year should be used specifically for this work, including work in accordance with instructions that could be given to the Standing Consultative Commission as a result of the forthcoming meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

'Groundless Contentions' on Krasnoyarsk Viewed

LD0109164388 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—TASS news analyst Valeriy Vavilov writes:

An attempt to accuse the Soviet Union of violating international commitments was made again at the current meeting of representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva. The meeting had been called with a view to reviewing compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The U.S. delegation circulated a statement emphasizing that "the continuing existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar makes it impossible any future arms agreements in the S.T.A.R.T. or defense or space areas".

In this connection Phyllis Oakley, spokeswoman of the U.S. Department of State, said the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted "a significant violation" of the central element of the ABM Treaty and therefore it should be dismantled without delay and without any preconditions.

How should one view such unfounded and groundless contentions by the U.S. side? Why did they surface at a time when ways became visible for a practical improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations in main directions which determine the destiny of mankind?

Such a stand of Washington is viewed by authoritative Soviet military and political circles only as a demarche by certain influential American circles that seek to hinder this positive process in any way. The Krasnoyarsk radar has been chosen only as a pretext, as a way to torpedo the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union is known to have already made big compromises including those concerning the Krasnoyarsk radar. Representatives of the U.S. Senate visited the site. A U.S. spokesman confirmed in U.S. Congress that the USSR was fulfilling its obligations under the ABM Treaty.

At present the Soviet Union is prepared for an inspection: It is ready to allow American specialists to visit the radar station: Let them sit there as much as they like and monitor, although Washington, previously, too, already saw that the radar by its technical characteristics—frequencies and directivity—did not contradict the terms of the ABM Treaty.

The argument as to the unlawfulness of its location—in the centre of Siberia, and not near borders, at the periphery, is ridiculous. But this does not change the essence of the matter: Its location is accounted for only by the convenience of means of communications the network of which in that part of the Soviet Union is not particularly developed.

The readiness of the Soviet Union for a compromise, right up to the mothballing of the radar, by no means removes our concern over Washington's violations of the ABM Treaty. These are the treaty's "broad interpretation" which is being intensively propagandized, the pushing through of a program for the development of exotic weapons, the deployment of big phased-array radars outside U.S. territory—in Britain, in the area of Fylingdales, and in Thule (Greenland)—and further development of the "Star Wars" program.

Issues concerning SDI, ABM, and military programs are now being widely debated in the United States. Individual aspects of these are put forward as trump cards in the speeches made by the country's presidential nominees. But is it worthwhile to turn situation-determined interests of the election campaign into a stumbling block in Soviet-American relations? It is precisely these relations that the destiny of mankind, the destiny of civilisation depends upon.

U.S. Missiles in FRG En Route to Destruction

LD0109173188 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Heilbronn (FRG) September 1 TASS—The removal of Pershing 2 missiles that are subject to elimination under the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty began at the U.S. Waldhede military base near Heilbronn today.

To the cheers of members of the anti-war movement who gathered there, a convoy of nine rocket launchers rolled out of the gate of the base, heading for the technical centre in the city of Hausen where they are to be destroyed.

Twelve transporters carrying missile motors, Pershing 2 control and guidance systems left the territory of the base half an hour later. This cargo will go to the United States and will be destroyed at specially equipped plants.

Soviet Army Official on Disarmament Issues

AU0109111088 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 31 Aug 88 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Csaba Poor in Budapest: "We Should Deal With the Issue of Arms Limitation Prudently"; date not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Colonel General Vladimir Lobov arrived in Budapest to participate in the international roundtable conference on conventional disarmament, but he spent the day before the conference working. Following his visits to the Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, we asked him to answer our questions.

[Poor] What expectations did you bring here to Budapest, and, in your view, can such an exchange of views bring concrete results?

[Lobov] This conference provides opportunities for clarifying a considerable number of problems concerning arms reduction, disarmament, and the current state and structure of the armed forces and their armaments. Such a conference could contribute to discovering the existing asymmetry and disproportion and could also show the way to eliminate these phenomena.

I regard it as an extremely important task to discuss the military doctrines. For our part, we have repeatedly declared that the Soviet military doctrine is an exclusively defensive one. Its goal is not only to guarantee our country's security, but also to prevent any war and any form of armed conflict.

Finding ways of verifying armaments, armed forces, and their possible limitations is a decisively important issue. Interesting ideas and useful proposals could emerge here on the issue of eliminating surprise attacks too. We should find a way to eliminate the material bases for a surprise attack. Of course, arms limitation would be the easiest way to achieve this goal because, the smaller the number of arms, the less the danger of an outbreak of war.

[Poor] Can this roundtable conference accelerate the activity of the MBFR talks in Vienna and the exchange of views between the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries?

[Lobov] Of course, this meeting will not solve all the problems overnight and cannot work out the mandate of future talks on conventional disarmament between Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries. This is not the aim of this meeting. However, it is precisely the informal nature of this meeting that can contribute to the emergence of various opportunities for solutions. The fact that there are not only professional military men among the participants in this conference is very useful, because people who are dealing with the issues on the agenda of this meeting in their work on a daily basis, tend to think a little in stereotypes. Thus, it is worth listening to the positions of a broad circle of experts.

[Poor] Prior to this conference, you held talks with Lt. General Jozsef Pacsek, chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army and deputy minister of defense, and also paid a visit to the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary. What did you discuss at these meetings?

[Lobov] First of all, we discussed the current conference and its subject. In the case of Lt General Pacsek, we have known each other for a long time, we think in the same way, and we have been working together in the framework of the Warsaw Pact for a long time. We have agreed now that it is in the interest of both our countries' armed forces to solve the problems on the agenda of this conference as soon as possible because, just as all our people, we soldiers are living with these problems. Therefore, we also discussed primarily these issues with the commanders of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary.

[Poor] The lack of clarity concerning the issue of verification is also one of the most serious obstacles in the area of conventional disarmament. The Soviet Union has offered to mutually and simultaneously publish data concerning its armed forces. However, we are still waiting for a positive answer. Would it be a great risk for the Warsaw Pact to unilaterally publish certain data? Given the current stage of development of the intelligence services, there can hardly be any significant difference between the information we might supply and the real facts....

[Lobov] Why, then, is NATO reluctant to publish its own data? Simply because the current disproportion in the balance of forces is precisely to their advantage. If they laid their cards on the table now, it would show that they possess greater armed forces, although they keep claiming that the Soviet Union has an advantage. How would they face public opinion then?

[Poor] But it is the Warsaw Pact that always comes up with initiatives. This process should start on the basis of reciprocity and equality. We are talking here not only about material aspects but also about moral ones. If we lay our cards on the table, they should do the same.

You think that, if we publish certain data, then NATO would not follow our example?

[Lobov] Look, if they had wanted to, they would have already done that, and would have accepted our proposals. We are ready to mutually and simultaneously publish relevant data on the Warsaw Pact armies and the NATO armed forces and then compare them.

[Poor] What is the situation with the withdrawal of troops stationed abroad? The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its readiness in respect to this matter. Is it not possible that certain unilateral steps would also be expedient in this respect? Let us take Hungary's case, for example: The withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary would probably not represent a great strategic loss; at the same time, however, from a political viewpoint, such a move would greatly increase the international prestige of the Soviet Union....

[Lobov] The Soviet Union has not only clearly expressed its readiness in respect to this matter but has also proved it in practice. For example, we withdrew 1,000 tanks and 20,000 soldiers from the GDR in 1980. This move remained without a response from the other side. Why should we repeat this now? Unilateral measures only lead to a situation in which the aforementioned asymmetry is even more to our detriment.

Let us take the example of the 72 U.S. fighter bombers that must be withdrawn from Spain. Why do they not deploy them on U.S. territory? Why must these planes be deployed in Italy? We have even offered to reduce our air forces on this continent by a similar number of planes if these F-16 planes are withdrawn from Europe. They have not accepted this offer. Thus, we must deal with this issue with utmost care in order to minimize the danger of a surprise attack.

[Poor] The Western press often carries reports on alleged differences of views between the Soviet political and military leadership, particularly on the disarmament issue. What is your opinion about these claims?

[Lobov] All I can say about this is that the Western press has a predilection for presenting wishful thinking as reality, thinking they would like to see in reality. There is full consensus in the Soviet Union. From privates up to the generals, the entire Soviet Army supports the party's political efforts and strives to contribute to the implementation of these efforts with all its power. I think that my presence at this roundtable conference also proves this.

Further on Gerasimov's 31 Aug News Briefing

On FRG Defense Minister's Assertion

LD3108153988 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 31 TASS—The assertion of the FRG Defence Minister Rupert Scholz that allegedly interaction between the USSR and FRG in the sphere of security is now impossible, is at variance with the pronouncements of other competent representatives of the FRG Government. This was stated at a briefing today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

He recalled that in an interview to the newspaper STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG the FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl had said he intended to turn a new chapter in the USSR-FRG relations in the course of the forthcoming official visit to the Soviet Union.

"The readiness of the head of the West German Government for broader all-round cooperation between our countries cannot but find a positive response of the Soviet side", G. Gerasimov said. "In any case, this helps establish the necessary favourable climate in Soviet-West German relations. We hope that the chancellor's readiness to turn a new chapter in the Soviet-West German relations will be substantiated by deeds in the future".

Rupert Scholz's assertion will hardly help write a new chapter, and even a page in the USSR-FRG relations, said the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Notes Criticism of U.S. ABM Stance

LD0109140088 Moscow TASS in English 1349 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—During talks in Geneva between representatives of the USSR and the United States regarding the ABM Treaty the Soviet delegation has sought to make sure that a confirmation of allegiance to the treaty and agreed outlines of ways to lift the concern of both sides would be reflected in a joint statement or communique, the delegation has said in a statement.

It was made public today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents conducted by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate.

Regrettably, a joint statement or communique has not been adopted in view of the American side's reluctance to practically address the concerns of the Soviet side.

The American representatives have attempted to reduce the entire review of the observance of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance by the Soviet side of an American demand that the Krasnoyarsk radar station, which does not yet exist, should be dismantled, the Soviet delegation said in the statement.

"Upon the results of the discussion a unilateral statement has been issued by the American side, which offered an unobjective view of the situation that has come to exist," it continued.

On the issue of the radar station under construction in the area of Krasnoyarsk, the Soviet side has confirmed that the station is meant for tracking space objects and does not fall under the limitations of the ABM Treaty.

"To remove the concerns of both sides on the issues of compliance with the ABM TReaty, the Soviet side would be prepared to a radical solution to the issue of individual remaining fragments of the radar station flat twin and the van pawn shop, to which the American side refers," the statement said further. [sentence as received]

Besides, the Soviet side has made a number of constructive proposals which, once realized, would facilitate the resolution of also other issues raised by the USSR and the United States, namely:

—To work out an agreement for the sides to give each other advance notification of plans to build large phased-array radar stations, specifying their mission,

—To agree on the signs making it possible to distinguish an ABM radar station from other radar stations,

—To work out procedures for dismantling or destroying ABM radar stations at test ranges,

—To allow Soviet representatives to visit the U.S. radar station in Greenland and the construction site of a launch complex for instrumented balloon rockets on Shemya Island.

The Soviet side believes, the statement said, that "joint efforts to find solutions of principle could be continued and we shall facilitate this. Among others, there is a mechanism envisaged by the treaty—the standing consultative commission for examining the concerns voiced by the sides."

More on ABM Compliance

LD0109140888 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—In defiance of the real state of affairs, the American side keeps denying, on its bare word, or pretending that it doesn't see serious concerns on the part of the Soviet Union over U.S.

compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet delegation to talks reviewing the treaty's observance has said in a statement upon their results.

It was read out at a briefing today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate.

"The United States has not shown readiness to take any steps to rectify its violations of the treaty," the statement said.

Starting from 1975, the USSR has been voicing concern about the U.S. deployment of major phased-array radar stations of the Pave Paws type both in U.S. territory and elsewhere.

The substance of the concern lies in the fact that these major radar stations have parameters sufficient to fulfil the tasks of ABM radars.

In conjunction with the radar stations at the Grand Forks Base the above stations can serve as the radar base for an ABM defense of the territory of the United States, which is incompatible with Article I of the ABM Treaty that prohibits providing a base for a defense of the territory of a country.

The Soviet side is especially concerned about the U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty consisting in the deployment, after the treaty's entry into force, of a new and major phased-array radar station of the Pave Paws type in Greenland and the construction of a similar radar station in Britain.

The ABM Treaty strictly regulates the deployment of major phased-array radars with a potential of more than three million with account taken of the mission of such radars.

Radars for early warning of missile attacks that have the above characteristics may only be deployed along the periphery of the national territory of a country and oriented outward.

The major U.S. phased-array radar at Thule, Greenland, has a potential substantially exceeding three million. [not further specified] The area of Thule is not a location along the periphery of U.S. national territory.

The U.S. side itself has said that the Thule radar station is meant for early warning of missile attacks.

Consequently, the deployment of the major phased-array radar in the area of Thule is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

The started construction of a similar radar station at Fylingdales, Britain, is a violation of the same kind.

The Soviet side has voiced also other concerns over U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Denies USSR Expanding Base in Syria

LD3108163488 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Excerpt] Moscow August 31 TASS—The Soviet Union regards the Non-Aligned Movement as an important force opposed to war, aggression, imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today in connection with Non-Aligned Day observed tomorrow.

Addressing Soviet and foreign journalists at the press centre of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the ministry's information directorate, emphasised: "We respect the independent, non-aligned status of the movement and do not look at it in the light of East-West relations."

The ministry spokesman stressed the importance of the direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, established 25 years ago, for diminishing the risk of an accidental outbreak of war.

Gerasimov denied the claims of THE NEW YORK TIMES and the Voice of America that the Soviet Union was expanding its naval base in Tartus, Syria.

"The Soviet Union maintains no military bases in the Mediterranean," he said. "As to Tartus, Soviet vessels from the Mediterranean squadron do enter that port with Syria's consent for small repairs and replenishment of water and food."

The Soviet Union was backing active and immediate actions in favour of reducing the military potentials in the Mediterranean, he said.

Commenting on the current visit to Moscow by a delegation from the national congress of Honduras, Gerasimov described it as the first official visit by Honduran parliamentarians to the Soviet Union, paving the way to cooperation between the highest state authorities of the Soviet Union and Honduras. [passage omitted]

Denies Chemical Warfare, 'Warning' on Zia

PM0209114888 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 36, 3-9 Sep 88 (Signed to Press 1 Sep) p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the Press Center"; boldface passages as published]

[Text] At a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists G. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, reported that the American newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES recently published an article claiming that the chief of the Soviet Army Chemical Troops Directorate, who visited Syria, allegedly discussed with the Syrian side **the**

possibility of cooperation between the USSR and Syria in the production of chemical weapons. These assertions are not in accordance with reality, and nor are the assertions that Cuban troops used Soviet-made chemical weapons in Angola. The USSR, G. Gerasimov stressed, does not transfer chemical weapons to other countries and does not teach them how to produce such weapons.

AP has issued a report headlined: **"The Soviets warned of possible actions on the eve of the loss of the Pakistani president's plane—American officials say."** This refers to a conversation between USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Vorontsov and U.S. Ambassador Matlock. In fact no warnings or threats were uttered. Yu. Vorontsov merely stated that if the Pakistani side does not fulfill the Geneva accords it will lose all credibility.

Answering a REUTER question on the **trial of Churbanov**, G. Gerasimov reported that the trial will begin 5 September at the USSR Supreme Court building. It will be conducted by the USSR Supreme Court military court collegium. Preliminary estimates are that the trial will last 1.5-2 months, and some 200 witnesses will be questioned. It has not yet been decided whether G. Brezhneva will be called as a witness.

Vorontsov-Armacost Consultations Begin 1 Sep

LD0109134488 Moscow TASS in English 1317 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—Consultations between Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost began here today.

In the consultations, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said at a briefing here today, the sides would discuss a broad range of regional problems with a view to facilitating the processes of settling conflict situations relating to Afghanistan, in the Middle East, Central America and southern Africa, between Iran and Iraq.

Experts on 'Substantial Results' of CSCE Talks

PM0109115988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 88 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Nazarenko dispatch: "The Vienna Meeting: On the Threshold of Decisions"]

[Text] Vienna-Moscow—The Vienna meeting of the 35 CSCE member states resumed its work 29 August, following a 3-week "technical break." The Vienna meeting, which started its work 4 November 1986, is the third since the all-European forum in Helsinki. The previous meetings were held in Belgrade between October 1977 and March 1978, and in Madrid between November 1980 and September 1983.

Almost 2 years have passed since the day the Vienna forum opened. A considerable time period. Quite naturally it is logical to ask: What has been achieved in this time? Which problems of the all-European process are close to being solved, and which are still subject to disagreement? Is there light at the end of the tunnel?

I tried to obtain an answer to these and other questions during a recent working visit to the Austrian capital. My meetings and conversations with Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation at the CSCE meeting in Vienna, with the delegation's advisers and experts, with heads and members of delegations from socialist countries, and with representatives of Western, neutral, and nonaligned states gave me a pretty complete idea of the state of affairs at the forum and the prospects for its conclusion.

It must be said that highly substantial results have been achieved in Vienna, especially in terms of provisional agreement on the texts of various sections of the meeting's draft final document which, as it was said by the foreign ministers of the 35 participating countries when the forum opened, should be meaningful and balanced in terms of all "baskets" and should raise all-European cooperation to a new level.

Military questions are discussed here both as part of the first "basket" (the final document's section on the military-political aspects of security) at the Vienna meeting itself, and at the forum-linked consultations between the 23 Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO states to prepare a mandate for future talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces and arms throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. A text containing an appraisal of the last stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament (1983-1986) has been agreed within the first "basket" and adopted for inclusion in the final document.

It is admitted by everyone that the confidence-building measures elaborated by the conference in the military sphere are being successfully implemented. True enough, they cover only the activities of the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO ground forces. Meanwhile it is well known that the Madrid meeting's final document contains a call for "the stage-by-stage implementation of new, effective, and specific actions aimed at developing progress in the strengthening of confidence and security and achieving disarmament." Observing the spirit and letter of this call, the Warsaw Pact countries offered to extend confidence-building measures also to the independent activities of navies and air forces in Europe and its littoral seas and oceans, making these activities within certain frameworks open, verifiable, and consequently more predictable.

What is specifically offered by the socialist countries in terms of extending confidence-building measures to the independent activities of navies and air forces? I asked this question of Major General V.M. Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting and its military expert.

First of all, Viktor Mikhaylovich said, the activities of navies and air forces must be covered by measures similar to those established and implemented for the activities of ground forces. Specifically speaking, they could include the notification of independent air and naval exercises listed in the sides' open annual plans and exceeding certain levels in terms of scale and numbers of forces involved, as well as notification of the movement of troops and military equipment in Europe by air and sea from other theaters of military operations and regions; the prohibition of exercises in intensive shipping regions and restrictions on air force and naval concentrations in places of international importance; the invitation of foreign observers to maneuvers; and the institution of strict monitoring of the activities of air force and naval forces right up to on-site inspections without the right of refusal. I wish to emphasize that our proposals on the extension of confidence-building measures in the sphere of military activities enjoy support from a number of neutral countries

Unfortunately, the NATO countries object to such a step, even though they continue calling on the Warsaw Pact Organization countries for more openness in military activities. In their view, for example, independent naval actions are altogether outside the scope of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid final document. Therefore, they say, the United States and its bloc allies will continue to insist on the all-Europea process.

As regards contacts between people, for example, there has been success in eliminating virtually all differences, apart from minor exceptions. Accord has been reached on reducing the time taken to process applications for foreign travel and family reunions. Agreements have been reached on exchanges of school pupils and their possible stay with families, as well as on exchanges of students and lecturers.

There is an interesting proposal in the cultural sphere regarding the favorable treatment of the question of opening cultural centers by participating states.

What are the prospects for the Vienna meeting's conclusion? Everything will depend on the pace of work, according to the Soviet delegation head. Provided there is success in maintaining the pace achieved in the last few weeks prior to the brief "technical break" between 8 and 29 August, the Vienna meeting could be concluded in a matter of a few weeks, by about the second half of October.

Continuing NATO Maneuvers Deplored

PM0109122188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 88 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov "Military-Political Review": "From Norway To Turkey"]

[Excerpts] So, U.S. and NATO armed forces have won their latest brilliant victory. The fierce fighting, in the course of which B-2 "Stealth" bombers, unmanned aircraft, and "Tomahawk" cruise missiles were used, lasted 6 days. Systems at NATO's disposal were reinforced by high-accuracy weapons systems, additional ICBM's, and the latest communications systems. Pentagon specialists announced that as a result the "Blues"—by which they meant the U.S. and NATO armed forces—had defeated the "Reds," that is, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and their East European Warsaw Pact allies.

Yes, this was only a game. But an extremely indicative game. Talking recently about this computer game involving 70 Pentagon experts, THE WASHINGTON POST noted that it took place at almost the same time as the "Soviet Union was demonstrating to U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci its own state-of-the-art bombers, warships, and tanks." However, it is hardly fair to describe these computer exercises costing $500,000 dollars as a mere game. For conclusions are drawn from them in complete earnest. This month a 500-page secret report must be ready to present to the U.S. defense secretary on the results of the staff games. THE WASHINGTON POST again reports that the report will contain "recommendations regarding these weapons systems and the changes that must be made to U.S. and NATO strategy to combat the Soviets."

High-ranking Pentagon staffers think that the report's task is to help the defense secretary and Defense Department strategists to make changes to the latest weapons systems research programs and to the arms procurement programs provided for by next year's Pentagon budget. The newspaper attests that these staffers hope that the report's recommendations will be taken as the basis for adopting decisions for the next 5-15 years, "irrespective of which party's representative becomes U.S. president."

In other words, just at the time when the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are proposing on the basis of the new political thinking to construct a secure—for everyone—and nuclear-free world, backing up their proposals with concrete actions, Pentagon strategists are contemplating hauling the old confrontational stereotypes into the next millennium, as it were, and retaining a base for conducting policy from a position of strength. All this quite graphically illustrates that the enormous militarist machine operated by imperialism in the "cold war" years is still not slowing down. Furthermore, there are extremely influential forces in the West who are interested—however absurd this may seem—in giving this machine an additional burst of speed. This in turn inevitably draws the Western military chariot onto the old hackneyed path of militarism, which leads straight into the abyss in our nuclear, space age.

This week the militarist machine was given the latest and—to all indications—by no means the last boost. NATO's "Reforger-88" exercises, which are the prelude to the annual series of large-scale exercises given the overall title "Autumn Forge," began on Belgian territory. "Reforger-88," which will continue until 12 September, will, in the opinion of the Belgian press, be the largest military exercises in the entire history of such NATO

maneuvers. This year approximately 17,000 U.S. officers and men are involved in them and a large quantity of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, and other military equipment is being used. In the course of these maneuvers, held regularly for more than 20 years, operations for transferring U.S. troop units and combat equipment from the United States into the FRG via Belgian and Dutch territory "to reinforce NATO forces in Europe" are rehearsed. [passage omitted]

A fleeting glance at the list of planned NATO measures for this fall is enough to determine that the majority will take place on FRG territory. This arouses no enthusiasm in the population of a country which already suffers the almost incessant roar of aircraft practicing training combat tasks at extremely low altitudes. Since the beginning of August alone, USAF SAC has carried out six large-scale exercises over FRG territory involving B-52 nuclear-capable bombers.

Citing FRG Defense Ministry representatives, the West German press reported that the U.S. bombers were operating at an altitude of 150m. At the beginning of August one of these bombers was observed 4km away from the nuclear power station near the small town of Okhu [name as transliterated]. And 4km for a modern aircraft is only a few seconds flying time. It's terrible to think of the consequences of a possible accident. These misgivings are by no means unfounded. The recent series of crashes involving military aircraft in the FRG indicates this.

If you look at the chart that shows how densely chemical enterprises, nuclear power stations, and nuclear and chemical weapons dumps are sited on the country's territory, you can imagine the danger for the peaceful population of the FRG and all Europe posed by an aircraft crashing onto any one of a multitude of these points. That is why the protest movement against dangerous hedge-hopping flights by NATO aircraft is spreading. A federal movement "Against Noise in the Sky" has even formed in south Hesse. Ellen Weber, deputy chairman of the German Communist Party, recently demanded that official Bonn halt low-altitude flights by military aircraft. At a time when talks are under way on further disarmament measures, notably on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms, she stressed, these exercises must be regarded as provocative and as preparations for offensive military operations.

The last 3 years have substantially changed the world political climate. Guided by the new political thinking, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have infused a fresh spirit into the development of international relations. A unique situation has taken shape enabling the dangerous course of events to be broken and the movement toward the nuclear abyss halted and reversed. The fresh wind from the East has blown out of many Western people's minds the old stereotypes about the "aggressive Soviet Union." "Mistrust of the Soviet bloc has been dramatically reduced since Gorbachev has been at the helm in Moscow," NATO experts complain. But the FRG's WESTFAELISCHE RUNDSCHAU attests that "the population's readiness to sacrifice its own interests for the sake of the Defense Ministry's plans has sharply dropped under the influence of disarmament signals from the USSR side."

West Europeans are protesting about NATO strategists' attempts to drive world development into the old, hackneyed rut of militarism. "We regard NATO maneuvers as frank provocation, contrary to the prevailing global trend of strengthening detente, stability, and security," Helge Hagelund, one of the leaders of the Norwegian antiwar movement, stated recently. "We must respond to the Soviet Union's desire to secure a reduction in tension in the north of Europe, not in words but in deeds, with equally constructive initiatives rather than with an increase in the number of exercises and a buildup in the scale of these exercises."

The socialist states are proposing that international relations not be based on military rivalry and the gamble on force. The shoots of the new thinking must be nurtured and the potential of trust in relations between states built up. Only then can the inertia of militarism be overcome and military-political stability and security in Europe and throughout the world consolidated.

'Born Again' UN's Peacekeeping Role Appraised

PM3108091088 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Stanislav Kondrashov "Political Observer's Opinion": "United Nations: Born Again"]

[Excerpts] In the dead sands where for 8 years in succession Iranian and Iraqi soldiers fell dead, the blue color of hope has appeared—the color of the berets and helmets of the UN military observers. Forming an uneven chain, they are now taking their places on the truce line between Iran and Iraq, a line that extends for more than 1,000 km. There are 350 of them. They come from 24 countries. Many flew hastily to Tehran and Baghdad immediately after 8 August, when UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar announced at a Security Council session that from 20 August the warring parties will cease fire, having agreed to implement in full the demands of Resolution 598. The resolution was approved by the Security Council on 20 July 1987. Iraq adopted it immediately. It took Iran a year to take that step.

If you weigh it up purely arithmetically, it comes out rather sparse: 3.5 km of front for every one UN military observer. Moreover they have no powers to enforce the truce. They can only monitor its observance and report "to the chief." Nonetheless a phenomenon of extraordinary importance lies behind their appearance on the front line of virtually the bloodiest regional war the world has known since World War II. Some people are

calling it the rebirth of the United Nations as the chief instrument of peace. Others put it even more strongly—the birth of the United Nations. Because in its 43 years of existence this most important international organization has by no means fully pursued its historic purpose of "sparing future generations the calamities of war," as the first line of its charter declared. Now, favorable conditions appear to be emerging, and I would like to describe some of them.

For the moment, let me remind you that the UN peacemaking efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war are not confined to sending observers. On 25 August, in fulfillment of Resolution 598, Perez de Cuellar met with high-ranking representatives of Iran and Iraq in Geneva. They embarked on talks to turn the truce into a peace. The talks are not likely to be easy, but they are direct talks between yesterday's irreconcilable enemies, at the same table. When Diego Cordovez, the UN secretary general's personal representative, conducted talks, also in Geneva, on questions of an Afghan settlement, the sides—Afghanistan and Pakistan—did not meet face to face. But Cordovez yesterday, and Perez de Cuellar himself today, were basically playing the same role—that of peaceful intermediary between the sides in conflict, with the authority of the United Nations, first and foremost the Security Council, behind them. Cordovez' Afghan mission was very difficult and hard work, but all the same it was successful—the agreements were concluded, and they gave the Soviet Union an acceptable framework for withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, although the Pakistani side is by no means taking the trouble to fulfill scrupulously its commitments on noninterference in the intra-Afghan struggle. [passage omitted]

But let me return to the subject of the rebirth of the United Nations. True, in the Iran-Iraq war both sides were tired and exhausted, and it was only from inertia, so to speak, that they were tossing more and more portions of cannon fodder into the mincing machine, firing rockets at cities, and poisoning the civilian population with toxic gases (which UN experts impotently confirmed). But nowhere else but in the United Nations could they signal, with minimum loss of face, their readiness to cease fire and end the war. Resolution 598 stood the test of time and demonstrated (if this is not tempting fate!) its viability. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar showed patience, circumspection, and persistence—those essential qualities for the main administrative official of the United Nations. The five permanent members of the Security Council, which, under the Charter, bears the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, reaffirmed their adherence in principle to the political settlement of the conflict. With this support, Perez de Cuellar had the necessary freedom of action.

Those are the components that made up this specific UN success.

This should be placed in a broader context. The renaissance of the United Nations is rightly linked to the general improvement in the international climate. First and foremost this is due to the improvement in a central area of international life—Soviet-American relations. By signing the Washington treaty the two powers took the first steps in the sphere of real nuclear disarmament, and they are now working on going at least halfway in the direction of a nuclear-free world. The increased exchanges and agreements indicate that the once frozen currents in bilateral relations have been set in motion. Progress is difficult in the extremely important sphere of human rights, where the differences arise directly from the different nature of the two systems, but even here the sector of practical understanding is widening and the sector of polemical annoyance is narrowing. And, finally, the participants in the Soviet-American dialogue are more and more actively engaged in the quest to unblock regional conflicts. Here the United Nations helps them in their efforts, while they, in turn, release its potential, so to speak, and provide scope for its latent peacemaking energy. Not to exaggerate the role of the two powers, the improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and China, and also between the West and China, should also be included in the world context that is currently favorable to the United Nations.

Soviet foreign policy has undergone very dynamic and constructive changes in recent years. By taking more account of the interests of our partners in international life, we infect them with a reciprocal desire for collaboration. In declaring its strategic goal to be the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, the Soviet leadership specifies that this system should and will be formed mainly through increasing the role and effectiveness of the United Nations.

In relation to the peacekeeping operations, this course means not a skeptical, but a positive attitude, not ostensible, but practical participation, and entirely concrete initiatives. There is the question, for instance, of stepping up the activity of the Military Staff Committee, which was established by the UN Charter but has been virtually inactive for more than 4 decades, and holding a session of this committee at the level of the chiefs of general staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, possibly with the participation of their colleagues from other interested countries. The institution of UN military observers could be used as a kind of peaceful "preventive" system to help avoid conflicts.

Moscow is ready for constructive cooperation with the Western countries in the Committee of Thirty-Three (the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations that has existed since 1965) with a view to drawing up detailed "guiding principles" for peacekeeping operations, and is ready to take part in implementing the proposal to create a reserve of UN military observers and armed forces.

It is proposed to extend the sphere of the UN secretary general's initiative and actions, though not, of course, to the detriment of the Security Council's powers.

Thus not only in the general political plane, but also in the strictly practical plane our country attaches increasing significance to UN peacekeeping operations.

The financial aspect of the matter is not ignored. Formerly we opened our purse for UN operations reluctantly, and by no means always. Now we pay punctually, even to meet old debts, contributing tens of millions of dollars to fulfill old, but formerly unacknowledged, financial commitments—for instance, to maintain the interim UN forces in Lebanon.

A few weeks ago Perez de Cuellar stated in an interview for NEWSWEEK magazine: "I was pleasantly surprised to learn that the Soviet Union has decided to give us not only political, but also financial support... The Soviets realize that you cannot declare the desire for the United Nations to play an important role, and then deny it the necessary resources."

At the same time the Americans, as the main contributor to the UN budget (25 percent of the entire budget), are evading their financial commitments. Their total debt in terms of regular subscriptions and the financing of peacekeeping operations is in excess of half a billion dollars. The U.S. Congress, imposing a ban on payment, now bears the main blame for the fact that "the successful peacemaker is standing with its hand outstretched." That is how one British newspaper metaphorically depicted the present UN problems. Tens of millions of dollars are required for the operation to send UN observers to Iran and Iraq. Hundreds of millions will be needed when the United Nations turns its efforts to Namibia. This, the financial aspect, must necessarily be numbered among the components of its success. It pays dividends in the interests of the peoples.

The United Nations is a mirror on the changing world. But a mirror which is itself capable of transforming the object that it reflects. Experiencing for itself the favorable changes in the international atmosphere, the United Nations is called upon to consolidate and develop them through the collaboration of the member states that call themselves, not for nothing, the United Nations.

United States & Canada

SDI Becomes Presidential Campaign Issues

PM0109112788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Shalnev dispatch under the "Facts, Events, Opinions" rubric: "United States. While the Candidates Are Arguing..."]

[Text] Washington—Senator Dan Quayle, the Republican U.S. vice presidential candidate, has stated that the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty must be either revised and rewritten or repudiated. In an interview with THE WASHINGTON TIMES, the senator did not conceal that this is necessary in order to facilitate the process of creating and deploying the "Star Wars" system.

The day this interview appeared, I heard the same words from Edward Teller, who is considered not only one of the creators of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, but also as the "begetter" of SDI. Speaking at the headquarters of the Heritage Foundation, an extremely conservative organization wielding quite powerful influence on the incumbent administration on questions of military and foreign policy, E. Teller said: "I am always profoundly alarmed by treaties banning things that have not even been invented yet. That kind of treaty should be avoided. This also applies to the ABM Treaty. But what can be done when they have already been signed? Forget them and move on."

How can you move on? Teller, who spent several years working in the Livermore Laboratory in California on the creation of a nuclear-pumped laser for SDI, has an answer to this: "You must try to deploy what has already been created."

Teller predicts that this deployment may take place within the next 4 years. "But an appropriate Washington administration is needed for this." These words from a scientist and physicist, who—as many people in Washington's corridors of power admit—was one of the people who urged President Reagan to adopt the decision to develop SDI, were greeted with applause.

It is clear what kind of administration Teller has in mind. Nonetheless I would prefer to clarify this. In a short conversation I had with him, the scientist said the following: "One of the candidates has said that SDI is a deception, the other has said: 'Let's try it'."

The first candidate is Dukakis, the Democratic contender, the second is Bush, the Republican.

Incidentally, there have recently been many disputes over an interview that Bush gave to THE NEW YORK TIMES in which—to many people's surprise—he refrained from unconditionally and unquestioningly supporting SDI. What is behind this caution? Do the vice president's statements mean that he is departing from the traditional position held by the Republican administration, which was unequivocally confirmed in the election platform adopted by the ruling party at its recent convention in New Orleans? I think that clarification and explanations will come from Bush.

But what does Teller think about the interview? The scientist does not attach particular importance to it, believing that the reporter who wrote the account for THE NEW YORK TIMES could have changed the emphasis.

It is indeed possibly premature to make a final assessment of the interview that caused the stir. But these are practical rather than theoretical matters. In one of its recent bulletins the Heritage Foundation, which has at its disposal the richest sources of information in the Reagan administration, reported: Soon Reagan will adopt a decision on the question of whether or not to deploy 100 ballistic missile interceptors in the region of Grand Forks, North Dakota. The deployment of the interceptors would be the first phase in the creation of a national strategic defense system. Subsequent phases may include the deployment of space-based systems. According to Robert Everett, leader of the Pentagon military-technical administration subunit dealing with SDI, the first phase system may be designed in 2 years and deployed by the mid-1990's.

As we can see, Teller's forecast concerning the "next 4 years" is not groundless.

But what do people in the administration itself say? I turned to General Edward Rowny, special adviser to the president and the secretary of state on arms reduction talks, showed him the Heritage Foundation bulletin, and asked him to elaborate on when the president would make his decision and what that decision would be.

The general replied that he did not want to discuss this in public and that we just have "to wait and everything will become clear."

So, the decision is really not far off.

'Intervention' in Revolutionary Russia Viewed

PM0109110188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Shalnev: "Logical Finale"]

[Excerpts] New York—The State Department and the Defense Department listened to me attentively and politely showed me out. It seems that there was no one in the huge apparatuses of these two Washington departments who could say even a few words about what happened in the Soviet Far East exactly 70 years ago. As if the events of those years had precisely nothing to do with the United States.

I went about it another way—I turned to the archives of the New York Public Library. Amazing: In this most rich archive where, it seems, anything can be found, there was virtually nothing on the subject which interested me. Even in those sizeable, thick books where the history of all the military operations ever carried out by the United States are examined in detail, virtually step by step, there were at best a few lines on this operation. [passage omitted]

U.S. forces were active in the Soviet Far East for almost 2 years. Only in April 1920 did then U.S. President Wilson consider the further presence of the forces "impractical." As F. Shuman, a professor at Chicago University, explained in his work, this was impractical because "despite all the efforts of the Entente and the Americans, the Whites suffered one defeat after another."

"The U.S. expedition to Siberia," Shuman writes, "failed just as ignominiously as the one sent to Arkhangelsk. Both were sent to Russia on the pretext of showing the Russians the way to peace and democracy."

It remains to be added that the ignominious finale of U.S. intervention against revolutionary Russia was logical: There is no force capable of stopping a people who have chosen their future.

... As I was finishing this article, someone from the Pentagon called me. The caller introduced himself as Lieutenant Colonel John Chapel, an official of the U.S. Army "public relations" department. He asked how he might be of help, and stopped short when I asked him to comment on events which had occurred 70 years ago, and then said: "That's all history."

But over the last 70 years has U.S. willingness to send its forces to any part of the planet when Washington thinks that this accords with the interests of national security really diminished? Is it so rare that, on the pretext of putting other peoples on the "right path," the "path of democracy and freedom," the United States has launched and still launches operations directed at undermining and overthrowing regimes that do not suit Washington?

"That's all history, all that is in the distant past," the lieutenant colonel from the Pentagon tried to persuade me.

If only it were....

China

Rogachev, Qian Qichen Discuss Cambodia

LD0109192288 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Beijing September 1 TASS—Igor Rogachev, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, visiting here, was received by Qian Qichen, Chinese minister of foreign affairs, on September 1. The results of the Soviet-Chinese working meeting on the Kampuchean problem was summed up during the conversation.

The Soviet representative said that, as was shown by the working meeting, the Soviet Union and China are interested in the earliest and fair settlement of the regional conflict concerning Kampuchea on the basis of the balance of interests of the parties. Pointed out was the importance of the achieved mutual understanding that the two countries can in practice promote a settlement of the external aspects of the Kampuchean problem while the internal aspects will be tackled only by the Khmers themselves.

Qian Qichen expressed satisfaction in connection with the constructive work done by the participants in the meeting and pointed out that it revealed some points of contact in the position of the sides. He also emphasized that to solve the Kampuchean problem is a common desire of the two countries.

The need for further efforts to overcome divergences of opinion on a number of important aspects of a settlement in Indochina was pointed out during the conversation in which Tian Zengpei, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the PRC, and V. Fedotov, charge d'affaires ad interim of the USSR to the PRC, took part.

Talks on S.E. Asia 'Constructive'

LD0109165588 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Beijing September 1 TASS—A Soviet-Chinese working meeting was held in Beijing from August 28 to September 1 on issues of settling the situation relating to Kampuchea in keeping with a mutual agreement.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei took part in the meeting.

The Soviet representative was received by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

Both sides stressed the importance of defusing the conflict situation relating to Kampuchea and declared the intention to facilitate the process of political settlement given the understanding that its domestic aspect should be handled by the Kampucheans themselves.

The meeting's participants positively assessed the holding of the informal meeting on the Kampuchean issues in Jakarta, which reflected the current world trend towards resolving regional conflicts by way of negotiations and dialogue.

The sides stressed the usefulness of the exchange of views which helped clarify each other's positions and made it possible to advance in broadening the sphere in which the two viewpoints were identical.

They also stated the remaining differences on several aspects of Kampuchean settlement.

The meeting was held in a business-like, frank and constructive atmosphere.

Chinese Friendship Delegate Recalls Soviet Visit

PM0109145388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Aug 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Longstanding Bonds of Friendship"]

[Text] Beijing, 30 Aug—RENMIN RIBAO has published the impressions of Wu Xiuquan, chairman of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, who has returned from a trip around the Soviet Union as part of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society delegation.

China and the USSR are two neighboring states, and their peoples have long-standing traditional bonds of friendship, the author wrote. The Chinese people ardently welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the difficult years of the Chinese revolution, the USSR gave a great deal of assistance to China. Soviet forces made a huge contribution to liberating the country's northeast from the Japanese militarists, he recalled.

Wu Xiuquan noted that "the visit to the country of Great October made a deep impression on the delegation members." We are personally convinced that the social climate of Soviet society has became noticeably more lively. We hope that the Soviet people will overcome all the difficulties and obstacles in the path of restructuring and will achieve even greater success.

The author expressed the hope that stable relations of friendship and good-neighborliness between the Chinese and Soviet peoples will be established and will develop for many years to come. This will accord with the two countries' fundamental interests and will assist in securing peace and stability in Asia and throughout the world, he stressed.

Chinese Specialists Debate New Soviet Policy

PM0109113888 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Candidate of Historical Sciences S. Goncharov article: "The Difficult Path to Mutual Understanding: New Political Thinking Through the Eyes of Chinese Scientists"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In recent years questions connected with the new thinking in Soviet policy have, it is no exaggeration to say, become a central theme in debates among Chinese specialists in international affairs. The author of this article comments briefly on the content of these debates, drawing on publications in the PRC press and conversations with Chinese colleagues.

For Chinese specialists, the discussion of problems of the USSR's foreign policy has particular relevance and topicality. For more than 20 years Soviet-Chinese relations were extremely tense, sometimes reaching the state of "confrontation along the entire front." This situation left a substantial mark on the ideas of the Chinese about our country's domestic and foreign policy, and was expressed, in particular, in the concept of "Soviet hegemonism." According to this concept, from the second half of the sixties the USSR began to pursue a "global expansionist strategy" aimed at achieving military and geopolitical superiority in the "struggle for world hegemony" with the other "hegemonist superpower"—the United States. "Hegemonism" was declared in China to be the basic content of the foreign policy of both the United States and the USSR; whereas in the United States it arose from its "imperialist essence," in the Soviet Union it arose from the "distortion and neglect of the principles of socialist foreign policy."

The Chinese were inclined to explain virtually every event taking place in the international arena in terms of "defensive" or "offensive" actions by the United States and the USSR in their "global struggle for hegemony in the world"; the basic task of all progressive forces in the world (China included) was seen first and foremost in the "struggle against the hegemonism of the superpowers."

The question of how justified (in both form and content) the Chinese ideas on "Soviet hegemonism" were is interesting in itself and merits a special analysis. But here, what is far more important is something else: The emergence of the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy has presented Chinese specialists with an urgent task of reinterpreting their former views and working out a new outlook on the USSR's international activity.

Immediately after the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum Chinese specialists in international affairs set about analyzing the possible changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy in connection with our country's adoption of the strategy of acceleration of socioeconomic development and the course of radical economic reform. Up until the 27th CPSU Congress China was mainly describing and interpreting the USSR's international activity according to the traditional concepts of "defense" and "aggression." It was concluded, in particular, that in the next few years, in its "global confrontation with the United States," the Soviet Union could adopt, on the whole, "more defensive" positions than formerly, in order to concentrate its efforts on tackling domestic problems, but that the USSR would still retain its "aggressiveness" in regional conflicts in the Third World.

After the 27th CPSU Congress the idea of major tactical changes in the USSR's foreign policy became generally accepted in the Chinese press. It began to be described as "cautious," "restrained," "more flexible" than before, "more effective and realistic," with the emphasis not on military-political methods, but on diplomatic and economic methods.

At the same time numerous articles began to appear in Chinese scientific and sociopolitical journals and central and local newspapers systematically setting forth the basic theoretical premises of the new thinking, and extracts from major speeches by Soviet leaders on international problems were widely published.

At this stage Chinese political scientists already faced the task of comprehensively studying the theory and practice of the USSR's present-day foreign policy. The very seriousness of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union posed a pressing demand for a switch from identifying "defensive" and "offensive" components in Soviet strategy to analyzing the underlying, fundamental causes of the changes taking place in it and assessing whether this policy is a gussied-up continuation of the former course, or whether it is fundamentally different in nature.

One peculiarity of the disputes that took place among Chinese international specialists soon after the 27th CPSU Congress was that many publications stressed that in the Soviet Union the theory of foreign policy has begun to outstrip the practice, and certain important theoretical provisions that deserve a positive assessment are not confirmed in actions. Appeals were made at that time in many Chinese publications for a "cautious attitude" to the new thinking, because it contains "many words, but not much action," and is possibly propagandist in nature to a significant degree.

From the second half of 1987, a new stage began in the Chinese scientists' assessment of the new thinking, and it continues to this day (although, of course, the precise timing of such stages can be defined only purely hypothetically). It was characterized, first, by the fact that the analysis of the Soviet new thinking reached a new, conceptual level, at which Chinese specialists began to draw up precise evaluations of the USSR's present-day foreign policy; and second, by the further polarization of views between different groups of specialists.

A whole series of factors helped to deepen the debates on the significance of the new thinking.

At the end of 1987, largely thanks to the USSR's constructive position, it was possible to sign the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles; in the first half of this year the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan were signed, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country began. These two events were important evidence that the principles of the new thinking are not merely proclaimed, but are also put into practice, which greatly influenced those people in China who formerly were inclined to regard these principles as "propaganda." M.S. Gorbachev's book "Restructuring and the New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World" was published in a mass edition in the PRC at the end of last year, and has already gone through several reprints. This book gave Chinese scientists the opportunity to form a fairly comprehensive impression of the ideas of the new thinking; it was at the center of attention not only among specialists, but also among wide circles of readers (first and foremost the intelligentsia), and it was discussed at special conferences in such prestigious scientific centers as Beijing University, the People's University, and a whole series of research institutes. Moreover there has recently been a dramatic increase, in China, in the interest in theoretical works by Soviet scientists specializing in international affairs and the new conclusions being drawn in their articles and books. People in the PRC watch with particular attention the critical assessments that appear in our press of previous Soviet foreign policy—as a rule detailed accounts of such items are published in the central Chinese newspapers.

Many nuances have now become apparent in Chinese scientists' assessments of the new political thinking, but they all boil down to differences on the main question: the nature of the changes in the USSR's foreign policy—"tactical" or "strategic." Basically some specialists seek to show that the Soviet Union is continuing its former "hegemonist" policy by new means ("tactical" changes), while others stress that fundamental changes are taking place and the USSR's foreign policy is ceasing to be "hegemonist" ("strategic" changes).

The appearance of such disagreements is in itself very significant—after all, only a few years ago the thesis of "Soviet hegemonism" was not subjected to the slightest doubts in China.

Those who support the view that the changes in the USSR's international activity are "tactical" in nature emphasize the unchanging "strategic course of the Soviet Union, aimed at confrontation with the United States." In their opinion the main aim of restructuring in our country is the desire to maintain the USSR's "superpower" status, to which end it is necessary significantly to improve the level of economic, scientific, and technical development. To fulfill this task the USSR needs a "breathing space," and therefore will for a certain time show "restraint" and "flexibility" in the international arena. After strengthening its economic base the Soviet Union will unleash with new force a "struggle against the United States for hegemony in the world in the 21st century," and now this will not simply be an arms race or geopolitical confrontation, but "competition in the overall might of states." On the strength of this, certain specific steps by the Soviet Union recently (in the sphere of disarmament, the elimination of regional conflicts, and so forth) merit approval, but must ultimately be assessed as new tactics in implementing the old strategy. This view has existed in China virtually since the beginning of restructuring in our country, and the evolution of its advocates' views consists mainly in the fact that they acknowledge to an increasing extent the profound and long-term nature of the "tactical changes" in Soviet foreign policy.

The adherents of views on the "strategic" nature of the changes that have already happened or are still only planned work on the basis that the Soviet Union, reinterpreting the experience of the past and reevaluating the realities of the modern world, is bringing its foreign policy fully into line with its nature as a socialist state. In the opinion of these scientists the revolutionary nature of the domestic changes in the USSR inevitably entails equally profound changes in foreign policy. In this respect it is logical for the USSR to renounce claims to a monopoly of the truth and manifestations of great-power status, and to seek to reckon with its partners' interests. The Soviet Union's foreign policy based on the new thinking not only serves domestic policy by creating a favorable international situation for restructuring and freeing additional funds for its needs, it is at the same time an important factor stimulating internal transformations.

The supporters of this view note that as a great power the USSR has legitimate interests in the international arena (including the country's security interests). If the Soviet Union, as the new thinking presupposes, is to uphold these interests not at the expense of other countries' interests, but on the basis of the principles of equality and noninterference in other people's affairs, then the USSR's actions can in no way be called "hegemonist."

The scientists who hold such views note that there are many obstacles in the path of the implementation of the principles of the new thinking (connected first and foremost with the fact that by no means all the Western partners are inclined to be guided by these principles in their policy) and that the process of putting the new thinking into practice will be long and complex and will depend largely on the success of restructuring within the country. In this connection they warn against getting carried away with optimism about the new thinking, because its proclamation is not in itself capable of resolving all the practical problems. At the same time the supporters of this view agree that the new thinking not only promotes the eradication of "hegemonism" from the USSR's foreign policy, but is an important factor in improving the situation throughout the world. According to our observations, the number of supporters of this view among Chinese scientists and their influence have been gradually increasing recently.

It is not hard to see that the depth of understanding and the positive assessments of the ideas of the new thinking in China are growing as this system of views and its practical implementation develop. For all the differences, sometimes major, among Chinese specialists, one thing is beyond doubt: The new thinking has made the USSR's foreign policy more comprehensible, more predictable, and utlimately more acceptable to China.

It appears that the further development of the new thinking and its implementation—including its implementation in the practice of Soviet-Chinese relations—will increasingly promote the development of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and mutual trust between the two countries. Such an atmosphere favors the formation of Soviet-Chinese ties based on the principles of good-neighborliness, equality, and mutual advantage. The practice of contacts with a great country like China could in turn enrich our new thinking with a considerable number of new ideas.

Chinese Economist's Reform Recipes Noted

PM0109111988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Savenkov report under the rubric "Economic Reform": "Li Yining's Six Points"]

[Text] Beijing—An increase in prices is the cost which the Chinese Government must ultimately pay to successfully carry out price reforms. Any measures to control the growth artificially can, of course, slow down this process for a short time, but they only exacerbate the problem.

This is the view of one of China's leading economists, Li Yining, a professor at Beijing University. In his view, price reforms should be implemented step by step. Moreover, prices should be coordinated with workers' wages, which in turn should depend on enterprises' economic results. Teachers and state employees should receive subsidies from the state and enjoy more opportunities for promotion and wage increases.

The price reforms, Li Yining believes, need laws and rules which will ensure honest competition and consumers' rights. At a recent meeting with foreign correspondents accredited to Beijing, Li Yining drew attention to six points which, in his view, are the main features of a description of the economic situation in China.

First, the failure of economic reform can be attributed primarily to the failure of price reforms, and the roots of success (this is the second point) lie in competently solving the problem of ownership reform. In his view, the old kind of social ownership is out of date. A new type is essential—a joint-stock system controlled by the state (the stocks belong to the enterprises) or the collective (stocks are bought within the enterprise by the workers and employees).

In order to make the new form of ownership dynamic, developed stock markets are needed, including the sale of stocks to individual persons "outside" (for the time being, shares can be purchased only on a small scale). Is there a danger that capitalism will return? There is no danger, Li Yining believes; the vast majority of shares will belong to the state and the collective. Moreover, at the initial stage of socialism in China, the main factor to which attention should be drawn is whether the economic methods accord with the aims of the country's development. The third point: efficiency above all. It

must be given priority over so-called equality (leveling, in fact). "If there is efficiency, there is no leveling; and if there is leveling, there is no efficiency. This is the reality."

Fourth, all economic problems must be resolved in the market, and the government should intervene only in those cases where the market is powerless.

Fifth, China's economic future: strong enterprises and competent professional entrepreneurs (in the countryside—farmers). And, finally, the sixth point: The state must formulate a rational system for obtaining income by taxing individual and private enterprises.

A reversion under the pretext of "stabilization" to the traditional system of edict management of the economy whereby enterprises were an adjunct of the administrative mechanism, Li Yining believes, presents a serious danger to reform, because the practice of traditional methods, particularly at the local level, is very strong.

Private Airline Set Up in Heilongjiang Province

LD0109184088 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1444 GMT 31 Aug 88

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Vladimir Tsvetov]

[Text] Here is a report from Chinese television. In Heilongjiang Province, in the northeast of China, a new airline has started operating—Mudanjiang General Air, the newsreader says. The airline was set up by a local peasant, Den Jengor, who did not know how to use the 2 million yuan earned, it must be assumed, thanks to family contracting. Now the peasant has at his disposal two AN-2 aircraft of Chinese manufacture. So far they are spraying local fields. Den Jengor is proposing to buy another eight aircraft of the latest design, and is thinking of expanding his airline's area of activity.

We would like to draw the attention of Aeroflot staff to this report. Don't wait for Igor Kirillov or Anna Shatilova [Vremya newsreaders] to tell you in the Vremya program, comrades, about the creation of a peasant airline in our country. After all, family contracting is growing in strength. Such a report would mean the end of Aeroflot's monopoly position and the first step toward its bankruptcy. So you'd better improve your service to passengers now.

Northeast Asia

Japan Seeks Role of 'Mighty Military Power'

[Biryukov]

LD0109202688 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The two dates, September 1 and 2, will apparently sear the peoples' memory for long with grief over the irretrievable losses, embitterment by unused opportunities to prevent human tragedy, and reminder to all the living of the need to preserve peace on earth.

It is customary to think that September 1 was precisely the date of the outbreak of the Second World War which claimed a toll of more than 50 million human lives. This is so if one judges by the well-known events in Europe. In essence, the first spark causing the universal military conflagration was the occupation of north-east China by Japan in 1931-1932 and by the subsequent aggression in central China. In Europe the flame of war was put out on the May days of 1945 whereas in the Asian theatre of operations the aggressor was defeated only on the first days of autumn.

The date on which the instrument of unconditional surrender was signed by representatives of militarist Japan, September 2, is not marked in that country. Tokyo marks, rather the date of the radio address by the Japanese emperor on August 15 when he announced the acceptance of the demand by the partners of the anti-Hitler coalition for an unconditional surrender. The date is marked, actually, not as the end of the world war started by militarist Japan, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy but almost as an official prayer for the repose of 'heroes who gave their lives for the native land'. The main war criminals who bear direct responsibility for unleashing the war are overtly reckoned among such 'heroes' in recent years.

Judging by visits being made these days by Japanese Government members to the Yasukuni Temple, where those criminals were canonised, Tokyo continues to worship the idols of militarism nowadays, 43 years since the end of the war.

Depriving the younger generation of memories, Tokyo makes efforts to whitewash the Japanese aggression and crimes perpetrated during the years of the Second World War, and calls for a revision of the results of the post-war set-up in the Far East, the results which Japan accepted by signing the instrument of surrender. The most important thing is that, in disregard for the fundamental law of the country, Tokyo openly makes efforts to turn Japan into a mighty military power by manipulating the pre-war propagandist cliches about a mythical "threat from the north".

Some people in the West and particularly in the United States are fond of speaking of Japan as a 'free of charge rider' of the Western military alliance. This was true in the long gone years whereas nowadays the state of things is different.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Karl Jackson, speaking at a news conference on Wednesday, emphasized that nowadays such a view on Japan is erroneous. He pointed out that over the past decade Japan had been

annually increasing its military budget by five per cent. This year it will amount to almost 30,000 million dollars and will possibly run already at 31,000-32,000 million dollars next year, which in absolute terms will exceed the military budgets of the USA's such traditional allies as Britain, France, and West Germany. And this is not just percentage, he emphasized. By the year 1990 Japan will have 60 destroyers, 100 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft, 200 F-15, 100 F-4 planes and, according to rough estimates, 100 FSX aircraft, although it is not clear so far when they will be phased into service since a respective program is only in the process of implementation. Mr Jackson said that thereby the changes that took place over the past ten years altered the estimate of forces directed against the Soviet Union.

Tokyo's policy of speeded-up military preparations, and Japan's increasing involvement in the U.S. confrontational strategy, including that in the reckless strategy of 'nuclear deterrence' run counter to the national interests of Japan and to the interests of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It gives rise to increasing concern among the masses of the Japanese people, and arouse natural anxiety among Japan's neighbours.

Vorotnikov Greets Soviet-Japanese Parley

PM3108134188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Aug 88 Second Edition p 1

[Greetings message from V. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers: "To the Participants in the 10th Meeting of Chairmen of USSR Kray and Oblast Soviet Ispolkoms and Japanese Governors"; date and place of message not given]

[Text] The RSFSR Council of Ministers greets the participants in the 10th meeting of chairmen of USSR kray and oblast soviet ispolkoms and Japanese governors.

I would like to express confidence that the main focus at the 10th meeting in Moscow will be devoted to deepening mutual understanding between the Soviet and Japanese peoples, and that your meeting will make a contribution to the development of good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

The RSFSR Government hopes that the top representatives of Soviet and Japanese local administrations gathered in Moscow will find ways of deepening cooperation in the most varied spheres, including the sphere of mutually advantageous trade and economic relations.

The meeting could play a positive role in possibly pooling efforts aimed at strengthening security in the Far East and Pacific region, and in maintaining international peace as a whole. The new political thinking which is becoming a determining factor in modern political life opens up broad opportunities for this.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers wishes success to the participants in the 10th meeting of chairmen of USSR kray and oblast soviet ispolkoms and Japanese governors in Moscow.

[Signed] V. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers

DPRK-ROK Parliamentarians' Contacts Welcomed

PM3108155388 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 30 Aug 88 p 3

[Sergey Kukhar "Commentator's Opinion": "Panmunjom, August"]

[Text] Preliminary talks between representatives of the DPRK and South Korea were held in the settlement of Panmunjom on the Military Demarcation Line that divides the Korean peninsula. Their aim is to prepare for a North-South interparliamentary conference.

The current dialogue in Panmunjom became possible in many respects due to the constructive initiative submitted by Pyongyang. This consists mainly of a letter from the chairman of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Standing Council to the chairman of South Korea's National Assembly. Inter alia, this letter proposed including on the agenda of the upcoming interparliamentary meeting the discussion of a joint declaration of nonaggression and of problems linked with organizing the 1988 summer Olympics.

Judging by the results of the meeting in Panmunjom or—more precisely—judging by the DPRK delegation's assessment of them, the South Korean side has not yet shown a readiness to reach accords. Nevertheless, talks have taken place, and there will be a new round of talks in the future—in October. It became known that the DPRK proposed a draft agreement for a meeting on the 38th parallel. By and large, the information coming from Panmunjom is quite sparse, and that is why no hasty conclusions must be drawn.

All the same, the very fact of such contacts must be regarded positively. The resumption of inter-Korean dialogue after quite a long time promises its participants not only propaganda laurels. A reasonable compromise could bring palpable advantages for the entire Korean people, especially a reduction in tension on the Korean peninsula.

Soviet Yachtsmen Sail for Seoul Olympics

LD0109145988 Moscow TASS in English 1144 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Vladivostok September 1 TASS—The "Mikhail Sholokhov", a comfortable passenger motor vessel, sailed out from Vladivostok to South Korea today. It will carry to Seoul, venue of the 24th Olympics, the first

group of Soviet athletes—the USSR yachting team who trained here for a week to get prepared for the important competitions at the Olympics.

Commission Head Murakhovskiy Meets Batmonh
LD0109182988 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 31 Aug 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The 34th session of the Soviet-Mongolian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation has opened in Ulaanbaatar. Jambyn Batmonh received Comrade Murakhovskiy, chairman of the Soviet part of the commission and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who has arrived to take part in its work.

During a friendly conversation particular attention was focused upon questions of the further broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous economic relations between the two countries. Certain problems of cooperation in agriculture, planning, and capital construction, the development of the fuel and power complex, and of enterprises in the mining industry were discussed.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Background to Burma Situation Examined
BK0109131788 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 1 Sep 88

[NOVOE VREMYA "Article" by Vladimir Vasilyev, historian and specialist on Burma—dated "2 September"]

[Text] It appeared as if the situation in Burma was stable for many years. But, the problems that had plagued the economic and political structures and had being growing steadily suddenly burst into the open after U Ne Win's resignation.

There were positive achievements following 1962, and they cannot be ruled out. Many progressive socioeconomic reforms were introduced and implemented. Farmers started getting rights to till land, the educational system became extensively developed, and free medical care became more effective. It is also common knowledge that factories and mills were nationalized and foreign companies were removed. But the key questions to raise here are: Did these reforms work? Do they help in the development of the economy?

In the mid-1980's, many economic enterprises in the country started to falter, and production levelled off in some of them. Rice production could not be boosted, and with the type of machinery installed in factories, prospects for increasing production became impossible. Since oil production failed to meet even the modest needs of the country, it had to be imported. Shortage of raw materials, spares, and fuel oil stalled mining and manufacturing industries. The decline in world's rice price particularly reduced Burma's income from its exports. It therefore had to cut down on its imports—spare parts, fuel, medicines, and other commodities.

Foreign debt today amounts to about $3.8 billion. Foreign debt servicing utilizes more than half of the country's income every year. The inflation rate in the meantime soared to new heights. As Burma's per capita income was less than $200, the United Nations included Burma in the list of least developed countries at the end of 1987.

Although it should be acknowledged that Burma's economy was affected by the causes similar to those of the majority of the other developing countries, Dr Vasilyev says it is necessary to seek the key causes that contributed to those troubles within that country.

Firstly, it was the coupling of the government's excessive control over the backward economy with the method of giving commands or the bureaucratic management. Secondly, it was the suppression of the private economy even without which was already weak and tottering. Practically closing the door on the world and completely banning foreign investments and joint ventures are also the causes. Professor Vasilyev remarked that introducing revolutionary reforms to an underdeveloped economy particularly without massive support from abroad will not bring about much benefit, and it shouldn't be recommended. It is essential to develop the backward economy first and to create vast opportunities for the productive forces to develop. Otherwise, the reforms will only amount to moving one backward area to the other.

It wasn't that the Burmese leadership did not know about the economic difficulties. It was that they talked about it only in the second half of the 1980's. Last September, the Burmese authorities decontrolled nine commodities including rice. It was believed that the move would encourage the farmers to increase their production and to sell their produce to the cities. The government even allowed private traders to export. But, at the same time, it demonetized high value currency notes without any compensation. The move, though directed at blackmarketeers, hit hard ordinary people, entrepreneurs who had earned their money legally, and the traders. This resulted in unrest among the students and the people of other strata which started erupting in many places. The ruthless suppression of the masses during the 17-day rule of U Sein Lwin angered the people, particularly the students.

Many believe that advancement of democracy cannot be expected in Asian countries because historically, these countries have not known what democracy is. True, democracy wasn't common among the Asian peoples. But, their dreams for the advancement of democracy and human rights have long been there. The objective is certainly bound to grow. Burma is no exception either. The belief that the declaration of intention to pursue

socialism would resolve all basic problems relating to democracy, is wrong; it is even misleading. This holds particularly true when the state administration is left in the hands of the military.

Soviet Historian Prof Vasilyev concludes his article by quoting a famous British academician on Burma, (Robert Taylor): The Burmese people brought themselves into such a desolate situation, and they will have to strive to free themselves from that mess.

SRV's Nguyen Van Linh on Reform Goals

OW0109044188 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0420 GMT 30 Aug 88

[Interview with SRV General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh from "Vietnam: the Year of the Dragon" documentary directed by Yuriy Meshcheryakov; Nguyen speaks in Vietnamese, fading into Russian translation; no place or date given—recorded]

[Text] [Narrator] Nguyen Van Linh is one of the veterans of the liberation and communist movements of Indochina. He held responsible party posts in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. In December 1986 he became the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee, a position of high responsibility which necessitates care for the country today and consideration for its future.

[Nguyen Van Linh] The Sixth Vietnamese Communist Party Congress evaluated our work positively. At the same time it candidly admitted that serious mistakes were allowed to take place in Vietnam. Objective conformity to socialist developments was not adhered to. Our aim today is to achieve deep renewal of all areas of life and to better utilize the potential of our country. Presently we are implementing three economic programs—to ensure foodstuffs, make consumer goods available, and develop exports. Presently, the solution of the food problem is the main objective. It is also necessary for us to restructure the entire economic mechanism. Furthermore, it is very important to rid the party of those who have compromised themselves, who are not worthy of being called a communist. We intend to improve all social relations. The first steps have been taken. These show promise.

Laos General Secretary Leaves After Holiday

LD0109202488 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0230 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Kaysone Phomvihan, general secretary of the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lao People's Democratic Republic left the USSR on 31 August. He had been in our country on holiday at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Near East & South Asia

Talks With Israelis Urge International Conference

LD0109163888 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—A working meeting of representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and Israel has been held in Paris at the request of the Israeli side. This was reported at a briefing here today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The meeting was held within the framework of contacts being held by the USSR with the sides concerned to further the idea of convocation of an international conference on the Middle East and elucidation of the Soviet stand on that question.

"The Soviet side denounced the Israeli authorities' repressive policy against civilians on the occupied Arab lands, killings, wholesale arrests and deportation of Palestinians from their native soil", said the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry. "At the meeting the Soviet delegation underlined that these actions were incompatible with international law norms, the U.N. resolutions and provisions of the Geneva convention on protection of civilians in wartime".

At the Paris meeting the Soviet side expressed the hope that Israeli ruling circles would support the international efforts aimed at attaining a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict. Convocation for the purpose of an international conference with the participation of all sides concerned, including Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and also permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

The USSR's stand in the question of normalization of relations with Israel was reaffirmed. Positive development in these relations is possible in the context of settlement in the Middle East, provided the beginning of the work of the international conference," said the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry. [quotation marks as received]

Kapitsa Meets Syrian Assembly Delegation

JN0209083788 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 2 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow—Mikhail Kapitsa, director of the Moscow Oriental Studies Institute, received Nazih Duwaydari, member of the Ba'th Party Central Committee and head of the Syrian People's Assembly delegation to the Soviet Union, in Moscow yesterday. The discussions during the meeting concerned the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and the situation in the Middle East.

The head of the Syrian delegation spoke about the latest developments in the Arab region, stressing that the Syrian Arab Republic under President Hafiz al-Asad is struggling to attain peace on the basis of achieving pan-Arab rights, including the liberation of the occupied territory, and the recognition of the Palestinian Arab people's right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state.

Kapitsa explained the dimensions of the current restructuring campaign in the Soviet Union and its impact on the overall international situation, including the state of affairs in the Middle East. Kapitsa called for reinvigorating the efforts of all international peace-loving forces to defuse the situation in the Middle East and seek a just and lasting solution in this region.

Najibullah Addresses Party Leaders

LD0109174588 Moscow TASS in English 1721 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Kabul September 1 TASS—Coalition government has been ensured in Afghanistan at the level of villages, districts, provinces and central bodies of power on the territory controlled by the state authorities, Afghan President Najibullah said here today.

The Afghan leader, addressing the first meeting of the leaders of the country's political parties, observed that "all new forms of state power with coalition elements that have been created recently show their viability."

"After May 15," he said, "the armed opposition has been imposing war on us and we, regrettably, are being drawn into it ever more actively.

"One should not forget the chief strategic goal of our government—the policy of national reconciliation.

"And if war is being imposed on us, we, in turn, should impose the policy of reconciliation. Above all, it is necessary to press for the cease-fire not only in the country as a whole, but also in individual villages, districts and provinces."

"All parties should display great vigour, militancy in pursuing the policy of reconciliation. All parties and public organisations should act as a single, united front," the president said.

Najibullah noted that the problem of establishing a democratic front remained so far at the initial stage of its solution. The process was hindered by the vestiges of the past, relapses of narrow party approach to national tasks, the aspiration of individual political leaders to settle old accounts and their underestimation of the seriousness of the present-day military-political situation.

The president stressed the need for all parties' participation in organising self-defence neighbourhoods, enterprises and institutions, forming special militarised units of individual parties and establishing control over territories.

Afghanistan's foreign policy should also be based on a multi-party basis, Najibullah said. "This corresponds to the principles of political pluralism and coalition policy.

"In foreign policy work, the parties' attention should be concentrated on the implementation of the Geneva agreements, relations with neighbouring countries and the entire Muslim world, consolidation and development of relations with the Soviet Union.

"Friendship and cooperation with the USSR form the cornerstone of our foreign policy. No political party in Afghanistan, which is truly national, may fail to reckon with that fundamental principle.

"Afghan-Soviet cooperation is an historic, objective necessity, an indispensable condition for our country's independence and neutrality. We should also strive consistently towards the normalisation of relations with the neighbours, above all Pakistan and Iran."

"The earliest cessation of the fratricidal war is the only way towards broad and full democratisation of our society. A totalitarian state is not our ideal, and we will fight till the end against those who are trying to impose it on our people," the president said.

The leaders of the political parties represented at the meeting expressed support for the course towards national reconciliation and their readiness to facilitate in all ways the implementation of that humane policy.

A resolution adopted upon the completion of the meeting expressed principled support for the policy of national reconciliation. It stressed the need for ending combat operations and starting talks between opposing groups and highly assessed the Geneva agreements.

The resolution said that Afghan-Soviet friendship was an important factor of the successful solution of the tasks of Afghanistan's social and economic development and international stability.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Greets Zambia's Kaunda on Reelection

PM0109143788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 88 Second Edition p 2

[Undated M.S. Gorbachev message to Kenneth Kaunda, president of the Zambian United National Independence Party]

[Text] To Comrade Kenneth David Kaunda, president of the Zambian United National Independence Party.

Esteemed Comrade Kenneth David Kaunda,

Please accept my sincere congratulations on your reelection as president of the Zambian United National Independence Party.

I wish you and all members of the party success in the struggle for the triumph of the humanitarian ideals of peace and socialism.

Comradely greetings,

M.S. Gorbachev.

Posibeyev, CPSU Delegation Leave for Ghana

PM3108135988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] In line with the plan of party ties between the CPSU and the Ghanaian Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), a CPSU delegation led by G.A. Posibeyev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Mari CPSU Obkom, has left for Accra.

SWAPO Leader Toivo ya Toivo Interviewed

PM3108135288 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with SWAPO General Secretary Toivo ya Toivo by IZVESTIYA and TASS correspondents M. Pavlov and G. Sobolev: "Toivo ya Toivo: Guarantees Are Necessary for an Agreement"—date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] Luanda—Namibia Day is marked on 26 August. It has been 22 years since Namibia's people, led by their political vanguard, the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), began the armed struggle against the colonial domination of racist South Africa. IZVESTIYA and TASS correspondents asked SWAPO General Secretary Toivo ya Toivo to talk about the prospects for achieving independence for Namibia. [passage omitted]

[Toivo ya Toivo] The situation in the country is complex. The unlawful occupation by South African troops continues. Together with the puppet parties and the "Interim Transitional Government" set up in Windhoek, they carry out repressions against SWAPO members and progressive-minded Namibians. Naturally, this arouses resistance among the country's indigenous population. Patience is so overstretched that even children have risen to the struggle. Since March, schoolchildren and students have been on strike, demanding that the South African troop bases be moved further away from educational institutions. The Pretoria authorities deliberately sited their subunits in this way, knowing that SWAPO would not conduct combat operations in such regions. The students have the support of their parents and teachers.

[Question] SWAPO recently declared a cessation of hostilities against South Africa from Angolan territory. Does this mean the renunciation of the armed struggle?

[Toivo ya Toivo] We agreed not to carry out military operations from Angolan territory in order to promote the peaceful settlement of the situation in southwestern Africa. SWAPO is following the decisions adopted at talks between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, through the mediation of the United States. But at the same time we have no right to ban Namibian patriots from waging an armed struggle against the occupiers on the territory of their own country. We are prepared to conclude an agreement with South Africa on a total cease-fire, but we need guarantees: Pretoria is not fulfilling its commitments in implementing UN Security Coucnil Resolution 435 on granting independence to Namibia, the "Nkomati treaty" with Mozambique, or the Lusaka accords with Angola. That is concrete evidence that South Africa can still hardly be trusted.

[Question] We are interested in the future of your fighters who are in Angola....

[Toivo ya Toivo] From 1 September they will be withdrawn from the border to behind the 16th parallel, as was agreed at the quadripartite talks. In the future we hope that these subunits will come under the temporary control of the UN international forces which, under Resolution 435, are to be stationed on the Angolan-Namibian border. After the elections in our country they will all return home.

[Question] What are the prospects of SWAPO's coming to power in Namibia?

[Toivo ya Toivo] We expect victory, although South Africa is doing everything to prevent it. It is working to create a "united front," in the hope of counterposing SWAPO. But the renegades do not even believe in their own success, while our organization has the people's support.

[Question] What is SWAPO's attitude to the white community living in Namibia?

[Toivo ya Toivo] We are not fighting against the whites, but against colonialists and racial discrimination. We want to take part together with the whites in our country's political life, and to determine its future.

[Question] How do you see that future?

[Toivo ya Toivo] I see Namibia as a nonracial, democratic state based on equal rights for all citizens, including whites. Perhaps over the years Namibia will become socialist, but before then it has a long and difficult path to travel. We must achieve true political and then economic independence. Namibia's economy is linked, or, more accurately, subordinated to South Africa, which cooperates closely with the West. Up to half of our country's gross domestic product annually is transferred to the United States, Britian, Canada, and other capitalist states. Nearly the entire volume of diamonds, zinc, tin, lead, vanadium, tungsten, and other strategic metals is exported to South Africa and the West. Namibia's banking and financial system is entirely dominated by South African and foreign monopolies. Namibia's monetary unit is the South African rand.

We believe that the transnational corporations will have to review the agreements concluded with South Africa and acknowledge our sovereignty. The SWAPO leadership hopes to establish just, mutually advantageous cooperation with them. We also still hope for further aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

U.S. Playing 'Double Game' in Angola

LD0109152688 Moscow in Portuguese to Africa 1830 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Vladimir Petrov commentary]

[Text] The United States intends to double its financial assistance to UNITA [National Union for Total Independence of Angola], the anti-Angola terrorist group. This fresh aid could amount to about $40 million. Congress will examine the respective bill next September, the [name indistinct] information service in Washington said. Here is a commentary by Vladimir Petrov on this subject:

The U.S. stance cannot but be described as a double game. On the one hand it is a mediator in seeking a political settlement in southern Africa; on the other hand, it stokes the fires of the regional conflict. Since the beginning of the quadripartite talks, there have been hopes kindled for an end not only to South Africa's armed aggression against Angola, but also for an end to the terrorist activity of UNITA bandits, who destabilize the situation in the country. The United States, with its aid to UNITA, is in reality planting a mine under a political settlement in southern Africa. Washington knows well the Angolan Government's position on this issue. As Antonio dos Santos Franca, chief of staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, said a few days ago, his country views the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country as being indissolubly linked to the end of U.S. financial and military aid to the Angolan antigovernment group UNITA.

The announcement about the increased aid at the same time as the coming withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola is probably not a coincidence. Washington has decided to enourage the bandits, who are losing the support of South African troops. Judging from everything, the United States has not lost hope of resorting to the UNITA bandits in order to force the People's Republic of Angola to change its political direction. But if Washington cannot do so through its strategic South African ally, it is very unlikely that it will achieve this through the terrorists.

The firm direction of the Angolan Government and its political flexibility enjoy the support of not only the Angolan people, but also of all the independent African countries. Will political realism prevail in Washington? A new and decisive phase of the quadripartite talks is ahead, in which the United States will have to adopt a constructive or a destructive stance. Its double game can scarcely contribute toward a successful political settlement in the southern part of the African Continent.

East Europe

Husak Arrives in Novosibirsk for 2-Day Visit

LD0109174888 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1500 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Gustav Husak, president of the republic, stopped over in Novosibirsk today on his way to China. Jindrich Malota, our special correspondent, reports the following:

[Begin Malota recording] Meeting Gustav Husak, president of the republic, at Novosibirsk airport, was (Vladimir Kozorezov), first secretary of the CPSU Oblast Committee; Valentin Koptyug, president of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and other representatives of political and social life of this area which was a great significance for the economy and scientific development of the whole country. After that, Comrade Husak, accompanied Slovak Premier Peter Colotka, Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, and other personalities left for the building which will become his residence for 2 days.

Novosibirsk is known as a significant center of industry, science, and university education. This fact also determines the agenda of tomorrow's stay. Comrade Husak will first visit the local academic village. Then he will be acquainted with the activity of two local scientific-research institutes. After briefly touring the town, he will meet representatives of the CPSU Oblast Committee. [end recording]

Polish Delegation Visits WWII Combat Sites

LD0209012988 Warsaw PAP in English 2244 GMT 1 Sep 88

[By PAP correspondent Slawomir Popowski]

[Text] Moscow, Sept. 1—A Polish delegation paid a visit to the Soviet Union on the 49th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland and laid flowers at Lenino and in Katyn today.

The delegation was made up of: Vice-Minister for National Defence Gen. Zbigniew Nowak, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Boleslaw Kulski, president of the Council for Preservation of Memory of Struggles and Martyrdom Gen. Piotr Roman Paszkowski as well as Poland's Ambassador to the Soviet Union Wlodzimierz Natorf.

They were accompanied by: chairman of the Smolensk District Executive Committee Alexey Orlov, second-in-command of the Moscow Military District Anatoliy Golovnov, Soviet Vice-Minister for Culture Vladislav Kazinin, head of the Department for Europe of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs Vasiliy Svirin as well as representatives of local authorities.

The name of the Byelorussian village of Lenino has come to be known as a symbol of Polish-Soviet brotherhood-in-arms. It was there that between October 12 and 13, 1943, freshmen troops of the 1st Taduesz Kosciuszko division went into combat for the very first time and attacked German positions hand in hand with soldiers of the Soviet Army.

A monument complex and a museum of Polish-Soviet brotherhood-in-arms are situated on the site of combat. In close vicinity of the Museum, a tomb of the unknown Polish and Soviet soldier stands, and next to it—a monument- symbol of gallantry and courage.

Assisted by a guard of honour, the Polish delegations laid flowers there and paid tribute to the fallen.

Also today, a ceremony was held in Katyn during which memorial tablets were unveiled announcing construction of a monument memorial complex devoted to Polish officers killed there.

The unveiling and flower-laying ceremonies in Katyn were held in a very solemn air, to the assistance of a guard of honour. An Army brass band played the Polish and Soviet national anthems.

While addressing the public, Polish National Defence Vice-Minister Gen. Zbigniew Nowak paid homage to the Polish officers whose ashes rest in Katyn. They were first to enter combat with the Nazis in September 1939.

He also spoke about traditions of Polish-Soviet brotherhood-in-arms and about a new quality in Polish-Soviet relations.

On his part, chairman of the Smolensk District Executive Committee Alexey Orlov spoke also about brotherhood-in-arms, about blood spilt together in struggles against the Nazi occupiers and about Polish-Soviet friendship.

Moscow TV Shows Katyn Commemoration

LD0109233188 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 1 Sep 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Correspondent V. Vengrzhanovskiy] An official delegation from the Polish People's Republic headed by General Zbigniew Nowak, deputy minister of National Defense of the PPR, has come to the area of Smolensk where, 45 years ago, the formation and equipping with combat weapons of the First Polish Division, named after Poland's national hero Tadeusz Kosciuszko, were completed [video shows Polish general and others at commemorative ceremony in Katyn] and it was here, in the village of Lenino in Mogilev Oblast at height No 215, as it was referred to in the front-line communiques, that the Polish sworn brothers together with Soviet servicemen first entered battle.

The guests from Poland looked at the relics in the museum of Soviet-Polish combat cooperation and visited the mass graves of Polish and Soviet servicemen. [video shows delegation touring museum]

In the town of Katyn in the grandoiose pine forest outside Smolensk, Polish officers and Soviet servicemen who died in World War II lie buried. A ceremony was held here today in connection with laying commemorative plaques in the foundations of a future memorial complex to be created jointly by Soviet and Polish architects. On the occasion of this event a rally was held in Katyn Forest. [video shows Nowak laying a plaque; rally in forest] Those who had assembled on this sacred soil—the people of Smolensk and their guests from Poland—paid a military tribute to the fallen. [video shows wreath-laying, march-past by Soviet servicemen]

PZPR Aims To Implement People's 'Just Demands'

PM0109120588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "PZPR Central Committee Politburo Session"]

[Text] Warsaw, 31 Aug—The PZPR, invariably pursuing a policy of national accord and socialist renewal, has striven and is striving to implement working people's just demands and eliminate all obstacles in this sphere. This is said in an account of a PZPR Central Committee Politburo session published in the Polish press today. The just protest by the working class in August 1980 and the decisions of the Ninth PZPR Congress, it was noted at the session, opened up a new stage in Polish history. But over the years many of the goals have not been attained for various internal and external reasons.

The PZPR Central Committee Politburo stressed the importance of the speediest implementation of the decisions of the recent party Central Committee plenum

concerning economic reform and democratic changes. It was pointed out that the working people's appreciation of the scale of the tasks and their maximum involvement in their implementation are essential if the goals are to be successfully attained. Party organizations and state and economic institutions must back initiatives by labor collectives, self-management bodies, and trade unions and react quickly to demands and signs of trouble. It was recommended that the government adopt specific measures to improve discipline in the sphere of prices and income.

It was pointed out at the session that the appreciable damage caused by the strikes and the remaining hotbeds of strike activity pose a threat to the economy and the state and to public order. It also prejudices the possibility of broadening dialogue and enriching the process of national accord.

Reporter's First Impressions of Romania
PM0109084188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 88 Second Edition p 4

[Report by V. Vedrashko: "August in Bucharest"—first paragraph is a PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Vladimir Vedrashko, PRAVDA's new own correspondent in the Socialist Republic of Romania, has now taken up his post. Today we publish his maiden dispatch.

The Moscow-Bucharest train's arrival at the Northern Terminus ("Gara de Nord") was delayed. I was met by fellow journalists. We drove the last few kilometers to my new place of work. Our correspondent's office here has for many years been located in a villa in the old city. With a large wooden mailbox at the gate.

Here I am, one on one with typewriter and telephone. The correspondent's workday begins with reading the press. Local newspapers and journal focus their attention on the most important problems of social development. Noting successes in the national economy, the press criticizes shortcomings and writes about difficulties. One's attention is drawn by material on the broader utilization of existing institutions of socialist democracy. "We have always proceeded and still proceed from the premise that socialism is built with the people and for the people," SCINTEIA, organ of the RCP Central Committee, notes.

Collective organs for enterprise management have been functioning in Romania for 20 years now. Time has proved that working people's direct participation in the solution of production questions largely determines the end results. Party organizations today have been set the task of developing working people's initiative and waging an implacable struggle against bureaucratism and formalism. Resolute measures must be taken to get rid of the bureaucratic administrative system in planning and management, the press stresses.

According to statistical data, Romania's national wealth has reached 5 trillion lei during the years of socialist building, with fixed assets accounting for 3.2 trillion. The achievements by industrial sectors are visible. I saw Romanian-made petroleum extraction equipment in operation near the city of Ploesti. The tractors and combines at work in the fields, the locomotives and cars on the railroads, the different ships on the Danube and the Black Sea—all these have been made by the republic's enterprises. The country produces aircraft. The overwhelming majority of cars and trucks in the streets of cities and villages are Romanian-made. Buses, trolleybuses, some streetcars, and all the rolling stock of the Bucharest subway also bear the trademarks of plants in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The achievements of socialist building are indisputable. But the press is sounding the alarm. Improving output quality and ensuring its competitiveness on world markets remain one of the most acute problems. This is what determines the steady growth of exports and the repayment of the foreign debt owed to capitalist countries.

The Romanian countryside. Around one-half of the country's 23 million inhabitants live there. Arable fields occupy 10 million hectares. Intensive technologies, high-yield varieties, and skillful application of chemical fertilizers coupled with other factors make it possible to produce big harvest yields of grain and pulse crops, potatoes, sugar beet, and grapes. Land improvement work progresses at a fast pace, and 37 percent of arable fields are irrigated.

A course of consolidating both cooperative and state ownership, overcoming the substantial differences between countryside and cities, and improving living and working conditions is being pursued.

The RCP with its 3.6 million members plays the leading role in the implementation of large-scale transformations. It is the RCP that now bears the responsibility for successfully implementing the course of building a comprehensively developed socialist society. The press often turns to questions of party building. "The party must not become a debating club, it must act as the vital center of all society," I read in SCINTEIA.

...Bucharest is Romania's pride and joy. Just one single visit convinces you of this. I have had many opportunities to see for myself that the capital's residents love their city, its old and new architecture, its parks and gardens. I saw a warning sign in the yard of a little old house on a Bucharest street: "Magnolia. Protected by the state." But the city is certainly not a botanical garden. It is inhabited by 2 million people, and they certainly have quite a few other concerns in addition to the protection of gardens and parks.

"Every major city has its own problems and contradictions," I was told by P. Foksha [name as transliterated], chief architect of the Romanian capital. "We are consistently working on their solution. Public transport services are improving, especially along the routes leading to major industrial enterprises—metallurgical, machine building, chemical, textile, footwear, and other plants. Our subway is of great help to our capital. It carries more than 700,000 passengers every day. We are monitoring noise levels and atmospheric pollution. We are taking steps to reduce them. We are developing the area around the Dimbovita River. Recreation zones are being created there. But our main task is housing. Some 5 years ago we managed to eliminate the problem of communal apartments. Today every resident of the city has an average of 14.1 square meters of housing."

And what about Bucharest's spiritual life? Anyone who takes the trouble to carefully study the subtle advertising can find interesting theater shows, art exhibitions, and concerts by established performers. And the unique living flower spreads in Bucharest's parks are an art genre in themselves.

Let me say a few words about radio and television. Bucharest has three radio programs. Television broadcasts, as a rule, for 2 hours every evening, from 2000 to 2200 hours. Broadcasts begin and end with news programs which review the main events in the country and abroad. Programs on sociopolitical and economic topics are traditional. Both Romanian and foreign feature movies, including Soviet movies, are shown. There are morning and evening broadcasts on Saturdays and Sundays, containing informative programs and light entertainment.

The practice of installing shared antennas to receive Soviet and Bulgarian television programs is widespread in Bucharest. A few days after my arrival I noticed groups of people outside the display windows of the Soviet and Bulgarian missions. They were copying details of Sunday's television programs.

Video recorders are becoming a part of life. Small advertisements in the newspaper ROMANIA LIBERA daily advertise video recorders and cassettes for sale. The addresses are, as a rule, in the capital. True enough, I did not come across any video recording equipment in the trade network.

The central streets are crowded. The expressions on people's faces differ. You see joy, worry, determination, curiosity—as in any large city on earth.

Initial impressions.... They produce more questions than answers. And this is probably natural: Acquaintance with a country and its people has a beginning but it is never complete.

West Europe

Better Prospects Seen for Cyprus Settlement

PM0109125588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Aug 88 Second Edition p 5

[Nikolay Miroshnik "Viewpoint": "Wind of Hope"]

[Text] Once again a wind of hope has begun to blow from Geneva, as if it had succeeded in shifting one of the oldest stones obstructing the calm and smooth flow of international life. I refer to the Cyprus problem, which has been on the official list of the world's burning issues since 1974, when the island was cut in two by the painful scar of the "green line" of foreign military occupation.

"Hope is the last to die" is not a modern saying. Indeed, the hope that the island will once again become a territorially whole state, a single fine home both for Greek Cypriots and Cypriot Turks, has not deserted either them or their numerous true friends throughout the world over all these years. During his many trips around the island as correspondent, the author of these lines always felt this hope, which was carefully cherished by its inhabitants. But we shall say quite bluntly that it is one thing to believe that fairness and goodwill will finally triumph some day, and quite another to see the real light at the end of what seemed only yesterday to be an endless tunnel.

The Geneva meeting between new Cypriot President Y. Vasiliou and leader of the Turkish community R. Denktas has ended. The parties met after a 3-year gap, putting an end to the period which, it seemed, threatened to shelve the Cypriot problem for as long as possible. The skeptic will retort: There have been similar meetings before, but what did they yield? And the sides' positions on the whole still have not undergone such fundamental changes....

All this is true. But today there exists that important "something" in modern politics which, despite our materialistic attitude toward life, including toward politics, is difficult to explain by means of precise categories. Let us call this an atmosphere, maybe, a sense of goodwill and political realism shared by the participants. For the first time Y. Vasiliou and R. Denktas are naming quite a specific and—this is the main point—short period for a possible settlement.

Of course, there is still a long way to go. There are more than enough obstacles on this path. Let us recall the question of the future state system of a united Cyprus or the timetable for withdrawing the occupying Turkish troops. Judging by their statements, both leaders advocate genuinely real, effective international guarantees for a settlement and the island's peaceful future. In this regard, the representative international conference within the UN framework and with the participation of all the sides concerned could finally have its say in this.

Let us note that the initiative for calling this conference belonged to the Soviet Union and that from the very beginning it received broad support both in Cyprus and abroad.

What gave rise to the present, if still not realized progress, then at least real prospects for progress in resolving the Cyprus question? First, without doubt, the general warming of the international political climate. The Cypriot president noted quite recently the impetus given by the improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations to settling regional problems. At a more local level, the tendency toward normalization in relations between Greece and Turkey was also a stimulus. Here is just one feature: For the first time in almost 40 years, the Turkish prime minister recently visited Athens.

And, of course, one has to take account of the political realism of the desire for businesslike talks shown by the actual participants in the meeting, and the persistent efforts and assistance given by UN General Secretary Perez de Cuellar to the participants in the dialogue between the Cypriot leaders.

A willingness to compromise in order to achieve the main goal does not by any means signify a weakness in position or character. Quite the reverse—frequently this testifies to political farsightedness, breadth of approach, an ability to see the forest as well as the trees, and concern not only for the interests of one of the communities but for Cyprus as a whole.

Latin America & Caribbean

Honduran Legislator's Arrival Comments Reported

PA0209012988 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 30 Aug 88

[Interview with Honduran Congress Vice President Victor Orlando Gomez Sisneros, head of a Honduran congressional delegation, by (Stanislav Pesnienko); in Moscow "this afternoon"—recorded]

[Text] [(Pesnienko)] This is the first time such a high-level Honduran delegation has arrived in the USSR. The delegation was welcomed at the airport by USSR Supreme Soviet members (Parekjeno) of the Legislative Proposal Commission and [name indistinct], deputy chairman of the Commission of Science and Technology of the Council of Nationalities. Following the welcoming ceremony, we approached Honduran delegation chief Gomez.

How does your delegation feel about arriving here in the USSR? What are your plans?

[Gomez] We can tell your Latin American listeners that we are on a special mission for the Honduran National Congress. We are on an official visit to the Supreme Soviet hoping to exchange views; to tell you what Honduras, my country, is like; and to learn about socialism. We have some knowledge of the Soviet structure as a state. We are a land, a country located in the heart of Central America. We have come to get acquainted, talk, and know each other. We believe that all the countries of the world, big or small, must know each other and be friends. This way, we can learn about each other's concerns and worries.

My first words are to convey a cordial greeting to this great nation and superpower, from a small country that is big in ideals, Honduras.

[(Pesnienko)] Mr Gomez, how do you feel about being here in the USSR for the first time?

[Gomez] Except for colleague Antonio Fernandez, this is the first visit by all my other colleagues. We are impressed by the Supreme Soviet members' welcome.

IZVESTIYA Notes Greetings to Ecuador

PM0109105388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Exchange of Telegrams"]

[Text] To mark the Ecuadoran national holiday—Independence Day—the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has sent the country's president a telegram, offering him and the Ecuadoran people cordial congratulations and good wishes for happiness, success, and prosperity.

In an answering telegram, President Rodrigo Borja Cevallos expressed gratitude for the warm congratulations on behalf of the people and government of Ecuador and himself.

Both messages express the hope that the good relations between the two countries will continue to be strengthened for the good of the Soviet and Ecuadoran peoples and in the interests of strengthening international peace and cooperation.

Political & Social

Chebrikov Discusses KGB's Role in Society

PM0109173188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Sep 88 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with V.M. Chebrikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR KGB, by A. Karpychev and A. Chernyak: "Restructuring and the Work of the Chekists"; date and place of interview not given—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] There are many letters in the editorial mail asking for information about the activity of the USSR KGB under the conditions of restructuring. There are also other questions about the work of the Chekists. We asked V.M. Chebrikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR KGB, to answer these.

[Question] Viktor Mikhaylovich, you have worked for the USSR KGB for a long time, and you have been its chairman since 1982. What do you see as the main tasks of the organs of state security today?

[Chebrikov] First and foremost, I would like to draw attention to a key word in our organization's title—security. Safeguarding the security of our socialist state, of our society, is still the task the party sets us today, our basic task.

Of course, we safeguard the country's security in a different sphere from, say, the Soviet Army. The Chekists' efforts are concentrated mainly on promptly exposing and stopping intelligence and subversive activity by foreign special services, as well as hostile actions by persons of an anti-Soviet, antisocialist disposition within the country that are aimed at undermining and eliminating our existing system.

One of the main tasks of the Committee for State Security is the protection of state borders.

In accordance with USSR legislation, KGB organs are charged with the investigation of cases of treason against the motherland, espionage, terrorist acts, subversion, smuggling, large-scale violations of rules governing currency operations, and a number of other crimes against the state.

The KGB is also charged with ensuring the scientific and technical protection of all types of secret communications in the country against radioelectronic surveillance by Western special services, and of developing the organizational principles for the security of these communications and for monitoring its condition. This is no easy task, and highly skilled experts in various sectors of science and technology are working to resolve it.

The tasks I have enumerated are, of course, not all the tasks facing the KGB; there are more of these. I expect we will discuss some of them in the course of our conversation.

[Question] Our entire country is undergoing restructuring. The all-union party conference outlined ways of further deepening this. In this context, we would like to know how restructuring is going in the KGB.

[Chebrikov] The Chekists share the interests of all the Soviet people and they have adopted restructuring as their own vital cause. I would like to single out what I consider the main element of restructuring in the KGB's work with cadres.

As you know, it was noted at the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum that state security organs have cadres who are ideologically tempered, devoted to the party and people, and professionally trained. That is a high assessment. At the same time, we realize that under present-day conditions, exactingness should be increased still further in work with cadres.

The committee's leadership constantly bears in mind a question of fundamental importance—the ability of our staffers to work in the new conditions, in the new political and moral atmosphere that is taking shape in society. In mastering these skills, our cadres undergo a real test of political maturity. Therefore, we attach great significance to restructuring our staffers' thinking and to abandoning stereotypes. It is this aspect of our work that should be stepped up, particularly at the present stage.

Much is being done to maintain professional standards and legal competence and to ensure the strictest, unswerving compliance with the spirit and letter of Soviet laws by every staffer.

Restructuring is also under way in the KGB party organization. Democratic principles and glasnost are spreading in the work of primary party organizations, taking into account, naturally, the specific nature of our activity. The Communists' activeness and militancy have increased, criticism and self-criticism have become more efficacious, and increased demands are made on Communist leaders. This work was given a major boost by the preparations and holding of the 19th all-union party conference and the decisions it adopted.

[Question] In answering the last question, you spoke, in particular, of the great significance that the KGB attaches to work with cadres. Could you tell us, at least briefly, how people become Chekists?

[Chebrikov] People come to us, to the KGB organs, on the recommendation of party and Komsomol organizations—mainly people with higher education. They have the school of labor, service in the Soviet Army, and experience in social activity and party work behind them.

For obvious reasons, our selection procedures are strict. And here special attention is paid to ensuring that people recruited to the organs have a highly developed intellect, high moral qualities, and strong ideological tempering.

After enlisting in the service, the future workers undergo specialized and legal training at one of the educational establishments in the KGB system. They are then sent to the subunits of the state security organs.

Success in our work depends to a significant degree on the Chekist's moral makeup and on the moral atmosphere in the Chekist collective. We can say with satisfaction that the vast majority of workers are characterized by immunity to consumerism, cynicism, egotism, or indiscipline.

[Question] Readers ask how are the processes of the further widening of democracy that are taking place in society reflected in the work of the department you head?

[Chebrikov] We are convinced that the processes of the widening of democracy and glasnost that have begun on the party's initiative contain tremendous potential for strengthening socialism.

Working under the party's leadership, Soviet Chekists are well aware that the KGB organs and troops can only worthily cope with resolving the tasks facing them under present-day conditions provided their activity is organically combined with the process of widening democracy and glasnost in society, and provided that they do not forget the political and lofty humanist nature of their work.

In the activity of state security organs, great significance is today attached to preventive work, the main purpose of which is to forestall in good time crimes against the state and other antisocial actions that touch on the interests of state security. More than any other form of Chekist activity, this accords most fully with the spirit of the democratization taking place in the country. After all, we are talking about the struggle for a person who is on the brink of committing a crime against the state.

Helping the deviant to shed his delusions and comprehend the relationship between the interests of the individual and society, the citizen and the state, discovering a person's best qualities—these, it seems to me, are some of the most honorable and gratifying aspects of the Chekist's work. Naturally, an essential condition of preventive activity is compliance with the norms of the socialist rule of law and respect for Soviet people's rights and legitimate interests.

At the same time, I wish to stress with the utmost clarity: Hostile elements and any other persons who embark on the path of antistate activity will be held responsible under the law. The law expresses the people's will. Disregard for the law by anyone and disrespect for it are impermissible.

In the conditions of the widening of democracy, in the activity of KGB organs great significance is attached to one of its fundamental Leninist principles—the support of the broad masses of working people. F.E. Dzerzhinskiy himself fought to establish this principle. Today this essential law of our work has a new resonance. Staffers of KGB organs devote tremendous attention to widening and strengthening links with the working people. They often visit labor collectives, address them, hold talks, and do much to improve the forms of public participation in the cause of safeguarding state security.

[Question] It is well known that party and soviet organs, ministries, and departments receive citizens. Does the KGB do this?

[Chebrikov] We regard the work of receiving citizens as one form of implementing the principle of enlisting the masses' support and maintaining links with them in the activity of state security organs. To this end, a reception service operates around the clock at the USSR KGB. Similar subunits exist at union republic KGB offices and in oblast and kray directorates.

Citizens are received in the reception rooms by reception service workers and staffers from other subdivisions of the committee. Leaders of the USSR KGB also meet members of the public there.

Citizens approach us with the most diverse questions, both verbal and written. They come to the reception service to report a planned or committed state crime or to submit proposals to improve the protection of state secrets. I must say that many reports by working people have helped us prevent serious crimes, expose dangerous criminals, and investigate the circumstances surrounding serious emergencies. Applications are also made on personal matters. At times, critical remarks are made about some of our employees.

At the same time, we often have people coming to us with requests for help in solving problems which are simply beyond the powers of KGB organs. But even in those cases people are attentively heard out and then advised where to seek help.

[Question] KGB and glasnost.... At first glance, these words might look unusual next to one another. What can be said about this?

[Chebrikov] I was expecting this question and I can say that I see nothing strange here. We perceive glasnost as one of the forms of our active contacts with working people. After all, if we say we want the people to

understand our activity, then we must display more of it. Much is being done here. In particular, we are engaged in joint work with journalists, writers, and filmmakers. Last year saw the publication of 235 books on topics concerning the Cheka, including more than 50 in languages of the peoples of the USSR. Also, 10 full-length feature and documentary films and 40 short cinema and television movies were released, and about 7,500 articles were published.

We have established relations of active collaboration with the editorial offices of PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and a number of other newspapers. I believe the public has already noticed that the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY now carries a permanent rubric entitled "USSR KGB Reports and Comments."

I assume that, in the conditions of profound transformations in all spheres of the country's sociopolitical life, there is a pressing need for additional measures to publicize the activity of state security organs at the present stage and to inform the public of various aspects of Cheka work.

Of course, not everything can be told, not all documents can be published. In this case, secrecy, as I have already said, is dictated by the specific nature of the struggle against secret subversive activity against our country, and "100-percent" glasnost would be absurd in this case. But a more thorough analysis of material at our disposal shows that there is much that could be brought out into the open.

We are more prepared to answer questions, and we really have things to say. After all, the goals for which Chekists work and at times even sacrifice their lives are noble ones, for they are the goals of our whole people.

[Question] It is well known that the history of the state security organs contains tragic pages linked with unjustified repression. In this context, our readers ask: Are there any guarantees that such things will not happen again?

[Chebrikov] I think that, to begin with, it must be said that the tragic pages which you mentioned do not exist only in the history of state security organs. That was a hard time for our entire party, for the entire country.

It is well known that the gravest violations of socialist legality were committed within state security organs during that period, and that many, many Soviet people were subjected to unjustified repression. An assessment of these violations has been provided by our party's Central Committee, and KGB staffers fully agree with it. Speaking of that period, it must be said that many Chekists at the time took a stand against the violations of socialist legality. But experienced cadre staffers were dismissed under various pretexts, and a sizable proportion of them were groundlessly convicted. More than 20,000 Chekists, highly skilled workers, and Communists devoted to the party fell victim to the repressions as a result of false accusations. Many of them started work under F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and V.R. Menzhinskiy. Among them are the prominent Soviet Chekists A.Kh. Artuzov, Ya.K. Berzin, M.I. Latsis, Ya.Kh. Peters, S.V. Puzitskiy, V.A. Styrne, G.S. Syroyezhkin, and I.S. Unshlikht; the first chiefs of military counterintelligence M.S. Kedrov and A.V. Eyduk; T.D. Deribas, chief of the Far East Kray NKVD Administration; R.A. Pillyar, chief of the Saratov Oblast NKVD Administration; his deputy, I.I. Sosnovskiy; and others.

The struggle against the subversive activity of foreign intelligence services and hostile elements would have been far more effective at that time if the work of state security organs had not been constrained by transgressions against the law and repression against a large proportion of their employees. But despite this, the Chekists continued to guard the interests of the Soviet state.

This is demonstrated, for example, by the results of work by NKVD-NKGB organs on the eve of the war. Thus, in 1940 and the 1st quarter of 1941 a total of 66 fascist residences were discovered and more than 1,300 of their agents neutralized in western regions of the Soviet Union. The Chekists obtained important information on the military-political plans of the imperialist powers and accurate information concerning fascist Germany's preparations for war against the Soviet Union.

The combat work of members of state security organs during the Great Patriotic War deserves a special appraisal. I will give you just a few figures. During the war years the activity of several thousand German fascist intelligence agents was halted, including that of 1,850 agents who parachuted into our country's rear regions. A total of 631 fascist agent radio stations were captured, more than 80 of which were used for radio operations and sending the enemy disinformation. Due simply to these efforts, they succeeded in neutralizing 400 agents and members of German intelligence. More than 2,000 operational groups were working in the enemy's rear; they participated in developing the partisan movement and supplying the Soviet command with valuable intelligence on the enemy. These groups destroyed more than 200,000 Hitlerites in the enemy's rear, derailed some 3,000 special trains, and obtained information on 1,260 German intelligence agents in the Soviet rear. The names of the Chekists who worked behind the front line are well known: N.I. Kuznetsov, D.N. Medvedev, S.A. Baupshasov, V.A. Molodtsov, I.D. Kudrya, N.A. Geft, and many others.

The work done by the Chekists and the military work of border guards during the war undoubtedly constitutes a glorious page in the history of our state security organs. They made a significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

If we talk about the present day and guarantees that violations of socialist legality will not recur, I can say with great confidence that such guarantees do exist. What exactly do I have in mind? First and foremost, the activity of state security organs is carried out under the leadership and control of the party, in strict accordance with the norms of existing legislation. The actions of KGB organs which affect the rights and legal interests of our citizens are constantly supervised by organs of the prosecutor's office. All criminal cases coming under our jurisdiction are examined solely within the legal procedure, as is well known.

KGB organs are involved with the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme Court in rehabilitating citizens unjustifiably repressed. Together with the party and the people, we are striving to ensure that the good name of every innocent victim is restored.

Of course, it has to be admitted that errors still occur in the work of some of our personnel as well as deviations from the norms of criminal-procedure legislation. But we regard any deviation from the law as a calamity and the culprit is always severely punished, no matter what post he holds. This has been reported in the press. I want to stress once again that KGB organs and forces are geared to the need to operate strictly within the framework of the law and their authority and always act in accordance with political criteria and the party.

But there is another most important guarantee of the absolute observance of socialist legality in our work—it is the very atmosphere in the party, in society, the atmosphere of expanding democracy and glasnost in the country.

[Question] Another question from our readers: What new elements already exist or can be expected in the legal regulation of KGB organs' activity?

[Chebrikov] Additional measures are currently being adopted to strengthen the legal basis of the activity of USSR KGB organs and forces and clarify their place and role in the mechanism of the Soviet socialist state. In particular, in conjunction with interested departments, a USSR Law on State Security is being prepared. I believe these measures will also contribute to solving the task of forming the socialist rule-of-law state as the form of organization and functioning of political power that fully accords with socialism and socialist democracy.

In this connection I also want to say that at the moment a great deal of attention is being paid anyway to improving Soviet legislation and implementing legal reform. These were discussed in detail at the 19th party conference. The implementation of its goals and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee July (1988) Plenum will certainly be a very big step forward on the road to strengthening and developing the fundamental principles of socialist statehood and the reform of Soviet society's political system. The KGB is actively involved in this work. We have made specific proposals on a whole range of draft unionwide legislative acts.

State security organs have participated in the elaboration of normative acts envisaging a considerable relaxation and simplification of measures connected with the protection of state secrets.

With the participation of the KGB, a number of departments have declassified many materials to which access in the past was restricted for various reasons. This had made it difficult to use these for national economic and scientific purposes. A number of other restrictions which were a breeding ground for formalism have been lifted. This work will continue in the future on the basis of the requisite balance and responsibility.

At the same time, I want to stress that the relaxation and simplification of the aforementioned measures by no means signify that it is possible to relax vigilance and efforts to ensure the safety of state secrets. There must be no vague areas in this matter.

[Question] What can you say about the activity of capitalist countries' special services in present-day conditions? What is actually being done to safguard the interests of Soviet state security?

[Chebrikov] It is essential to be perfectly clear about the following. Despite a certain improvement in the international climate, certain imperialist circles have not abandoned the course of confrontation. They are continuing to aim to achieve military superiority over the USSR, discredit the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy, and undermine and weaken our state and public security. The capitalist countries' special services, in close collaboration with one another, are increasing the scale of intelligence activity and subversion against the Soviet Union. This activity epitomizes the bourgeoisie's clear class attitude toward socialism.

I want to draw attention to the following: Quite frequently of late we have heard statements to the effect that we are allegedly frightening ourselves with "certain Western special services" and "mythical foreign agents" and are all but victims of our own "spymania." I believe that one must always take a realistic stand on this question. And the reality is as follows: The capitalist countries' special services exist, and no one has abolished them or intends to abolish them, and appropriations for their activity are not diminishing but are in fact increasing. It is perfectly clear against whom their activities are directed. There is plenty to corroborate this.

[Question] Could you cite specific examples?

[Chebrikov] We possess reliable information concerning attempts by foreign intelligence services to use agents to penetrate the Defense Ministry, the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, and a number of other state departments and important national economic installations in our country. In the last 2 and ½ years USSR KGB organs have exposed and instituted criminal proceedings against more than 20 dangerous agents of capitalist countries' intelligence services engaged in espionage. Unfortunately, there have also been KGB employees among them. It has to be admitted that our political, military, and economic interests have been damaged as a result of the activity of Western special services' agents. But we have managed to prevent even greater damage as a result of the exposures which I have mentioned.

Some more facts: In 1986-87 more than 50 diplomats and correspondents from NATO countries, some of whom were caught red-handed while carrying out agent activities, were expelled from the Soviet Union for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. On 6 October 1987 THE LOS ANGELES TIMES published an interview with U.S. CIA Director Webster. This is what he said, in part: "We are currently continuing to improve recruitment work inside the Soviet Union.... Agents represent the basis of intelligence activity even in the age of spy satellites and other effective technical means." You couldn't put it plainer. Quite naturally, we drew appropriate conclusions from this.

[Question] And what can you say about the special services' use of these technical means?

[Chebrikov] The intelligence organs of the capitalist states, first and foremost the United States, make active use of the latest developments, particularly in the field of modern space and electronic technology. The symbiosis of espionage and scientific and technical progress is also displayed in the activity of U.S. intelligence on the territory of the Soviet Union. In recent years state security organs have neutralized considerable numbers of complex and extremely expensive electronic complexes utilized by the U.S. and other Western special services to try to gain access to our secrets. Here is a characteristic example:

On the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk 60 km from the Soviet coast, we detected and removed two large deep-water containers, each of which weighed 6 tonnes. These contained U.S. intelligence apparatus designed to intercept information from a USSR Ministry of Communications underwater cable. The package of intelligence apparatus included a special device for picking up emissions from the cable, a programmable electronic system for recording intercepted information, about 100 multichannel magnetic recording units [blok], and a plutonium-238 atomic energy source which posed a radiation pollution threat to the environment. The system was designed to record over the course of a year all reports transmitted via the underwater communications cable. The system was also fitted with a hydroacoustic beacon that enabled U.S. intelligence to rapidly locate it to extract the accumulated information.

[Question] Do the special services use special technical means in their work against Soviet establishments abroad and Soviet citizens in other countries?

[Chebrikov] The special services devote special attention to the utilization of diverse technical means for purposes of espionage and the organization of the surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad. In 1981-88 alone more than 200 instances of the installation of special information-gathering, monitoring, surveillance, and bugging equipment were discovered in Soviet establishments abroad.

More than 100 different bugging systems—each of them designed to monitor a large number of office premises and apartments—have been neutralized in the office and residential buildings of the USSR Consulate General in San Francisco, the USSR Mission to the United Nations in New York, and the new USSR Embassy complex in Washington.

A considerable quantity of special apparatuses designed for the surveillance of personnel of Soviet establishments in the United States has been detected in employees' cars.

Most of all the above-mentioned devices were developed on the basis of the most modern scientific and technical achievements and designed to operate for many years. Samples of some of the special technical means removed from the new embassy building and other Soviet establishments in the United States were displayed together with photographs at news conferences held last year by the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow and the USSR Embassy in Washington.

Measures to neutralize such large-scale technical penetration by the U.S. special services of the office and residential buildings of USSR missions and establishments abroad required considerable efforts and great professional skill on the part of those responsible for the security of Soviet citizens working abroad.

I would also like to note that the special services also conduct subversive work against our friends and allies.

[Question] What other areas of Western special services' activity could also be mentioned?

[Chebrikov] It is very transparent that they are attempting to utilize for their own ends the rapid development of the Soviet Union's trade, economic, scientific, and cultural ties with capitalist states. And not only to obtain secret information in which they are interested but also with a view to retarding scientific and technical progress in our country.

As I have already said, under the conditions of a dynamic political situation the capitalist countries' special services are constantly modifying the tactics of their intelligence and subversive activity. They resort to the most sophisticated subterfuges and at the same time do

not shrink from the crudest provocations. This is well-exemplified by their hostile actions against Soviet citizens and missions abroad. In the leading capitalist countries alone, the special services have carried out more than 6,000 provocations in the last 3 and ½ years. These include explosions, instances of arson, and hooligan acts of various types. Recruitment campaigns, attempts to persuade Soviet people not to return to the USSR, kidnappings, and illegal arrests and detentions have become a regular occurrence. Exceptional danger is posed by the utilization of special psychotropic substances against Soviet citizens. In cases of this kind, the so-called "champions of freedom and democracy" are not inclined to become expansive on the theme of humanitarian principles and human rights.

[Question] As is known, one of the main forms of subversive activity against our country is ideological sabotage. What are its particular features at present?

[Chebrikov] Indeed, this is the form of imperialism's subversive activity which has been widely utilized against socialism practically from the start of the Soviet land's emergence. Ideological sabotage has always been directed at shaking Soviet people's socialist world outlook, at forming in them views and sentiments that are alien to our society, and at inciting them to perpetrate anti-Soviet actions. Here, too, we encounter direct interference in our internal affairs and crude falsity, slander, and juggling the facts. This activity is directed and coordinated by special services which make active use of the mass media, the dispatching of their emissaries to our country, and other highly refined methods of hostile influence upon people and of inspiring antisocial manifestations. The special services and subversive ideological centers, in seeking to complicate restructuring, are now also endeavoring to stimulate the organization in our country of illegal, semilegal, and even legal formations which would operate at their bidding. To achieve these aims they are seeking out in our society hostilely inclined individuals, taking measures to promote their organizational cohesion, providing them with moral and material support, and nudging them onto the path of direct struggle against the Soviet state and social system.

In modern conditions the West's special services are resorting to the most cunning devices in order to exacerbate the internal political situation in the USSR. They are attempting to discredit the leading role of the Communist Party and to inspire the emergence of a political opposition on the basis of some autonomous [samodeyatelnyye] groupings which are essentially hostile to restructuring.

Foreign subversive centers persistently try to introduce into Soviet people's consciousness the idea that the negative phenomena in our country's economic and social life supposedly stem from the very essence of the socialist system, and that the only possibility of achieving a real improvement in affairs is to reject the historic choice we have made, to reject socialism. They strenuously proclaim the values of bourgeois democracy. Unfortunately, people are to be found who—if it is possible to express it so—"take" the bait. It is precisely such people, in particular, that the special services bank on by enlisting them for unlawful activities.

[Question] That's enough about the special services. Insofar as the protection of the Soviet Union's state border comes—as you have already stated—under the jurisdiction of the KGB, we would like, at our readers' request, to ask you a question on the sort of tasks fulfilled by the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops.

[Chebrikov] The protection of the state border is an entire system of political, military, sanitary, classified, and other measures. And they are implemented by a number of state organs. Of course, the main force directly fulfilling this task is the Border Guard Troops. In line with the Law on the USSR State Border, they are responsible for protecting the border on dry land, at sea, on rivers and lakes, and on other bodies of water. In the air the state border is guarded by the country's Air Defense Forces.

The Border Guard Troops fulfill an extremely wide range of crucial tasks. Suffice it to mention some of these such as repelling the armed invasion of the USSR's territory by military groups [voyskovyye gruppy] and bands, suppressing all manner of provocations, defending the border region's population against these criminal encroachments, preventing the crossing of the state border by unlawful means, implementing the passage across it of people, freight, and transport means, and combating smuggling.

There are also tasks about which readers possibly know less. Thus, in conjunction with other departments, border guards protect the USSR's 200-mile maritime economic zone and monitor the preservation of natural resources and the status of the environment.

[Question] How would you describe the situation on the border at the present time?

[Chebrikov] On the whole it is stable. This is due largely to the foreign policy line pursued by the Soviet Union. Joint actions are carried out with the socialist countries to protect the common border. Border relations with the PRC have recently improved significantly. The situation on the border with Finland is an example of good-neighborliness and mutual understanding between states with different social systems.

At the same time, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that certain circles seek to create seats of tension close to the Soviet border.

There are continuing attempts at legal and illegal penetration of our country by foreign intelligence agents. Terrorists and emissaries from nationalist organizations

are sent in, and means of espionage and sabotage and propaganda materials that incite extremism are shipped in. Smuggling continues, including such highly dangerous forms as the illegal shipment of chemical and radioactive substances and drugs across the border and their transit through Soviet territory. This is also impermissible from the standpoint of the USSR's international commitments.

In view of the growth of international terrorism, a special place in the duties of the Border Guard Troops is now assigned to stopping attempts by terrorists to penetrate the USSR and attempts to ship in means of sabotage and terrorism.

Together with customs organs, the Border Guard Troops carry out a campaign against smuggling. On average, every year hundreds of thousands of items of contraband worth a total of R14-16 million are confiscated at the USSR state border. In recent years Soviet border guards have often had to disarm armed smugglers who were attempting to cross the border at places other than checkpoints. In these instances alone, more than 2 tonnes of drugs were confiscated in the last 5 years.

[Question] Has restructuring affected the Border Guard Troops? What new things have emerged in their activity?

[Chebrikov] Undoubtedly. By ensuring reliability in protecting the border, the essential purpose of this activity is to create the most favorable conditions for our country's constantly expanding international ties. The number of border checkpoints is being increased, formalities are being simplified and reduced, and other measures are being taken to speed up the transit of people and freight.

On the border with the socialist countries, the monitoring of passengers and transport in conjunction with those countries' border guards is being introduced, and a simplified crossing procedure for people living in border regions is in place.

With the aim of reducing restrictions on the activity of our citizens in the border zone, measures are being taken in conjunction with the appropriate Soviet organs to reduce the border zone. The procedure for entry into this zone and movement within it is also being simplified. This process will continue.

[Question] And in conclusion, Viktor Mikhaylovich, this question. How would you generally formulate your position with respect to the problems which concern our society today?

[Chebrikov] Above all I would like to stress that there is complete unity in our Politburo on fundamental questions. As for my personal position, I support the political platform advanced by the party at the Central Committee plenum in April 1985 and confirmed by the 27th party congress, subsequent Central Committee plenums, and the 19th all-union party conference. I believe that the further strengthening of the CPSU's leading and organizing role and its prestige in the eyes of the working people is essential. I am in favor of the expansion of democracy and glasnost; radical, scientifically based economic reform; reform of the political system; and the full unfolding of the socialist system's potential.

I would like to take this opportunity to say that the organs of the country's state security, working under the CPSU's leadership, will do everything necessary to be equal to the demands that are being made of them; that they will demonstrate vigilance, restraint, and firmness in the struggle against any encroachments on our state and social structure; and that they will assist in every way the party's course aimed at restructuring and the renewal of Soviet society.

CPSU Politburo Meets on Ecology, Water Supply

LD0109204288 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 1 Sep 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At a session held on 1 September, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo examined the state program for the gasification of rural rayons of the non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR which has been drawn up by the government. The program envisages largely satisfying by 1995 the natural gas requirements of the rural population, municipal and service institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the region, and also of processing enterprises and livestock farms. The volume of gasification will increase several times during these years. In order to solve this task, it is planned to attract substantial financial and material resources and to build the Yamal-non-Chernozem Zone special-purpose main gas pipeline; an extended gas distribution network, gas filling stations, and service stations for domestic gas equipment.

It was deemed necessary to set up organizations and cooperatives to plan, build, and operate gas networks, and to involve in the construction of gas supply facilities the Komsomol and student detachments from all the union republics.

It was noted in the discussion that the implementation of the planned measures is of great political and socioeconomic importance. This will make it possible to solve successfully the task of transforming the villages of the non-Chernozem Zone, raising the population's living standards, and substantially increasing the output of agricultural produce.

The Politburo examined a proposal by the USSR Council of Ministers for a radical improvement in the ecological situation in the area of the Aral Sea. The proposal has been drawn up on the basis of the recommendations of a commission of some of the country's leading scientists and specialists.

Emphasis was placed on the need to take radical measures to restore the disturbed ecological balance in the regions around the Aral Sea and to conserve that sea. Special attention was paid to the prime importance of the rational use of water resources and the introduction of progressive water-conservation systems of land cultivation. It was decided that large-scale projects will be carried out in 1988-2000 to reconstruct the irrigation and collection and drainage systems. The construction of large areas of irrigated land is being halted. In order to ensure a guaranteed inflow of river water into the deltas of the Amu-Darya, Syr-Darya, and the Aral Sea, it was deemed desirable to set limits on water use for irrigation and economic purposes.

It was noted that improving the public health and epidemiological situation in the Aral Sea area is a task of enormous political and social importance. It is necessary in the shortest possible time to enhance the quality of medical services available to the population, carry out the construction of public health institutions and water supply facilities, and attain an improvement in the sanitation of villages, rayon centers, and towns.

The session approved a plan for measures to carry out the proposals put forward during the July 1988 official friendly visit of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the Polish People's Republic. The plan also takes into account the requests and comments that arose during the numerous meetings and conversations on Polish soil. A concrete definition was given to measures to enhance cooperation in the economic and intellectual spheres and expand contacts in the fields of science and culture through youth organizations and the encouragement of mutual visits by citizens of the two countries.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo also discussed certain other questions concerning the Communist Party's domestic and foreign policy.

PRAVDA Previews Article on Outbreak of WWII

PM0109114988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed preview of Feliks Kovalev, Oleg Rzheshevskiy article carried on page 4: "The Lessons of History. How the War Began"]

[Text] World War II involved 61 states and 80 percent of the world's population; it lasted for 6 years. The flames of war swept across enormous expanses of Europe, Asia, and Africa, leaped across oceans, and reached the shores of Novaya Zemlya and Alaska in the north, the Atlantic seaboard of America in the west, the Kuril and Hawaiian Islands in the east, and the frontiers of Egypt, India, and Australia in the south. The war took more than 50 million lives, 20 million of them in the Soviet Union. The calamities and suffering experienced by the peoples cannot be measured. What were the causes and what are the lessons of those dramatic events? Could the war have been prevented? The general public's keen interest in these matters and the comprehensive discussion of them reflect the process of restructuring in the sphere of public consciousness and the strengthening and broadening of the positions of socialist pluralism of opinions on the most acute issues in our history. It is true that during passionate polemics views are sometimes expressed that are not sufficiently critical in reproducing the well-worn theses of antisocialist propaganda, such as the stereotype of the USSR's "direct responsibility" for the outbreak of war. Unchecked facts are used in polemics, such as the claim about the "total isolation" during the war of G. Dimitrov, who, as is known, was head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department at the time and was the key figure in liaison with Western communist parties and with the partisan movement headed by them in a number of occupied countries.

The authors of this article do not share the aforementioned views and do not agree with this approach to the facts. Hence their desire to try again to interpret the Soviet Government's position against the background of the general international situation on the eve of World War II and to paint as objective a picture as possible of what happened, without swinging from one extreme to the other. One would emphasize right away: The desire to understand and explain the dramatic upheavals of that period is no apology for the crimes of Stalinism and Stalin's and Molotov's foreign policy errors and miscalculations. There are things which can be explained, but not justified.

'Fundamental' Causes Examined

PM0109102188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Sep 88 First Edition p 4

[Feliks Kovalev, Oleg Rzheshevskiy article under the rubric "Lessons of History": "How the War Began"]

[Text] The fundamental, underlying causes of World War II, like the first imperialist war, were the clash of interests of the monopolies of the major capitalist powers and the desire to preserve the existing results of the division of the world or to recarve those results in their own interests. The monopolies bear the responsibility for the processes of militarization of society and the buildup of the arms race, which, naturally, was uneven in different countries. It was they who generated the force that was to become the main instigator of the war—fascism, which, expressing the interests of big capital, was the most aggressive, terrorist form of dictatorship of ultra-reactionary groupings of the bourgeoisie. These were the assessments that the Comintern and our own party made of fascism from the time it came to power in Germany, and the Soviet people were educated in that spirit. The assertions that have appeared in literature and journalism to the effect that the course of rapprochement with fascist Germany steadily gained strength in our country more or less from 1934, after the 17th party congress, can hardly be considered to be based on proven facts. The spirit of the antifascist decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress (1935) held undivided sway in the

practice and policy of those years. Incidentally, that is precisely why the Soviet-German agreements of August-September 1939 came as such a surprise and such a grave shock to the international communist movement, and, indeed, to our own people.

In essence, World War II had already become a reality by the mid-thirties. Japan's occupation of Northeast China in 1931-1932 and then its invasion of Central China in 1937, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, the German-Italian intervention against republican Spain in 1936-1938, Germany's occupation of Austria in 1938—all these are links in a single chain of actions by the aggressors which gradually merged to form a general torrent of fascist invasion that eventually engulfed virtually the whole world. Of all the great powers, only the USSR consistently condemned the aggressors and came to the assistance of their victims where it was able to.

At the same time the Soviet Union made the greatest possible efforts to prevent war. Only this policy provided the Soviet people with the conditions for building a socialist society and met the vital interests of the peoples of other countries. The USSR counterposed to the emerging bloc of aggressive powers a course of creating a system of collective security, the necessary basis of which was military-political cooperation between the USSR, Britain, France, and the United States. The most important milestones along this path were the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaties (1935) and the rudiments of the formation of a front against aggression in the League of Nations in 1935-1936.

Another world war was not a fatal inevitability. An analysis of the events of that time shows that there were alternative paths of development for international relations. War could have been prevented by erecting a barrier in the path of the aggressors not only in the mid-thirties, but even at a later and more complex stage—in the last months and even days before the start of the war. An alternative existed in the period of preparation for the Hitlerites' occupation of Czechoslovakia in the summer and fall of 1938; it existed also in the summer of 1939, when the fascist German aggression against Poland was actually in preparation.

On 15 March 1938, asked by American journalists what the USSR intends to do if Germany invades Czechoslovakia, M.M. Litvinov, USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs, stated that our country will fulfill its allied commitments. In the second half of April Z. Fierlinger, Czechoslovak envoy to Moscow, reported to Prague on the official position of the Soviet Government: "The USSR, if it is asked to do so, is prepared together with France and Czechoslovakia to adopt every measure to ensure Czechoslovakia's security. It has all the necessary means to do this...." In view of the exacerbation of the situation, the government of the Soviet Union proposed to France that talks begin between the general staffs of the Armed Forces of the USSR, France, and Czechoslovakia to discuss concrete forms of assistance to Czechoslovakia, that an international conference be convened in its defense, and that an appeal be made to the League of Nations to bring appropriate influence to bear on the aggressor. There was no response.

The Soviet Government was prepared to fulfill its commitments in all circumstances. On 26 April 1938 M.I. Kalinin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, setting forth the treaty formulation that defined the conditions under which the USSR and Czechoslovakia were obliged to give each other assistance, made an important point: "Of course, the pact does not prohibit either side from coming to assistance without waiting for France." Naturally, it was necessary for Czechoslovakia to address a request for such assistance to the USSR Government.

Seeking to undermine the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as support for Czechoslovakia's independence, the Hitlerites launched a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign. They claimed that the government of Czechoslovakia, by concluding a treaty with Moscow, had turned the country into a hotbed of the "red peril" and an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the Bolsheviks. Fascist German propaganda centers outside Germany did everything possible to frighten ordinary people in the West with the "communist threat."

In this atmosphere the Anglo-French policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor flourished luxuriantly. After a series of meetings by British premier N. Chamberlain with Hitler and with his French colleague E. Daladier, on 19 September 1938 an Anglo-French ultimatum was presented to the Czechoslovak Government containing the so-called "propositions" whose adoption led to the downfall of Czechoslovakia. Formally, the note containing this ultimatum stipulated that in the event of the satisfaction of German territorial claims on Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia would receive international guarantees of its independence. The promise of these "guarantees" was made with the proviso of the "replacement of the existing treaties involving mutual commitments of a military nature and a common guarantee against unprovoked aggression." In other words, an integral part of the ultimatum was Czechoslovakia's renunciation of its treaty with the USSR, that is, in effect its only hope of real assistance from outside.

There was some time left before the expiry of the ultimatum, and as early as 19 September CSSR President E. Benes summoned S.S. Aleksandrovskiy, USSR plenipotentiary in Prague, and told him that he hopes that "France will think better of it," will realize what Hitler wants, and will support Czechoslovakia, and that then war cannot be excluded. Benes put these questions to the USSR Government through the plenipotentiary:

1. Will the USSR give immediate and effective assistance, in accordance with the treaty, if France remains faithful to the pact?

2. In the event of invasion Czechoslovakia will immediately ask the Council of the League of Nations to put into operation Articles 16 and 17 (providing for the adoption of collective measures against an aggressor—Authors). Will the USSR, as a member of the League of Nations, help to take actions on the basis of the aforementioned articles?

The Soviet Government answered the questions immediately and in the affirmative. Nonetheless, on the evening of 21 September Czechoslovak Foreign Minister K. Krofta, although he already knew the Soviet Government's reaction, handed the British and French envoys a reply to the ultimatum containing the Czechoslovak Government's agreement in principle to the Anglo-Franco-German demands.

On 25 September 1938 the USSR people's commissar for defense cabled the USSR Army and Air Force attache in France to inform the French chief of general staff that the Soviet military leadership had adopted a series of measures of a preemptive nature with a view to assisting Czechoslovakia: "1. Thirty infantry divisions have been brought into regions directly adjacent to the western border. The same has been done with cavalry divisions. 2. The units have been appropriately reinforced with reservists. 3. As for our technical troops—aviation and tank units—we have them in full readiness."

The situation in the German ruling echelons was not unequivocal. Some representatives of military circles expressed fears: Joint action by the forces potentially opposing an invasion (Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Britain, and France) threatened disaster. According to the "Gruen" plan, it was proposed to use 30 divisions in operations against Czechoslovakia. Yet Czechoslovakia alone had 45 divisions and possessed armed forces with a numerical strength of 2 million men, 1,582 aircraft, 469 tanks, 5,700 artillery guns, and other arms. The defense of the country was based on strong border fortifications not inferior to the French Maginot Line, still less to the German Siegfried Line.

However, the real opportunity to bar the path of German aggression by joint efforts was lost.

On 29 September 1938 in Munich the heads of government of Germany, Britain, Italy, and France (Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Daladier) announced the partition of Czechoslovakia, instructing it immediately to hand over to Germany Sudetenland and the regions bordering on it, and also to satisfy territorial claims made by Poland and Hungary. Czechoslovakia was robbed of one-fifth of its territory, on which about one-fourth of the population lived, along with mighty defense installations and one-half of heavy industry. The new German border projected into the outer suburbs of the Czechoslovak capital, Prague. Representatives of Czechoslovakia itself were summoned to Munich only to hear the verdict.

This monstrous outrage against a sovereign country and the betrayal by Britain and France of their Czechoslovak friends and allies had grave consequences for the people of Czechoslovakia and the fate of Europe, and destroyed the already unstable treaty system that was intended to contain German aggression. The mutual assistance treaties that linked the USSR, France, and Czechoslovakia, combined with Czechoslovakia's own defense potential, could have proved a decisive obstacle in the path of the spread of aggression. It is not the Soviet Union's fault that this sytem of treaties was not brought into play.

The Munich betrayal changed the correlation of forces on the continent in favor of the fascist powers. Less than a year later the conflagration of World War II broke out.

The Soviet Union, which, like France, was linked to Czechoslovakia by a mutual assistance treaty, was excluded from the "Munich group" and from participation in the resolution of the major military-political conflict that arose in Europe over the fate of Czechoslovakia. This meant that our country found itself in profound international isolation. "The Munich agreement," the British researchers A. Read and D. Fisher noted recently, "has become the historical symbol of shortsightedness, betrayal, and perfidy, the supreme achievement of the policy of appeasement.... Czechoslovakia, occupied by the Germans, became a sword pointing to the east, to the heart of the Soviet Union."

On 30 September in Munich and on 6 December 1938 in Paris, respectively, Anglo-German and Franco-German declarations were signed that basically amounted to mutual nonaggression pacts. The Hitlerites could now calmly draw up plans for expansion to the east, against the USSR. After the signing of the Franco-German declaration, a Quai d'Orsay briefing sent to the French embassies expressed the hope that "German policy will in future be oriented toward the struggle against Bolshevism." This was said openly in the United States too. The well-known American politician and former President H. Hoover stated at the time of Munich: "I am convinced that neither Germany nor the other fascist states want a war with the Western democracies as long as those democracies do not hamper fascism's advance to the East." American diplomats were at the same time concluding that Berlin's expansion after Munich would be oriented toward establishing German hegemony in the countries of east and southeast Europe. The Soviet leadership could not avoid coming to the same conclusions. It may be supposed that the grains of trust in the British and French ruling cirlces that still persisted in Moscow disappeared after Munich. We had to take care of the country's security and the future of socialism alone, we had to seek a way out of international isolation

and take steps to prevent the most powerful imperialist powers from uniting on an anti-Soviet basis, to prevent the USSR's becoming drawn into war.

In March 1939 the fascist states came to the conclusion that the Munich agreement itself was "exhausted." In that month Hitler "abolished" Czechoslovakia. On 3 April, on his instructions, the Wehrmacht command issued the order to draw up the "Weiss" plan, making provision for an invasion of Poland "at any time after 1 September 1939." In March Germany occupied Klapeida (Memel); in April Italy's aggression against Albania began; in May the German-Italian pact on political and military cooperation was concluded. This chain of events undermined the foundations of the Anglo-French security concept, which was based on a deal with Germany and Italy, and testifies to the unpredictability of the fascist states' actions. As a result the British and French Governments announced guarantees to Poland, Romania, Greece, and Turkey and established contacts with the USSR.

The Soviet Government responded immediately to this initiative and in April 1939 proposed to Britain and France to conclude a mutual assistance treaty and a military convention. After much procrastination London and Paris agreed to talks, which began in Moscow in mid-June.

The Moscow talks have been studied in some detail in historical literature. Researchers, including bourgeois ones, have repeatedly drawn attention to the Western participants' "frivolous" approach, at best, to the talks. Instead of rapidly reaching agreement with the USSR in a situation in which a military conflict in Europe might flare up in a matter of weeks, they plunged into endless arguments about secondary matters. The British and French representatives at first refused to offer guarantees from the three powers to the Baltic states, and later opposed the extension of guarantees to cover so-called "indirect aggression," that is, the transfer of power in those states into the hands of agents working directly for Hitler who would have joined him in aggression against the USSR. A consensus was not reached even on defining the concept of "indirect aggression."

Talks began in Moscow in August between the same three countries on a military convention. In the event of German aggression in the West or against Poland the USSR was prepared to grant any military assistance to Britain and France. Moreover, the Soviet representatives at the talks gave their partners detailed information on the state of our armed forces and even on plans for their mobilized deployment.

For the Soviet Union to be able to use its armed forces against fascist Germany, they would have to come into contact with the aggressor. But the USSR had no common border with Germany. The only solution was for Soviet troops to be allowed to cross Polish territory. Warsaw, however, stubbornly rejected all proposals on this score that were put to it by the British and French representatives, although, as everyone already knew, it was only a matter of days until the start of the aggression against Poland.

On 20 August E. Nadzhiyar [as published], French ambassador to Moscow, sent a desperate telegram to Paris: "The failure of the talks is inevitable unless Poland changes its position." A. Noel, British ambassador to Poland, reported in turn that no change had taken place in Poland's position. On the same day Zh. Dumenk [as published], head of the French delegation, received the following instructions from Paris: "On the orders of Premier Daladier, General Dumenk is authorized, together with the ambassador, to sign a military convention in the common interest."

The finale is well known. On 22 August 1939 Dumenk told the Soviet delegation that he had received a positive response from his government to the "main cardinal question," as well as powers to "sign a military convention." But he admitted that he knew nothing about the position of the British, Polish, or Romanian Governments; as a result the signing of the convention was thwarted.

Was there any possibility of making use of the position that France took at the last minute in the interests of achieving a positive result at the talks? Soviet documents do not supply an exhaustive answer to this question. At the same time they point out that France was very strongly under the influence of Britain. Ya.Z. Surits, USSR plenipotentiary in Paris, was right when, assessing France's position during that period, he wrote to Moscow: "The whole problem is that France does not have an independent foreign policy today, everything depends on London."

As for Britain, to characterize its already fairly well-known attitude to the Moscow talks, it is interesting to quote the testimony of G. Ferker [as published], a British diplomat who was in Moscow during the talks and was later appointed ambassador to Finland. Answering questions from a correspondent of the Chicago DAILY TIMES newspaper in 1940, he said that "long before the arrival of the British military mission, the British Embassy in Moscow had received government instructions indicating that in no circumstances should the talks end successfully."

Discussing the reasons for the British Government's perfidious behavior, the same newspaper's correspondent R. Basvayn [as published] wrote that the sending of the British military mission to Moscow was determined by domestic political considerations, and not by any sincere desire to reach agreement with the USSR. The Foreign Office, he said, "warned its officials in Moscow that any accord was excluded." Here Basvayn concludes,

not without foundation: "It did not occur to Chamberlain and his friends that Stalin might know about the mission's real objectives and ultimately make the decision that resulted in the Soviet-German pact."

While the British and French representatives were creating the semblance of talks in Moscow, intensive secret contacts were under way between Berlin and London at various levels with a view to achieving a "very broad Anglo-German accord on all important matters." Much is known about these contacts, and in particular about Britain's willingness, for the sake of an accord with Hitler, to "abandon its commitments with regard to Poland." But much is still hidden in British archives. According to recently published information from British historians, a meeting between Goering and N. Chamberlain was scheduled for 23 August in Britain. A British secret service Lockheed A-12 had already arrived at a German airfield for the "distinguished guest." On 22 August the German side postponed the agreed upon visit because of Ribbentrop's departure for Moscow. It is clear that in the existing situation the probable Anglo-German deal represented an extremely dangerous threat to the USSR, the worst possible distribution of forces in Europe. Supposing that Moscow knew about the deal that was in preparation—and there were people in London who could have informed us—this could have played a considerable part in the decision to accept the proposals made to the Soviet side by the German Government in August.

Some Soviet researchers have recently put forward the thesis that, while the Moscow talks were going on, Hitler would not have risked attacking Poland, and that the conclusion of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact changed the balance in Europe in Germany's favor and enabled it to unleash a world war. Of course, ideas of this kind belong to the category of pure speculation and are not confirmed by facts or documents. The authors of the present article remain convinced that the invasion of Poland and its timing were predetermined by Hitler as early as the beginning of April 1939—long before the Moscow talks—the German armies were mobilized and deployed against Poland by mid-August, and the invasion would have happened in any event. Hitler was confident—and the course of events confirmed the justice of his confidence—that Britain and France were not prepared and did not intend in practice to use all their forces to come to Poland's assistance before it suffered defeat in fighting with the superior German Army. A major war on two fronts did not threaten Germany. The neutralization of the Soviet Union as a result of the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty changed nothing in this scheme of things, and there are absolutely no grounds for asserting, as propaganda hostile to the USSR has long done, that the 23 August 1939 treaty led to the unleashing of World War II.

As British archives indicate, on 19 August 1939, that is, not only before the signing of the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty but even before Hitler's approach to Stalin on 20 August, N. Chamberlain received exhaustive evidence from sources close to the Italian Government that the German "action against Poland" would begin between 25 and 28 August and that the German railroads were fully engaged in bringing troops up to the Polish border. This "action," and with it the world war, would have begun regardless of whether or not the Soviet-German treaty was signed.

An alternative development of world events would have been realistic only if the then leaders of the "Western democracies" had resolutely negotiated for the conclusion of a military-political alliance with the USSR from the very outset of talks with it. The USSR's 17 April 1939 proposal on this score was very balanced and really opened up an opportunity for a different move in world history. Yet there was just no desire to conclude such an alliance in the West. This is widely known today from published French and particularly British archive documents, and from memoirs of the participants in the events. As has already been noted, it was also known then to the Soviet leadership. To reckon on the USSR's putting its own security at risk without securing concrete and, indeed, allied commitments from Britain and France would be unforgivably shortsighted. The responsibility for the fact that an alternative to war did not become a reality in the summer of 1939 lies with the Western politicians who made decisions guided not by the widely understood interests of their own peoples and the peoples of Europe as a whole, but by narrow class enmity toward "Red Russia" and its then government. Even if these decisions had been influenced by the weakening of the USSR as a result of the mass reprisals, particularly against military high command cadres, the responsibility for decisions that proved disastrous for the fate of the world and history lies with those same Western leaders.

The breakdown of talks in Moscow meant that the last chance to stop the Wehrmacht's impending invasion of Poland and a subsequent war in Europe through joint efforts was lost.

The lessons of the Moscow talks are of abiding importance. They show that agreements of this kind are only possible given a profound understanding of the realities of the international situation, consideration for each side's legitimate interests, a desire for agreement, and readiness to reach mutual compromise in the interests of common security. Britain and, despite a certain hesitation, France, lacked a businesslike approach to the talks.

The Soviet Government had to make a principled decision about its further course before the formal conclusion of talks with Britain and France. The notification received from Hitler that a military conflict with Poland was imminent forced it to analyze the consequences of its entirely probable defeat in such a conflict: Germany would capture all Polish territory, including the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands that were part of Poland; and the fascist armies would reach Soviet population centers.

Our country would have been forced alone into a confrontation with fascism. It is also possible that the Soviet leadership headed by Stalin was afraid that in such a situation the sympathies of the Munich appeasers would be on the Hitlerites' side. Nor could they fail to take into account the fact that as of May 1939 Soviet and Mongolian forces had had to wage fierce battles against the Japanese interventionists on the Halhaiin Gol River. Japan's growing aggressiveness presented the quite realistic prospect of a war on two fronts. The Soviet Government could not permit a repetition of the 1918-1922 situation, when the country was forced to oppose intervention by all the main world powers simultaneously.

The prevailing situation was more than critical. It was essentially a question of the very survival of the Soviet state. There was one way out of the extraordinary historical circumstances: to try to forestall events and compromise with Hitler. This would open up the prospect of, first, postponing a direct clash with fascist Germany, if only for a time. This delay was vitally necessary, above all in order to modernize arms and armed forces, to develop and implement an extensive program of preparing the economy for war, and, finally, to fill in the "gaps" caused by the reprisals in the upper levels of the military command. Second, an opportunity opened up for driving a wedge into the German-Japanese alliance.

Sending a message to I.V. Stalin 20 August proposing the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, Hitler warned that if it were not signed, the USSR could be drawn into the "Polish-German crisis." Proposals to improve Soviet-German relations had been made by German representatives previously, but they had elicited an evasive response, at best, from the Soviet side. On 30 May, after the replacement of M.M. Litvinov by V.M. Molotov as people's commissar for foreign affairs, one of the leading officials in Hitler's Foreign Ministry stated in a report to his leaders that Germany was "making enterprising proposals," but encountering the "distrust" of the Russians. In late June Ambassador W. Schulenburg again noted the "glaring distrust" on the Soviet side; on 4 August the same Schulenburg reported to Berlin that the USSR was "fully determined to reach agreement with Britain and France." And only then, on 19-20 August, when it had finally become clear that those countries simply did not need an effective and equal agreement with the USSR, was it concluded that an agreement with Germany was the only way out for us.

It could be argued that Hitler "outwitted" Stalin in neutralizing the Soviet Union on the eve of a military conflict in Europe. We think, however, that these kinds of speculative arguments are put forward in isolation from the terrible realities of the end of the 3d week of August 1939, when one decision or another would decide whether the Soviet people would be drawn into a war with a terrible enemy.

German Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow 23 August. The Soviet-German nonaggression treaty (pact) was signed on the night of 24 August, after Ribbentrop's talk with V.M. Molotov and I.V. Stalin. This document stipulated that the sides would refrain from aggressive actions and attacks on each other and would not support any third power if one of the treaty participants for its part became a "target for military operation." The sides also pledged not to participate in groupings of powers aimed against one of the sides.

Historians and political scientists in the West claim that certain "secret protocols" were also signed along with the nonaggression pact. Such documents have not been discovered in Soviet archives. Their originals, evidently, are not to be found in Western archives either, or anywhere at all. The copies of photocopies appearing in various publications are reproduced in a highly contradictory fashion. On more than one occasion Soviet researchers have drawn attention to the fact that the confusion caused in this connection remains unanswered. Doctor of Historical Sciences V.M. Falin remarked recently that "secret protocols" were mentioned neither by Hitler himself, who customarily published all documents likely to besmirch every latest victim of his aggression, nor by J. von Ribbentrop, the chief participant in the Moscow talks, who would clearly have found it advantageous to utilize the "protocols" as part of his defense at the Nuremburg trial.

War broke out on 1 September. German troops crossed the Polish border and began an offensive along the entire front. The Polish people and Polish soldiers resolutely defended their fatherland and adopted a patriotic, antifascist position. The rebuff given to the aggressor by the people made it necessary even for the then Polish Government to adopt the concept of resistance to fascism. Despite the heroic resistance of Polish officers and men, the numerical and technical superiority of the German Army took its toll.

The Soviet Government refrained from any action right until mid-September. Only on 17 September—when the German Army was approaching Brest and Lvov and had stormed Warsaw, when the Polish Government was to all intents and purposes no longer in control of the situation in the country, and when Poland's military defeat was obvious—were Soviet troops ordered to cross the border and take the territories whose population was made up of an overwhelming majority of Belorussians and Ukrainians.

On the basis of the "Treaty on Friendship and the Border" concluded 28 September, the demarcation line between the USSR and Germany was drawn approximately along the so-called "Curzon Line" defined by the Entente countries as Poland's eastern border back in 1919. This was the ethnic border between the Polish population on the one hand, and Ukrainian and Belorussian populations on the other. D. Lloyd George wrote in the fall of 1939 to the Polish ambassador in London

that the USSR had taken "territories which are not Polish and which were seized by Poland after World War I.... It would be an act of criminal madness to place the Russian advance on a par with the German advance."

The Soviet Union's political and diplomatic efforts during the war aimed at creating a strong and sovereign Polish state and the Soviet Army's military operations (more than 500,000 Soviet officers and men died in the battles for Polish independence, which we fought shoulder to shoulder with Polish troops and all Polish patriots) all convincingly attest that Soviet policy with regard to Poland was not dictated by any kind of selfish intentions, much less by aggressive intentions. The USSR's entire subsequent line on the Polish issue did not only not run counter to the Polish people's long-term interests, but was invariably aimed at actively defending their interests in the international arena and at establishing and gaining international recognition for the new, fair borders of reborn Poland.

M.S. Gorbachev has very accurately described the numerous foreign speculations with regard to the events of 1939: "It is said that the decision made by the Soviet Union in concluding the nonaggression pact with Germany was not one of its best. That is perhaps so, if one is guided not by harsh reality but by speculative abstractions taken out of the context of the time. In those conditions the question was approximately the same as it was in the case of the Brest peace: Would our country remain independent, would socialism continue to exist on earth?" The situation in August 1939 was indeed reminiscent of the situation in late 1917 and early 1918, when there were debates in the party about the Brest-Litovsk talks, and V.I. Lenin said: Either our government agrees to conclude an "obscene peace" or it will be "brushed aside."

The events of 1938-1939 should, it seems, be assessed on the basis of the real situation at that time and with full consideration for both the narrow class, egocentric, and unprincipled policies of London and Paris, and for the subjective mistakes and negative aspects of the course of the then Soviet leadership headed by Stalin. Introducing elements of Stalin's administration-by-edict methods into our diplomacy and the sphere of interstate relations was a mistake. It was obvious, for instance, that Stalin had not taken the proper measures to strengthen the new border or position troops, arms, and strategic resources expediently.

Even if one admits that Hitler ultimately gained more than the USSR from postponing a confrontation with our country and that Stalin's reckoning on a protracted war in the West was not justified, even in the light of these omissions the 23 August 1939 nonaggression pact cannot fail to be seen as an enforced measure dictated to the Soviet Union by the specific historical situation of the time, and that it was the only remaining possibility for avoiding immediate involvement in a war in the West and the East—and the Soviet Union was not to know if it might be facing once again a united front of all the imperialist powers. On the other hand, the "Treaty on Friendship and the Border" concluded with Germany 28 September 1939 produced a sharp "rejection response" at the time and still does so today. The decision to draw the demarcation line with the Hitlerites along the line of ethnic distinction between regions with a majority Polish population and regions inhabited by Belorussians and Ukrainians was, of course, correct. However, describing this demarcation line as a "border" was, needless to say, incorrect, even taking into account the grave situation in which the Soviet Union found itself at the time. This, of course, was a crude political mistake compounded by the promise to develop "friendship" in the very title and text of the 28 September treaty; this mistake cannot be justified from either the political or the moral standpoint.

A number of Soviet notes and statements, including V.M. Molotov's 31 October 1939 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet, contain attitudes that are insulting to the Polish people and the Polish state; an erroneous assessment was made of the nature of the Polish people's war against the aggressor; Soviet-German statements propagandizing fascist Germany's "peace-loving aspirations" were quite needlessly signed; congratulations were sent on the "victories of German arms"; Soviet propaganda adopted, to put it mildly, an incorrect attitude to the Western powers' military failures and Britain's difficulties in its single combat against the aggressor.

Historians will still have to study the events of those years in detail and clarify assessments of the participants' decisions and actions.

We were unable to avert a tragedy. Why? Different answers can be given, but we would like to highlight one reason. The world is an integral whole, and the interdependence of states, however powerful and influential they may consider themselves to be, is indissoluble. The world was already interdependent back in 1939, and that is why the attempts by our future allies in the anti-Hitler coalition to base their own security on the egoistic principles of "appeasing" the aggressor at the price of other countries' security, thereby playing with fire, ended in a worldwide conflagration. In the present nuclear world interdependence has increased many times over. Today it is even more impossible to safeguard one's own security to the detriment of others' security without risking a nuclear conflagration. This is the main lesson that we should draw from the events on the eve of World War II.

Ponomarev Recalls 'Lessons' of World War II

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[M. Ponomarev article under the rubric "History: Dates and Reflections": "The First Salvos of World War II"]

[Text] 1 September is more than just the day when, following the summer break, the academic year begins in primary and secondary schools, technical schools and

colleges, institutes and universities in many countries in the world. This date is permanently imprinted in mankind's historical memory as marking the day when the first salvos of World War II were fired.

The war—resulting from the complex intertwining of interstate contradictions and the confrontation of class forces, the objective laws of social development, and the subjective actions of the leaders of many world states, of ill will, mistakes, and confusion—was unleashed by Hitler's Germany. The German fascist leadership set itself the goal of winning "Lebensraum" by force of arms, crushing the growing and strengthening socialism, and achieving world domination. Thanks to the Western powers' connivance, having already captured Austria and brought Czechoslovakia to submission, it targeted its first blow against Poland. German fascist troops invaded its territory 1 September 1939.

The Hitlerite invaders encountered brave resistance by the Polish Army. The heroic feats by the defenders of the Westerplatte and by Polish soldiers in their hundreds and thousands have gone down in history. But the forces were far from equal. Enjoying overwhelming superiority, the German fascist troops crushed the Polish Army's resistance in a matter of 2-3 weeks. On 16 September the bourgeois Polish government, which paid for its categorical rejection of Soviet assistance in the face of the growing threat of Hitlerite aggression, fled Warsaw, and sought refuge on Romanian territory.

Tied to Poland by relations of alliance, France and Britain declared war on Germany 3 September. But they gave no practical assistance to their ally. The ultimate outcome of their shortsighted policy was that in less than 1 year the Hitlerites occupied almost all of West Europe. At the same time, Japan launched military operations in the Pacific and Far East.

The Hitlerites perceived the Soviet Union as the main obstacle in the way of world domination. They attacked the Soviet Union 22 June 1941. That was the beginning of the Soviet people's Great Patriotic War against the German fascist invaders.

Here there is neither an opportunity nor any need to trace the entire course of the war. Its history is quite well known in general outline. It is important to stress only that the Soviet-German front became its main front from the summer of 1941. It was there that 607 divisions of the fascist bloc countries were routed, while only 176 divisions were routed on all other fronts. Germany lost in battles against the Soviet Army 10 million of the total of 13.6 million men lost, as well as 76 percent of the combat equipment and weapons. It was the Soviet Army that captured Berlin, capital of Hitler's Reich, where representatives of the German fascist command put their signatures to the act of unconditional surrender on that unforgettable day in May 1945.

Even so, though, today's date prompts certain reflections. First of all, it is necessary to decisively rebuff the West's attempts to convince the public that the start of World War II was marked by the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty of 23 August 1939. This treaty can be appraised differently; there can be different views about whether the 18 months' breathing space secured by this treaty was necessary and whether it was put to the best use. Historians have yet to resolve these questions of major importance. But there is no doubt that the Soviet leadership's agreement to sign it was conditioned by the Western powers' unwillingness to erect an insurmountable barrier in the way of Hitlerite aggression and by their desire to direct it eastward. To a certain extent, the decision to sign the nonaggression pact in 1939 can be compared with the decision to consent to the rapacious Brest peace because, both in 1918 and in 1939, the question was: Should our country be independent or not, should socialism exist or not.

A second aspect. One of the abiding lessons of the war is provided by the conclusion that states with different sociopolitical systems can pool their efforts, find mutually acceptable solutions, and act effectively for the sake of a common lofty goal. This was actually done by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, united by the common desire to crush the aggressor and put an end to his crimes.

There is another lesson. Bearing in mind that the Soviet servicemen, having chased the German fascist invaders out of their country's territory, performed miracles of heroism to liberate Europe's enslaved peoples and protect human civilization from Hitlerite barbarism, their example should be an everlasting model to all of us who must save civilization from total destruction in the nuclear fire, a standard against which to verify our actions for ensuring universal security.

Finally, we must not forget the calamities brought upon mankind by Nazism. Preventing its revival is the duty of all the earth's inhabitants. Not for nothing has 1 September, the day when World War II began 49 years ago, been proclaimed the International Day of Struggle Against Fascism—a struggle which remains topical to this day. Evidence of this can be seen in numerous facts. A West German court has just now passed a not guilty verdict on SS member W. Otto, an accomplice in the murder of E. Thaelmann, leader of the German proletariat. A few days ago, Switzerland was the venue for a gathering of the notorious anticommunist league, which has taken over many postulates from Hitlerite fascism. Such things cannot be tolerated. Mankind's conscience does not permit it.

Lenin Library Exhibits Special Stack Books

LD0109234688 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 1 Sep 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Stepanyuk, identified by caption]

[Text] In Moscow today an exhibition of books handed over from special stacks opened at the Lenin Library.

[Stepanyuk] Only a part of the publications—some 800 books—returned to the readers from special stacks are represented here, in the library. There are first and foremost the works whose authors were sometimes unlawfully subjected to repression, books by Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev, Zinovyev, Rozengolts, Tomskiy and many others. After the restoration of the political and public figures' honest names their creative legacy is being returned to the people. There is literature about revolutionary figures: Plekhanov, Volodarskiy, Kirov, Vorovskiy, Frunze, Dzerzhinskiy. Also included in the list of open-shelf books are memoirs about the revolution and the Civil War by Kerenskiy, Milyukov, Krasnov, Savinkov.

Opening the exhibition, Morozova, deputy director of the Lenin State Library, and Solodin, member of the USSR Glavlit [Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in Print] Collegium, reported that now some 10,000 domestic publications and hundreds of thousands of copies of foreign periodicals have been transferred to open stacks. The laborious work on rehabilitating book stocks is being done intensively and will be fully completed by October-November. Of course, several months will probably still be needed before they reach the reader to register them in the open stacks. Many of the books are unique, existing in only one or two copies; in order to avoid losses copies have to be made. Regretfully the libraries' technical abilities are still limited.

As far as the employees of the Lenin Library are concerned, despite all these complications they are doing everything possible to fulfill the decision on transferring literature into general-use stacks as quickly as possible. The exhibition is supplemented by these voluminous files with lists of books which have been transferred to the open stacks. In the immediate future such exhibitions of Soviet and foreign publications will be organized on specific subjects. [video shows the Lenin Library, visitors at exhibition, exhibits, man and woman speaking to microphone, librarian searching through files. The following books can be seen among the exhibits, with publishing details where visible:

N. Bukharin, Theory of Historical Materialism, 1922; Proletarian Revolution and Culture;

N. Bukharin, Attack: Collection of Theoretical Articles, State Publisher

N. Bukharin, The Next Tasks, Kubuch Publishers;

A.I. Rykov, Letters to the Countryside: on Harvest Failure; Ways of Agriculture Development under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, State Publishers;

L. Kamenev, Articles and Speeches, Vol (?13);

L.B. Kamenev, Lenin and the Communist Party;

L.B. Kamenev, Ilyich's Cause, Proletariy Publishers;

L.B. Kamenev (with an illegible joint author), Domestic Trade and Cooperative Societies, State Publishers, Leningrad 1923;

G.V. Plekhanov, (?Novaya Moskva)

(?D.) Zaslavskiy, Plekhanov, Raduga 1927;

In Memory of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg;

In Memory of Karl and Rosa;

(?Karl) Liebknecht;

I. Naumov, Comrade Volodarskiy, Priboy 1924

The Speech in the Case of V.(?K.) Vorovsky's Murder;

The Struggle for the Urals and Siberia;

Anti-Soviet Forgeries;

S.A. Alekseyev (compiled by); The October Revolution: Memoirs by Kerenskiy, Milyukov, Krasnov, Denikin, Stankevich, Sokolov et al, State Publishers;

N. Krupskaya, Educating Young People in the Leninist Spirit;

N.A. Kornatovskiy, The Struggle for Red Petrograd (1919); Chevengur;

Mikhail Koltsov, The Creation: 10 years;

Boris Lavrenev, The Break: Stories and Plays;

A. Kruchenykh, Yesenin's Death;

A. Kruchenykh, Yesenin's Dark Secret;

A. Kruchenykh, To Fight Hooliganism in Literature;

A. Kruchenykh, Yesenin's Faces: From Cherub to Hooligan;

V. Pertsov;

Vyacheslav Polonskiy, Essays by a Literary;

Recent Russian Literature;

A.V. Lunacharskiy, Essays on Marxist Theory of Art;

The Story of One Deviation;

V. Karpinskiy, The Struggle for Socialism;

(?V. Karpinskiy), The Greatest of the Revolutions;

F.Ya. Kon, Four Congresses of the Komintern;

N.V. Krylenko, In Five Years: Prosecution Speeches 1918-22;

The Situation of the Working Class in the USSR, Moskovskiy Rabochiyh;

A. Martynov, Sources of Trotskyism, Priboy, Leningrad;

M. Mironov, Kautsky on Revolution, 1929;

The Greatest Socialist Revolution in the USSR;

Mikhail Pavlovich, Collected Works, Vol 1;

Pilsudski, 1920, Voyennyy Vestnik;

(?D.) Petrovskiy, Capitalism and Socialism: From Thomas More to Our Days, Krasnaya Nov (?1923);

(?M. Pokrovskiy), The October Revolution;

M.N. Pokrovskiy, Marxism and the Peculiarities of Russia's Historical Development;

Trotskyism: Before and Now;

Hamburg on the Barricades;

A. Rudash, against the Latest Revision of Marxism: Collected Articles, 1925;

The Trial of Savinkov;

The Case of Boris Savinkov;

The Savinkov Riddle;

The Bolsheviks;

The (?Third) Congress of the Soviets.]

Further Details on Exhibit

LD0109235788 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 1 Sep 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Stepanyuk identified by caption]

[Text] In Moscow today an exhibition of books transferred from special stacks opened at the Lenin Library.

[Stepanyuk] About 3000 domestic book titles and hundreds of thousands of editions of foreign periodicals have already been returned to the library's open-shelf collection from special stacks. [figures as heard]. This was reported at the opening of the exhibition by Morozova, deputy director of the Lenin Library, and Solodin, member of the USSR Glavlit Collegium. The laborious work on rehabilitating book stocks is being done intensively and will be fully completed by sometime in October or November. At this exhibition, the first of its kind, there are some 800 books. First and foremost these are works whose authors were unlawfully subjected to repression during Stalin's years, works by well-known party figures: Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev, Zinovyev, Bubnov, Rakovsky, Rozengolts, Chernov. After the restoration of the political and public figures' honest names, their creative legacy is being returned to the people.

Side by side there are examples of a different kind—books and memoirs about the revolution and the Civil War by Kerensky, Milyukov, Denikin, Krasnov, Savinkov. In publishing in the 1920's memoirs of ideological enemies of the revolution, the Soviet power was confident that their counterarguments would not sway the Leninist teaching. Glasnost is destroying blank patches in our history, science, and literature.

The exhibition is supplemented by these voluminous files with lists of books transferred to the open stacks. Unfortunately there are only one or two copies of some of the books left, and they have to be copied to avoid losses. Incidentially, some 20 percent of the books that have been transferred from special stacks will be republished. Of course, before this great lot of newly arrived books and magazines is going to reach the reader, several months will probably by needed to register them. But already now Lenin Library employees are doing everything possible to fulfill the decision about transferring literature to general-use stacks as quickly as possible.

This exhibition will be open this month. In the immediate future there will be similar exhibits of Soviet and foreign publications organized on specific subjects.

Adzhubey Interviewed on Success of Reforms

PM0109153888 Paris LE FIGARO in French 31 Aug 88 p 4

[Interview with Aleksey Adzhubey, Nikita Khrushchev's son-in-law, by Pierre Bocev in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Introductory passage omitted] Question: Glasnost and perestroyka [restructuring] are words that have entered the Western languages, and Mikhail Gorbachev is known throughout the West. What is your opinion of this evolution of the Soviet Union?

Answer: I support this process very actively. Account must be taken of the situation. It is necessary to be very active and to take matters in hand. I have received you today to make my contribution to this overall trend. Your bourgeois press still claims that the further away we move from socialism the closer we move to the goal, to prosperity. Not at all. We believe that we will be close to this goal if we succeed in creating real socialism.

Question: Judging from Gorbachev's speeches, this "real socialism" also embodies "socialist pluralism." Should it be inferred from this that political parties other than the Communist Party will be authorized?

Answer: We have a single party system. Other social organizations must have the right to exist to represent society's various forces and to prompt the Communist Party to be more active. One example of this are the national fronts being formed nearly everywhere. They embody the broadest sectors of the population. Perhaps some day there really will be other political parties; I do not know. The important thing is that no group be led by demagogues.

In the West political parties have rallied together, excluding the alternative represented by the communist parties. In our country it is the only party, so it is all the more necessary for the masses of non-party people to participate in political life in an organized national front.

Question: Some of these embryonic parties express ideas very remote from the Communist Party's, however. Take the Pamyat group—with its pan-Russian and anti-Semitic aims—condemned by your press. Should it be banned?

Answer: Of course I do not like Pamyat. Let it be clear, however, that I am not opposed to the "informal groups." It is a natural process, if only for one reason: For decades the official organizations acted exclusively in accordance with rigid patterns. Of course the methods of the GUP (the precursor of the KGB, the political police—LE FIGARO editor's note) must not be used, the movement must not be banned. But its demands and line of action must be exposed for everyone to see.

In France you had the Poujadists, you have Le Pen.... Everywhere there are people who exploit mankind's base ideas.

Question: The criticism of Stalin in the Soviet press is reaching levels inconceivable even 2 years ago. He is termed a "tyrant" and a "criminal" and a memorial to his victims is to be erected. Will this criticism eventually reach Lenin some day, as some isolated articles are beginning to do?

Answer: You can find many intellectuals who are very critical of the twenties but not of Lenin personally, because at the time he could not foresee what would happen. Lenin's name, the symbol that he represents, must remain pure and healthy in the country that he created. However, there is nothing to prevent us from discussing the ideas of that era. The important thing is not to criticize Lenin but to return to his ideas, subsequently distorted.

Question: Mikhail Gorbachev himself constantly condemns "dogmatism," that is, the continued existence of conservative factions within the party. In the West Yegor Ligachev is perceived as the leader of this tendency. At the beginning of the month he delivered a very "orthodox" speech in Gorkiy and a week later Aleksandr Yakovlev, another Politburo member, replied to him, as it were, with a very "liberal" speech in the Baltic region. Are there struggles within the party leadership?

Answer: I do not know what happens within the Politburo. I hear Mikhail Gorbachev telling us that there are no contradictions there. At the same time, I clearly perceive the contradictions that you mention in the two speeches. And why not? Ideas must coexist: Perhaps they are not principled contradictions. Perhaps pluralism must be exercised even within the leadership.

Question: Could this not pose a threat to the "Gorbachev line"?

Answer: To be afraid is to be passive. Struggling means being active. All forces must be active. Ligachev's Gorkiy speech was perhaps not as bad as all that: The essential thing is to understand who is who.

In the United States the president and vice president represent the two extreme wings of the same party. Why can this not be so in our country?

As for Yeltsin (a Politburo leader and Moscow Communist Party leader dismissed for "leftism"—LE FIGARO editor's note), he was able to speak, which is a very good thing. However, his ideas must not be represented within our party's leadership. This is not the time to give a voice to muddleheaded radicalism. Yeltsin wanted the same result as us but he tried to achieve it by the old methods. The hunting down of bureaucrats, purges, and the murder of the kulaks. We have already done all that. His blueprint could perhaps seem effective to simpleminded people but it is unrealistic. There must be no more witch-hunts.

Do not forget that everyone can evolve. Khrushchev was indeed with Stalin, but one day, when he realized what was happening, he revolted. Our present bureaucrats can also change. Consider Belyayev, chief editor of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. He was an official of the apparatus and radically transformed his journal in a progressive direction. Gaugin had his radical turning point in life, and so did Lyubimov and Ben Bella.

Question: So is there no guarantee that the "new thinking" encouraged by the general secretary will be irreversible?

Answer: Everything is always reversible. But that which was tragic would become farcical. What do the opponents of restructuring fear? It is simple: They are afraid that the forces "at the top," that is, the country's leadership, will not be in contact with those "at the bottom," with the population. This is exactly what we must work toward.

Question: However, as the authorities themselves admit, the "forces at the bottom" are increasingly critical of the fact that restructuring is still not apparent in the stores, which are as poorly stocked as ever.

Answer: There is some impatience, and with reason. People believe that restructuring should be increasingly reflected in real effects. The people's impatience is an important factor. Some economists warn us that if the reform does not produce results the situation could become tragic. Gorbachev has told us, however, that the delay in the economic and social processes is much greater than expected.

One of the major problems is the eradication of the "shadow economy," which you call the "black economy."

People's monitoring is starting to take effect. It will thwart the illicit traders, all these "blatmeystery," the kings of the swindle. Everyone would like this to happen more quickly but when you go to bed at night you cannot be surprised to discover that you are still the same the next morning.

Question: So what does the future course entail? A partial return to capitalism?

Answer: The establishment of a "socialist market" is a necessity. It is a rather abstruse term, but what it covers is very clear—state ownership, the cooperatives, and individual labor—each of these elements being as important as the others.

And do not talk to me about a return to capitalism. It is a fairy tale; it is not for real. The people who say that they prefer the black bread of pure socialism to the white bread of true socialism are not for real. Socialism is not equal wages; it is shared prosperity. You do not create a wealthy society full of poor people. And those who criticize us for the socialist market try to frighten us by claiming that we are eliminating ideas for the benefit of the stomach. These are old cliches which do not deserve a reply.

Listen to Lenin. Socialism is not built through enthusiasm alone but also through material advantage and people's prosperity. Do you know who used this quotation? Khrushchev in September 1953 and Gorbachev at the 27th congress in 1986.

Question: Why should Gorbachev have a greater chance of success now than Khrushchev had a quarter of a century ago?

Answer: Because, basically, he tells the truth about the situation. Previously we were living in a command administrative system, and Khrushchev changed nothing in it. Hence it was impossible to resolve the problems. Mikhail Sergeyevich realized that we needed a new economic system.

Khrushchev achieved the fall of Stalin, not of Stalinism.

Question: How did you live during the years when you were a nonperson?

Answer: I immediately found work on the SOVETSKIY SOYUZ magazine, but I could publish nothing. It was taboo. There was no question of my name appearing in the press. I only became "legal" again in April 1985, after Gorbachev's accession to power. I cannot say that everybody likes it, but it must be accepted.

Question: What about Khrushchev's ouster itself? You were a Central Committee member at the time.

Answer: I was present at the plenum which ousted Khrushchev, and I voted like everybody else, just as I voted a month later for myself to be dropped from the Central Committee. It was like that at the time.

Moreover, my Central Committee seat was dependent on my post as chief editor of IZVESTIYA, and I lost that even before Khrushchev's fall—a few hours earlier. I received a telephone call 13 October, when I came back from the airport where I had to welcome Cuban President Dorticos. Ilichev (Central Committee secretary in charge of ideology—LE FIGARO editorial note) wanted to see me. It was not difficult to understand what he wanted. It took him only a few minutes to give me notice of my departure from IZVESTIYA, and that did not seem to upset him at all. Moreover, like the true official that he was, he managed to find a new job as deputy foreign minister, and that is where he spent the 20 years of stagnation.

Khrushchev's overthrow had in fact been planned since February 1964. It was then that the apparatchiks realized that he was planning to eliminate the system. That was the major grievance.

In late 1963 he anticipated that which we now call radical restructuring. They did their utmost to get rid of him. Every possible argument was used—economic problems, the fact that he talked a great deal, growing dissatisfaction, relations with China. The basic problem, however, was that he wanted to attack the system.

This is why one of the keys to Brezhnev's success was that he reassured them: Everything would be calm; they would remain in their posts; nothing would happen. When he implemented his own reform in 1965 Rada and I believed there would be an improvement of living standards. However, it was all immediately engulfed by the stagnation. Of course everyone survived. The USSR is a huge country and still moves, albeit in slow motion. Gradually, however, there was the corruption, the Rashidovs (the former Uzbekistan Communist Party leader whose name has become synonymous with fraud—LE FIGARO editor's note), the shadow economy, the

untruths—all those things we know about now. Stalin represented terror, Brezhnev represented corruption—the two sides of ancient Rome in its period of decline.

Dolgikh, Other Officials Visit Power Institute

PM0109152188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 88 Second Edition p2

[TASS report: "Prospects for Hydropower"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification S.Ya. Zhuk "Gidroproekt" Institute is one of the biggest scientific research and planning and surveying organizations in the country. It has made a significant contribution to the development of Soviet and world hydroelectric power industries. Major hydroelectric power complexes have been and are being built in the Soviet Union and a number of foreign countries on the basis of its projects and developments.

On 29 August V.I. Dolgikh, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was acquainted with the work of the institute. He noted the important role played by the institute in ensuring the comprehensive solution of energy, water resources, and transport problems and in broadening the use of nontraditional, renewable sources of energy. The institute has a science subdivision, experimental production facilities, and branches in various regions of the country, making it possible to rapidly create and introduce into practice examples of new equipment and technology and progressive engineering developments, and also to more fully consider specific local conditions. The series of GES's built and being built on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan and the Naryn River in Kirghizia can serve as examples of highly effective planning decisions. The scientific and technical community is currently engaged in broadly and critically analyzing what has been done to date and what is planned for the immediate and long-term future.

In his conversations with the institute's leaders and with prominent scientists and specialists, V.I. Dolgikh drew attention to the need for more thorough scientific, technical, and economic substantiation of GES projects, taking into consideration the comprehensive solutions to ecological problems on which the general public is now rightly insisting and which are required by national economic interests. He emphasized the particular importance of enhancing the effectiveness of capital investments in hydroelectric power; reducing the cost and time for building GES's; more broadly introducing means to mechanize and automate planning work and construction and power engineering production; and speeding up a solution to the task of using small rivers to generate power.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee asked about the organization of preparatory work for the transfer to full economic accountability and self-financing from 1 January 1989; efforts to increase the interest of scientists and specialists in ensuring a high technical standard and quality of planning documentation; and the solution of social problems.

V.I. Dolgikh was accompanied by A.I. Mayorets, USSR minister of power and electrification, and senior officials from the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR Gosplan.

Local Officals Obstructing Cooperative Rights

PM0109113188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Gavrichkin commentary under the rubric "Topical Subjects": "A Law Outlawed?"]

[Text] The Soviet law "On Cooperatives in the USSR," so highly regarded by the public, came into force on 1 July 1988. A gratifying fact in itself. Given this support from the state, members of established cooperatives and people intending to form a cooperative began to breathe more easily. But now, when almost 2 months have passed since the new document "came into effect," it is time to ask the question: Has the situation really become easier for those people who breathed the sighs of relief?

Without claiming to give a comprehensive, general picture, I will say this: In many cases members of cooperatives are indeed finding it easier to live and work. But situations have also arisen that are causing alarm. Here are some examples.

...In July, land belonging to the cooperative of the well-known "Arkhangelsk peasant," N. Sivkov's "Krasnaya Gorka," was entered by feed procurement workers from the neighboring "Morzhegorskiy" Sovkhoz, who mowed 17 hectares of grass crops and took the hay away. True, the rayispolkom promptly intervened and made the sovkhoz return half the hay to the cooperative. But, forgive me for asking: Why only half? Surely the grass crops cultivated on the land belonging to "Krasnaya Gorka" are the property of the cooperative, which enjoys the same protection under the law as state property?

Something similar happened to the "Belek" purchase and trade cooperative in the city of Frunze. Under the pretext of "no certificates," militia workers from the Uchkurganskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department in Namangan Oblast did not allow members of the cooperative to remove grapes they had bought legally from the population that were therefore their property. It had nothing to do with certificates, of course. The local authorities are worried by the "dispersion" of products. They are still thinking in the old way—it does not seem to have occurred to them that they should not be stopping the process but helping these perishable goods to "disperse" to the consumer as quickly as possible—

this is the whole point of their work. But no! This is an example of people whose duty it is to protect the legal order playing a part in stifling competition and the law with it.

The third incident is quite scandalous. Pensioner Ivan Alekseyevich Krivolapov who, together with his son and son-in-law, intended to set up a steer fattening cooperative or, at worst, take out a plot of land and fatten livestock under the conditions of a lease contract, has had to put up with public humiliation since December last year to the present day. His good idea has been blocked by the "boss"—V. Sysuyev, director of the "Mishkinskiy" Sovkhoz in Mishkinskiy Rayon, Kurgan Oblast.

Stoically withstanding the endless insults, the members of the cooperative bought a house in the desolate village of Khokhly, built an enclosure for livestock, and restored a ramshackle sovkhoz tractor.... But they were unable to register the cooperative or sign a lease contract. And recently V. Sysuyev took the tractor away from the cooperative that had failed to establish itself and ordered its members to clear out of the village, because "the sovkhoz does not need your meat." But what is amazing is this: V. Okhokhonin, first secretary of the party raykom; V. Lomakin, chairman of the rayispolkom; and A. Mekhontsev, chairman of the rayon agro-industrial association are aware of this episode in every tiny detail. But they have not even attempted to reason with the high-handed director.

I have deliberately cited examples that have received broad publicity in the press. So what? Well, all right, members of cooperatives are in no hurry to seek protection from our Themis on the basis of the Law on Cooperatives. But why on earth do law enforcement bodies not show some initiative and rise to their defense in the face of such scandalous cases of the law being broken and rights infringed upon?

Surely it is not simply a question of our prosecutors not reading the newspapers. So with whose tacit consent are the Namangan, Arkhangelsk, Kurgan, and all the other local "laws" being invented and actively protected, while the real law appears to have been outlawed?

Daily Condemns Artels' Theft of Gold, Goods

PM0109115388 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Aug 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "Notes From a Session of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium: Whose Gold Is It?"—passages in boldface as published]

[Text] I will not soon forget the engineer's searching, slightly ironic look after he poured a few of the strange, small, dull brown pebbles into the palm of my hand. "You know," my interlocutor explained later, "you can judge someone's character by his reaction to gold. Some people's hands, believe it or not, even shake. Such people are dangerous..."

I was in Bodaybo, in a laboratory which serves as a kind of museum for the "Lenzoloto" production association. Later, after visiting the placer deposits and viewing the powerful soil-washing drags and the prospecting sections where people work for days on hydraulic pumps, I was able to better appreciate the value of each of the nuggets I saw.

I was reminded of all of this when the discussion at a routine session of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium turned to those people who try to enrich themselves with this precious metal which belongs to the state and is extracted with considerable effort.

USSR Prosecutor's Office information: Around 300 kg of industrial gold has been confiscated from thieves in recent years. In 1982-87 around 60 criminal cases in which sector officials were charged with theft, bribery, and abuse of their official position were closed by the investigative apparatus of the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the MVD. Thirty criminal groups operating in prospecting artels in the "Kareliya," "Sogdiyana," "Tsurata," "Yuzhnaya," "Druzhba," "Lenzolot," "Zaybaykalzoloto," and Uralzoloto" asociations, as well as in a number of others, were detected. More than 200 officials and financially accountable people were convicted as a result of cases brought to court. More than 30 artel chairmen, deputy chairmen, and officials of sector mining enterprises have been convicted of theft, bribery, and concealing gold in the last 2 years.

Is this an argument in the dispute about the benefit or harm of prospecting artels themselves? Of course not. The artel is one of the oldest forms of cooperative activity. The effectiveness of the prospectors' work, which is stimulated by full economic accountability, can be judged from these figures: More than one-third of the gold in the country is mined by the prospecting method. However, it needs to be stated bluntly that the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, which is content with its production record, has a complacent attitude to the violations that exist alongside those records. And the gamut of these violations is extensive, ranging from defective measuring equipment to muddled accounts.

"Until the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy checks to see that its instructions are carried out, thieves will be able to stay ahead of even technical developments," Magadan Oblast Deputy Prosecutor P. Shmakov observed at the session. "It must not be forgotten that hardened, experienced criminals who know the mining business make a living out of stealing and selling gold."

Who should be countering them? Obviously the artel leaders. But the diamonds and gold main administration, which is in charge of the ministry's mining of precious metals, shows an odd sort of "concern" for its cadres, to put it mildly.

USSR Prosecutor's Office information: Two-thirds of artel chairmen at the "Yakutzoloto" association have been replaced for various reasons in 3 years. Velokopytov and Yakushev, who had previously been found guilty of neglecting official duties, were elected deputy chairmen of the "Progress" and "Seligrad" artels. Nalbandyan and Chernogor, previously convicted of abusing their official positions, are looking after supply questions at the "Indigirskaya" artel. The "Amurzoloto" association's artels employ 156 convicted people, including 15 convicted of mercenary offenses.

And USSR Deputy Prosecutor General A. Katusev, who chaired the session, rightly remarked that certain artels have become congeries of people of dubious repute, and that some at times even hide criminals on the run. It is no wonder that the morals and customs prevailing there are akin to those of a prison. I would like to stress again that we are not here, of course, talking about all prospecting collectives. But a clear, regular pattern is visible: The failings of notorious departmental monitoring provide a breeding ground for crimes involving precious metals. It is not difficult to deceive the monitoring because "it is happy to deceive itself."

The system set up by the ministry means that enterprises check one another, obligingly failing to notice instances of favoritism and mutual protection in the artels, as well as disorderly accounting. A recent case: A man called Kasayev was detained while possessing 5 kg of stolen gold, but the shortage of the gold has not been discovered anywhere... The criminal groups spawned by this lack of monitoring are joining up and multiplying.

Estamirov, an experienced receiver of stolen goods in Magadan Oblast, obtained over 7 kg of industrial gold worth almost R500,000. But he did not find it convenient to operate on his own. Accomplices were found—Vladimirov, a legal advisor in the "Eksperimentalnyy" goldfield, and Zaichka, a pilot with a local aviation enterprise—to help get the stolen property out. The criminals have now received their just desserts, but their story once again confirms that criminals are pitting good organization against slovenliness and carelessness, which is particularly worrying.

Incidentally, we should not be speaking just about the theft of gold but also about the theft "surrounding gold." True, Ye. Kompaneytsev, first deputy chief of the main administration for diamonds and gold, assured people at the session that there are not generally any special reasons for disquiet. "Our data," the main adminstration representative said, "does not coincide with the figures presented by law enforcement agencies." He then reported that prospecting artels receive as much equipment, gear, and materials as they need.

This pleasing picture ill resembles the reality. The prospectors at the "Amurzoloto" association, for example, have received only 14 percent of their equipment. It is no secret to anyone that they will get out of this situation. And they get out of it by a well-tried method, by organizing a clandestine network of suppliers. They have acquired more than 1,000 bulldozers and roughly half of their machinery and equipment over the last 5 years.

USSR Prosecutor's Office information: More than 250 highly paid suppliers permanently residing in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Simferopol, and other administrative and industrial centers in the country have been detected in the last 18 months alone. In violation of existing legislation they, by various means, acquire equipment and other material resources intended for enterprises and construction projects in the country. L. Pichugin, departmental chief in the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy Material and Technical Supply Administration; Yu. Stepanov, chief of an equipment supply group at the USSR Ministry of Machine-Tool and Tool-Building Industry, and others have been convicted of receiving bribes in connection with the illegal allocation of spare parts, automotive vehicles, and construction materials to artels. G. Reznik, deputy chairman in charge of supply at the "Amurzoloto" association's "Tynda" artel, was engaged in receiving stolen spare parts over a number of years. The property stolen was worth more than R100,000.

Bribes, graft, kickbacks—all are used to circumvent the law and obtain equipment from strictly centrally controlled stocks. The material and moral damage done here, as everywhere, is irrecoverable.

And the damage caused by violations of technical practice? How many deposits have been abandoned before being fully worked? Many teams leave in their wake in the taiga a dead zone, one dubbed with bitter irony a "lunar landscape" by local inhabitants. The attitude toward nature of goldminers, particularly prospectors, can only be described as rapacious. In the section occupied by the "Obedineniye" artel in Yakutia, the waste water contains a concentration of harmful impurities 100 times in excess of the permitted level.

Prosecutors in Yakutia are demanding that local goldminers do not forget to recultivate the utilized land as prescribed by contracts. The answer received is the old, familiar one about a shortage of resources. At the same time the main administration for diamonds and gold assures us that adequate resources have been allocated. And while this discussion drags on, thousands of hectares of soil along the banks of taiga rivers are disappearing. It presents an awful spectacle that really does recall a lunar landscape: dunes and craters of inert sand where once stood mighty cedars. Who will measure, and can it be measured in rubles, this flagrant waste?

"We will check the conclusions that the leaders of the main administration for diamonds and gold have drawn for themselves," A. Katusev said in conclusion. "We will also again review the case of the 'Pechora' artel, which was dismissed the other day and which aroused such

keen debate in the newspapers. The fact that hundreds of kilograms of precious metals disappear and that the ministry representatives are not disturbed is alarming."

The gold-mining engineer in Bodaybo who referred to "people with shaking hands" said it was pointless to admonish them. The language of the law in action is the only language they understand. It is too easy to squander our wealth if it flows from the gold-bearing veins not into the state's purse but rather into some people's secret coffers. And consequently, the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy and local soviets and law-enforcement agencies near where precious metals are mined have something to seriously consider here.

Arutyunyan at Meeting on Education, NKAO Ties
NC0109213988 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Text] Yerevan, 31 August, ARMENPRES—A meeting of rectors, party organization leaders, relevant leaders in national education in the Armenian SSR, and leading party and soviet workers was held at the Armenian SSR Communist Party Central Committee. Restructuring in higher education and the new academic year were discussed.

The participants discussed the entrance exams, which have demonstrated young people's increasing interest in higher education. They pointed out that it is possible to establish ties between higher education and the scientific-labor fields and industry. Only through the efforts of scientists and industrial workers, as well as through the extensive use of scientific potential, can the difficult problems of our era concerning the training of high-quality experts, the acceleration of scientific-technical growth, and increasing productivity be solved.

In their speeches, the participants pointed out that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decision on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] is of great significance as far as the future development of interethnic relations is concerned. They said wide possibilities have opened up for the NKAO population in economic, cultural, and social development. Possible areas for the widening and deepening of all-embracing ties between the NKAO and the Armenian SSR have also been created. We must extend comprehensive assistance to the NKAO in solving their problems in the economic, social, and national cultural fields, the participants added.

The new academic year should begin in an organized manner and it should become a (?basis) for restructuring in higher education.

Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian SSR Communist Party Central Committee, was also present at the meeting.

Azerbaijan Commission Discusses Education
NC0109105688 Baku International Service in Azeri 1200 GMT 29 Aug 88

[Text] The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Popular Education and Scientific Training Commission has met on the eve of the beginning of the new school year to examine the work carried out by the Baku City Soviet Executive Committee Main Administration for Popular Education. The purpose of the meeting was to implement the decision adopted by the commission some time ago in connection with the provision of educational and (?other equipment) to the schools in the republic. The participants in the meeting also discussed the plans made for the establishment of specialized factories in Baku to supply the educational equipment and other educational requirements for the schools. [passage indistinct]

The participants in the meeting noted that the computer centers of the establishments, ministries, high schools, and scientific establishments should significantly conribute toward the education of the students.

Ukrainian Mother Laments War in Afghanistan
AU0109132188 Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAINA in Ukrainian 28 Aug 88 pp 3-4

["Excerpt from a new book" on Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan by Oleksiy Dmytrenko: "Sunflowers from the Dnepr Land"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] One cannot read such letters without emotion, without a wail from the heart. I was deeply agitated and stunned by the grief. [passage omitted]

Halyna Antonivna Marutenko from Malin, Viktor's mother, remembers everything and constantly sees everything like a nightmare. She wrote in her letter:

"In September, Vitya suddenly arrived from Kiev for the weekend and said that it was his turn to go into the Army—his duty. I immediately felt pain in my heart: Most likely it was the premonition that I would lose my son. Please understand me: The situation in the world is so disturbing that we mothers do not sleep much. In addition, there were rumors creeping around about zinc coffins. Alas, not only rumors. The number of fresh youngster's graves at our cemeteries was growing like the pangs of conscience....

"And here was Vitya with his orders: The departure was scheduled for 1 October. I spent days and nights crying, shedding tears wherever I happened to be. What nightmares I had.... Excuse me, in my mind I realize what duty is, but one cannot give orders to the mother's heart that has the right to its motherly truth: I did not want my son to kill anyone or to be killed by somebody, least of all in a remote foreign land. Please understand me well, there was the war against fascism.... It affected all Soviet

people, and I understood my father and brothers who rose to defend the homeland. Please see my point correctly: I am sorry about that remote mountain country, I wish it peace and happiness.... But, excuse my frankness, I damned myself for having given birth to a son and thus having deprived him of life, for having raised him for such unbelievable sufferings.... The Ukrainian mother again and again bemoaned and cursed the land of those mostly illiterate and independent people, a freedom loving land.... And neither they nor I myself are to be blamed for what happened. All decisions were made without us mothers. But the only correct way out had to be found immediately, before making a step.... After all, we live not in the ignorant, obscure 16th century, but in the 20th century of space flights. How useful would my son's constantly growing mind be in this turbulent century, the minds of thousands upon thousands of sons each of whom aspired to live and to struggle for happiness in his only, irretrievable life!

"In September, again on Sunday, Viktor went by motorboat with a friend to Kanev, to pay respects to Taras Shevchenko's grave on Chernecha Hill.

"Six months after my dear son passed away.... 15 July 1984 was for me a black day...." [passage omitted]

'Torrential' Rains Sweep Lachinskiy Rayon

LD0109124088 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] We have received a report from Azerbaijan. In Lachinskiy Rayon of the republic, in 1 and ½ hours the rainfall reached its monthly norm. Torrential rains fell, accompanied by squall winds, and it hailed and snowed high in the mountains. This caused the water to rise sharply in the (Akara) River and its tributaries. Mountain winds with immense force hurled powerful streams of turbid waters down onto houses, economic facilities, roads, and electricity and communication lines. Tens of houses, farmstead plots, village schools, and shops were destroyed; vehicles and equipment were washed away; and a large number of horned and small cattle were killed.

Over large areas, agricultural lands have been flooded, and communications with several inhabited settlements have been disrupted. A shepherd trying to save his flock was killed in an Akbulak pasture, and some people were injured. For 2 days the inhabitants of Lachinskiy Rayon struggled persistently to confront powerful mud flows with discipline and endurance.

All resources and means have been mobilized for the struggle against the consequences of the mountain torrent. A state commission, which includes heads and specialists from the republican ministries and departments, has started working. The scale of material damage is being estimated and help is being given to the victims.

Economic

Experts Argue for Free Economic Zones

PM0109090188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Undated "IZVESTIYA Roundtable Discussion" involving experts V. Karavayev, L. Vardomskiy, and S. Stepanov conducted by A. Cherepanov: "Free Economic Zones"]

[Text] I first came across the idea of establishing free economic zones in the Soviet Union during an assignment to Odessa. Doctor of Geographical Sciences Vladimir Dergachev spoke about the unique opportunities for creating such a zone in Odessa Oblast. On returning to Moscow I had the opportunity to become more thoroughly acquainted with this problem, which has a direct bearing on our country's foreign economic activity.

A scientific group studying the question of free economic zones (FEZ's) has been set up at the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System. The participants in IZVESTIYA's roundtable were Doctor of Economic Sciences Valeriy Karavayev, Candidate of Geographical Sciences Leonid Vardomskiy, and Candidate of Economic Sciences Sergey Stepanov.

Cherepanov: First, a general question. As far as I am aware, free economic zones are an everyday phenomenon in world economic practice today. Many developed and developing countries utilize FEZ's to develop their foreign economic relations. Can we talk here of a trend?

Vardomskiy: Yes, we undoubtedly can. Many states have introduced or are planning to introduce a special system for foreign economic activity on parts of their territory. "Free economic zone" is a conventional term. The goals pursued in each specific case are different. And they have different names. Free foreign trade zones operate in the United States, for example; there are 123 of them. American businessmen have the opportunity in them to import requisite components on preferential customs terms and assemble products, enjoy various skilled services, and export products. In short, these zones enhance the competitiveness of American goods and consequently stimulate production.

Export industrial zones exist in developing countries, particularly in Mexico, the countries of Southeast Asia, and Malaysia. There are several zones in India. They are concerned with attracting foreign capital on preferential terms, increasing the number of export enterprises, creating extra jobs, and boosting the inflow of currency. On the whole, a country utilizing a free economic zone becomes involved more quickly in the process of mastering the achievements of technical and technological progress.

Of the socialist countries, to date only China makes extensive use of this potential. A number of European socialist countries are now setting up free trade zones. They carry out limited functions, above all commercial ones, including transport, transit, and warehousing. It is planned to develop export production in them.

Cherepanov: In other words, the status of a free economic zone varies according to the tasks a particular country sets itself?

Vardomskiy: That is quite natural. The ways of creating zones and the goals pursued are not identical and consequently the forms and types of FEZ's themselves are different. They vary from the simplest, localized FEZ's covering a few dozen hectares—a duty-free warehouse, for example—to zones with larger functions, up to and including major industrial ones.

Karavayev: Why do we talk about the special nature of FEZ's? Here you have low duties or none at all, preferential taxation, and a different foreign currency setup from the country as a whole. State regulation of the activity of firms and enterprises is substantially less than in the rest of its territory.

Cherepanov: I think that I am right in saying that socialist countries must energetically set about creating FEZ's as part of their foreign economic activity.

Vardomskiy: The sooner the better, unless, of course, we are advocates of self-isolation. This is a worldwide objective process, and the socialist states must become active participants in it. Incidently, almost all the European CEMA countries have enacted relevant laws providing the opportunity not only to set up mixed enterprises but opening up the way to the appearances of FEZ's, since zones are a way of activating our foreign economic ties.

Karavayev: All the prerequisites are in place for this. I personally see this as an urgent need, since the situation prevailing in our foreign economic activity leaves, to put it mildly, much to be desired. The Soviet Union's volume of foreign trade with the West fell by R900 million last year. This situation can scarcely satisfy us, particularly when economic reform is being launched in the country.

The seach for new ways and forms of foreign economic ties is an imperative need. Incidentally, "new" is a relative term—it is "new" to us.

Free economic zones and joint enterprises are, if you will, two sides of the same coin: The former make it possible to remove unwarranted restrictions on the latter. It is also more expedient to set up zones around such enterprises.

Stepanov: Absolutely true. Given scientific and technical progress, no country in the world is capable of reaching a high level of development on its own. You cannot develop everything yourself. If you want to keep pace with scientific and technical progress, you must attract foreign capital. All the major Western countries do this in quite an energetic way, incidentally.

We can already talk about the first results of setting up FEZ's in the PRC. Until recently there have only been four of them, but the country's exports via the FEZ's already amount to around $3 billion. Last year exports doubled compared with the year before. It is advantageous to the country to export its output via the FEZ's, as they are directly plugged into the world market. They have become part of it, moreover. The zones not only manufacture products, but, as I have already said, serve as a channel for their export. Products in FEZ's are brought up to world standards—in terms of packaging and advertising—and only after undergoing this rigorous checking against world yardsticks are they released to the consumer.

Moreover, the Chinese leadership has used and does use FEZ's as a testing ground for all manner of economic experiments. Certain elements of labor and wage reform, subsequently applied more broadly throughout the country, have been tried out there. Certain other questions concerned with managing the economic system have also been tested there.

Cherepanov: But for such a vast country as China, four FEZ's are just a drop in the ocean. Does the PRC have any future plans in this regard?

Stepanov: A quite logical plan for the territorial incorporation of the country into the international division of labor has already been developed. The PRC has, among other things, decided to set up a so-called "eastern belt" along the coastline. This zone will be primarily involved in international cooperation. A decision was made some months ago to set up a FEZ on Hainan Island. The whole province, which covers 34,000 sq km, with a population of 6 million, a wealth of natural resources, and a tropical climate, will become a free economic zone. It is proposed to go further there and create a market economy that will retain the basic elements of socialism while being augmented by effective experience borrowed from world practice.

Moreover, the "eastern belt" will include 14 major cities, including Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, and the Liaodong and Shandong Peninsulas. Whereas the first zones were created on open sites without infrastructure, these cities produce around 20 percent of the PRC's industrial output.

Cherepanov: I know that our scientists are proposing specific places and regions of the Soviet Union for the creation of FEZ's.

Vardomskiy: Based on world experience, FEZ's gravitate toward places conveniently located for foreign partners. In our country these are coastal and border regions, the Baltic or the Far East, for example. Proposals for this have already been put forward by certain organizations. Odessa Oblast also has considerable potential. Incidentally, a free trade zone existed in Odessa during the last century and played a beneficial role in the city's development. There were similar zones in Batumi and Vladivostok. Of the regions cited, Odessa Oblast stands out by virtue of its transport links. There are four ports on the Danube—Reni, Izmail, Kiliya, and Vilkovo—and five seaports—Odessa, Ilichevsk, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, Ust-Dunaysk, and Yuzhnyy. It is very important that navigation begin along the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal in 1992. The importance of these ports for transit has the potential to grow. The oblast has developed industry, a major scientific base, and considerable scope for boosting agricultural output and developing the spheres of tourism and recreation. This will all make it possible to create a diversified type of FEZ in the Odessa region.

Moreover, free trade zones are being set up along the Danube in Budapest, Belgrade, Vidin, and Ruse. A new field of cooperation is being opened up. But it is also possible that socialist countries' FEZ's in this region could, through lack of flexibility and foresight on the part of relevant departments, become not partners but competitors.

You may say that I am running ahead and that nothing has yet been set up, but the practice of cooperation shows how important it is look to the long term and work with the future in mind.

Karavayev: A conference on regional aspects of foreign economic activity in the USSR was held in Tallinn recently. The idea of setting up a FEZ in Estonia, in the city of Tartu, was put forward there. It is a major university and scientific center. It is thus possible to establish a technopolis-type FEZ there based on existing scientific expertise and the attraction of foreign capital. There are examples in world practice of FEZ's growing up on the basis of national and international scientific centers. This new avenue of cooperation is now being extensively developed in the Common Market. The prerequisies exist in the Baltic republics, moreover, for the creation of other variants, particularly zones based on joint enterprises.

Virtually none of the representatives of central ministries and departments openly opposed from the rostrum the creation of FEZ's in our country. But fears were voiced off the record. Among other things, it was said that customs and tax legislation is not developed in our country and that FEZ's do not fit in at all within the present-day economic mechanism, in which command methods still dominate. In general, they suggested that we should wait until something turns up rather than acting right now.

Incidentally, people expressed the view at the Tallinn conference that if a FEZ is set up on USSR territory, it is essential from the very outset to rigorously observe a whole range of nature conservancy and other measures. That too is an answer to the skeptics.

Stepanov: I would like to say something else here. Every new idea, and not just in the sphere of foreign economic ties, is resisted by old, deeply entrenched strata. During the NEP period it was possible to attract—and energetically so—foreign capital and set up mixed enterprises, whereas today some people see this as virtually a deviation from the principles of socialism. People go so far as to say that we are "becoming a prisoner of world capitalism." Quite frequently an exaggerated notion of our potential prevails among our functionaries, and it is suggested that we should continue doing everything ourselves. The argument is not new. We heard it 20 years ago. I would like to reiterate: Given the mutual dependency of the world, and not just politically but economically, and given the scientific and technological revolution, no country can develop solely on its own basis, not even countries like the USSR and the United States.

It is essential to make an energetic entry into the world market and attract foreign capital and foreign specialists, seeking thereby to achieve the best results without forgoing our own principles and remaining a socialist country.

Cherepanov: What actual department should take charge of the analysis of the problem and the implementation of the ideas of creating FEZ's?

Karavayev: It is very important that the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission, which is charged with the strategic questions of the country's foreign economic activity, openly define its position on this question.

One should not be afraid to experiment and to amend and supplement our legislation as we go along. We must advance rather than waiting for our whole economy to begin operating under reform conditions.

On the other hand, we will be unable to budge without local initiative. It is at local level that the decisions made at the center must take on flesh and blood. But until the center makes a decision regarding these free economic zones, people at the local level are not going to be in any hurry to show initiative.

Editorial Office: We would like to know the standpoint of the State Foreign Economic Commission, the Gosplan, and relevant subnunits of CEMA on the problem of setting up free economic zones in the USSR.

Agriculture

Nikonov Speaks at Flax Growing Seminar

PM3108130588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Aug 88 Second Edition pp 2, 3

[TASS report on 11-12 August all-Russia seminar-conference on flax growing in Kalinin: "Intensive Development for Flax Growing"]

[Text] Kalinin, 12 Aug—Flax growing is one of the most profitable agricultural sectors. Evidence of this can be seen in the experience of many front-ranking farms in Russia's non-Chernozem Zone, Siberia, and other flax-producing regions in the country. But the opportunity for high returns on investment which is offered by flax growing has still not ensured its development at the proper level.

This was said by the participants in an all-Russia seminar-conference held in Kalinin 11-12 August. Speakers A.S. Semin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR non-Chernozem Zone Gosagroprom; Ye.A. Yakovlev, chairman of the "Put k Kommunizmu" Kolkhoz in Kalinin Oblast's Torzhokskiy Rayon; A.I. Gurina, link leader at the "Mir" Kolkhoz in Kalinin Oblast's Torzhokskiy Rayon; and others devoted detailed attention to ways to increase yields of both fiber and seeds and to improve their quality. It was noted that one of the main reasons behind the lag in flax growing is the insufficient interest of production subdivisions in achieving high economic results, the absence of relations of economic accountability, and poor technological standards in flax cultivation. In order to boost the sector's efficiency, it is necessary for it to adopt new principles of mutual relations between farms and flax processing plants and to ensure the widespread introduction of collective contracts, leasing, and intensive technologies.

The participants in the seminar-conference were addressed by V.P. Nikonov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He said:

Communists and all Soviet people realize well that the main task at this, the second stage of restructuring is to transform the awakened consciousness of the masses into the energy of creative activity. This is the goal pursued by one of the party conference resolutions, which says that the implementation of adopted decisions brooks no delay and that, proceeding from the interests of the cause, it is important to immediately embark on their implementation. Time is pressing us, especially as regards the solution of vitally important problems, such as housing and food problems and the supply of goods and services to the population.

Regardless of the subjects of discussion at the conference and at the CPSU Central Committee July plenum, man and the concern for his well-being and needs have always been and still remain at the focus of attention. But the most acute discussion centered on questions of providing housing, food, and other consumer goods. This is understandable. Too many problems have accumulated here, and they have been awaiting a solution for too long a time. It must be said frankly that the lag in the creation of a reliable food base in the country as a whole has become chronic.

In these conditions, daily work must be geared to making utmost use of all existing reserves and opportunities to supplement food resources, not only to maintain the level of food supplies to the population but also to improve it. Hence the most topical task now is to fully harvest, store, and rationally utilize this year's food and feed crops and to fully meet the feed needs of stockraising.

This is where the center of all work by the party and soviet aktiv and by urban and rural working people must shift.

The country has the real potential to reach by the end of this 5-year plan period the per capita consumption level envisaged by the food program for basic products such as bakery goods, pasta, confectionery goods, groats, vegetable fats, butter, wholemilk products, eggs, and poultry meat. The state of affairs regarding meat and fruit can be substantially improved by the end of this 5-year plan period. But in order to achieve this, the pace of output growth for these products must at least double in the remainder of the 5-year plan period.

Ensuring the set growth rates is not a simple task, and it demands intelligent and intense work. As in the past, the greatest reserve lies in struggling against losses and for the proper storage and improved processing of the harvest and stock units' output. This is the shortest way to ensure an improvement in food supplies already in the immediate future. This would require fewer resources, less time, and could produce a substantial improvement in food supplies.

Unfortunately, the majority of agricultural leaders and those who share their daily concerns often link the further growth of output production only with additional investments, the supply of new resources, and so on. We still encounter the old approach based on dependence, with hopes placed mainly on the center and no concern for utilizing the available opportunities. And yet we have thousands of farms which, operating in the same conditions and using the same resources, achieve high production and economic results. Work is successful wherever people actively assimilate economic methods of management and collective and family contracts, especially on leasing terms.

The key to success lies in changing people's attitudes toward labor. This can be achieved by fundamentally changing economic relations in the countryside. The Central Committee plenum set this task: to restructure

these relations so as to make the peasants true masters of the land and enable them to properly apply their energy, knowledge, and ability there.

We are accomplishing a sharp turnaround toward reviving and augmenting the peasants' best qualities since time immemorial, asserting real independence of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and enhancing their interest in and responsibility for end results. All this must be implemented together with a free choice of forms of cooperative activity and widespread proliferation of economic accountability contracts.

The new forms of production organization necessitate changes in the structure of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Matters are progressing in the direction of turning kolkhozes and sovkhozes into cooperatives in the not too distant future, into associations of economically accountable contract collectives operating on the basis of contracts with the kolkhoz board or the sovkhoz directors.

Restructuring in the countryside has brought to life numerous interfarm cooperatives and has produced quite a few new forms for the management of agro-industrial production. We can currently see coming to the fore interfarm cooperatives encompassing the entire cycle—production, processing, marketing of output, technological services, and scientific backup. The pooling of efforts is taking place both horizontally and vertically. The process of this integration is most graphically displayed in the formation of agricombines, agrifirms, and associations. Cooperative principles are taking root at rayon and oblast level. In this way, the new structure of the agro-industrial complex in the future could take the form of a multilevel cooperative starting with family, link, and team contract collectives belonging to kolkhozes and sovkhozes and progressing through rayon associations, agrifirms, or agricombines to the level of oblast agro-industrial associations.

The speaker devoted much attention to the problems accumulated in flax growing. This sector, he stressed, is one of the most backward in the RSFSR's non-Chernozem Zone. Over the last 2 years the area sown to long-stemmed flax in the zone has been cut by 40,000 hectares. Farms in the Mari ASSR and in Ivanovo, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts have allowed a catastrophic decline in flax fiber yields. Poor quality seeds are used each year for the sowing of long-stemmed flax, sowing time is stretched to 10 days, and sowing is done at spring plowing time as a rule. Especially serious breaches of cultivation technology are committed by flax growers in Novgorod, Pskov, Kalinin, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma Oblasts.

All this has resulted in a sharp decline in the gross output of flax fiber. Gross yields have declined by 19 percent in Vologda Oblast, by 24 percent in Novgorod Oblast, by 20 percent in Pskov Oblast, by 12 percent in Yaroslavl Oblast, by 8 percent in the Mari ASSR, by 9 percent in Kostroma Oblast, and by 8 percent in Smolensk Oblast. Flax growing is a loss-making sector in most of the zone's oblasts.

If we look at the root of the flax growing problems, the cause of the poor results is easy to perceive. First, there is the declining attention paid to flax growing, and second—the poor standards of crop farming and the neglect of seed cultivation. After all, for years harvest yields have fluctuated between 2.7 and 3.1 quintals per hectare, while the cultivation of this crop becomes economically expedient at 6 quintals and above.

The experience of Torzhokskiy Rayon's "Pobeda" and "Mir" Kolkhozes and of a number of other farms in Kalinin and Smolensk Oblasts and the Mari ASSR shows the great potential of this crop. People there produce 10-12 quintals of fiber and 5-6 quintals of seed [per hectare], and every hectare sown to flax guarantees profits ranging between R2,000 and R3,000.

Take, for example, Anna Ivanovna Gurina's link from the "Mir" Kolkhoz. It works on contract and produces 15-16 quintals of flax fiber, its output being of excellent quality. The rich experience of Ye.A. Yakovlev, formerly a flax grower and now chairman of Kalinin Oblast's "Put k Kommunizmu" Kolkhoz, is not going to waste either.

Good results in flax growing are produced wherever new forms of labor organization and remuneration have been introduced and the techniques for cultivating this crop are taken seriously.

The efficiency of flax growing can be enhanced by broadly assimilating intensive flax cultivation techniques which make it possible to produce 8-10 quintals of fiber per hectare and reduce labor costs by one-third or one-half. Last year the zone's farms applied these techniques on a total of 191,000 hectares (39 percent of the total area sown). The result of technological primitivism and inadequate cadre responsibility here is that normative yields were achieved only on a handful of farms.

The introduction of intensive techniques is impossible without well organized seed cultivation. The zone totally lacks a system in this work. Each year a sizeable proportion of the area is sown using inferior-grade seeds. Moreover, there is a shortage of even substandard seeds for sowing. This year, for example, Pskov, Vologda, Kalinin, and Yaroslavl Oblasts had to bring in 13,000 metric tons of seed from other republics. In order to bring flax growing up to the proper level, it is primarily necessary to solve as soon as possible all the questions concerning the production of seeds and the improvement of their quality. This must become one of the basic tasks of the appropriate Gosagroprom subdivisions.

The boosting of flax growing depends largely on the state of the material and technical base of flax processing plants. Unfortunately, it fails to meet modern demands. The tasks set by CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions regarding the building of new flax processing plants and the reconstruction of existing ones are not being fulfilled. During the first 2 years of the 5-year plan period, construction has begun in Smolensk Oblast on only 2 of the 10 plants planned for the zone. No work is being done to build flax processing plants in Vologda, Kalinin, Pskov, Gorkiy, and Kostroma Oblasts.

Workers in many flax processing plants experience shortages of housing and lack sufficient children's institutions. For example, the housing construction plan for 1986-1987 was fulfilled only 78 percent, with figures of 60 percent in Gorkiy Oblast, 73 percent in Pskov Oblast, and 67 percent in Yaroslavl and Ivanovo Oblasts.

As you can see, there are still plenty of problems in this important sector of the economy. This seminar-conference must become a turning point on the path to their solution.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee made a whole series of remarks on other questions concerning agricultural production.

Conditions in the RSFSR non-Chernozem Zone are complex when it comes to managing agriculture. Grain is not easily produced here, primarily because crop farming standards are poor.

Everyone knows that proper order on the land begins with crop rotation. But in the region as a whole crop rotation is applied in 76 percent of fields, and this figure stands at 54 percent in Vologda Oblast, 55 percent in Pskov Oblast, 54 percent in Bryansk Oblast, and 65 percent in Yaroslavl Oblast. Each year the zone's farms fail to cope with their fall plowing, while summer crops are planted after the spring plowing on large areas.

The area of clean fallow has expanded in the region. It was planned that kolkhozes and sovkhozes would produce stable high yields of winter crops from these areas, but this has not happened. The efficiency of clean fallow in a number of oblasts remains extremely poor due to inadequate application of organic and mineral fertilizers and nonfulfillment of the entire package of work to combat weeds.

Winter crops remain a major reserve for boosting grain production in the zone. Yet their potential is far from fully utilized on many farms due to breaches of technological procedures, and yields in the zone as a whole amounted to only 14.2 quintals per hectare in 1981-1985 and 14.7 quintals in 1986.

The main avenue for boosting the productivity of grain and pulse crops has been and remains the further expansion and improvement of their cultivation using intensive techniques, the observance of optimal doses of fertilizers in terms of quantity and nutrient balance, the prompt implementation of protective measures, and the reduction of harvesting times.

Most farms are not working properly on the improvement of soil fertility. The zone needs the application of 12-15 metric tons of organic fertilizer per hectare, but only 5-8 metric tons are actually applied. There are breaches in carrying out basic presowing preparation.

The Flax Scientific Research Institute headed by M.M. Trush is largely to blame.

Farms in the non-Chernozem Zone have to increase the application of organic fertilizers in the soil to a level ensuring a reduction of the loss of soil humus and must fundamentally improve their work on the chemical treatment of acid soils. Unless this is done, it is impossible to increase the return on mineral fertilizers applied and achieve a sharp improvement of yields from all agricultural crops.

Touching on the problems of feed production, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee drew attention to the fact that this is obviously extensive in most oblasts. Annual procurement amounts to only 14-15 quintals of feed units per standard head of livestock. The farms sell little grain to the state but strive to produce more concentrated feeds. Over 50 percent of grain feed produced at local level is fed to livestock in an unbalanced form. This of course leads to large shortfalls in livestock products. The situation as regards feed procurement is again quite variegated this year. While the situation has been somewhat complicated by drought in the Mari and Udmurt ASSR's and in Gorkiy Oblast, other regions have an opportunity to supply stockraising with more than enough full-value feeds. But some farms are not deploying technology and technical and human resources in line with prevailing conditions. People from villages, cities, and workers settlements have still not been recruited for feed procurement in places.

Now it is important to organize permanent monitoring and make sure that the remuneration of feed procurement workers' labor is strictly dependent on feed quality. Strict compliance with techniques must be ensured to reduce the loss of protein in feeds, boost the output of pulse crops and pulse-grain mixtures, and expand the areas sown to rape.

The opportunities for expanding the area sown to feed crops on plowland are virtually exhausted. There is one reserve left to increase feed stocks—natural feed fields. But little attention is given to their efficient utilization. Furthermore, a considerable proportion of these fields are not used, gradually become overgrown with weeds or

swamped, and are taken out of use. The level of natural hay meadows and pastures remains low, and the plans for their fundamental improvement remain unfulfilled year in and year out.

It is time for every farm to pay attention to the efficiency of the utilization of natural feed fields and do everything to ensure that this year's plan for their fundamental improvement is fulfilled.

In conclusion, V.P. Nikonov drew attention to the need for prompt and thorough preparation for wintering and the implementation of all necessary measures to secure further growth of the production of livestock products.

There was a note of urgency in the discussion on ways to develop flax growing which were held 11-12 August during V.P. Nikonov's meetings with scientists, production organizers, and labor collectives in Kalinin Oblast.

While on Torzhokskiy Rayon's "Pobeda" Kolkhoz, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee looked at the full range of machines used in flax fields. There was criticism of the insufficiently consistent and efficient work done by designers to improve the qualitative standards of equipment, primarily harvesting equipment. The rolling method of pulling, developed by specialists from the All-Union Flax Institute, is still not being introduced with the necessary perseverance. This method sharply reduces manpower requirements, and this is especially important for the non-Chernozem Zone. V.P. Nikonov expressed approval for the idea of a kind of alliance between strong farms and average and weak ones to improve production standards and efficiency. This is the "flax" system applied in Torzhokskiy Rayon, and within a brief period it has raised yields in many plantations by almost half.

The major successes that can be achieved in the sector's development provided work is done sensibly and with full dedication were described to the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee by N.I. Popov, chairman of Torzhokskiy Rayon's "Mir" Kolkhoz. The oblast's largest flax area covers 500 hectares here, and it has achieved the biggest yields.

While in Bezhetsk, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee visited the agricultural machine building plant. In the course of conversations with workers and specialists from the enterprise, which supplies a wide range of machinery for flax cultivation, he emphasized the special importance of the speediest switching of production to the manufacture of modern high-efficiency machines ensuring high quality of production. Progress in the reconstruction of the agricultural machine building plant, which is called upon to take the technological process to a qualitatively new level, is slow, and many departments fail to fulfill their commitments to the enterprise. Particular mention was made of the need to develop combines which prevent seed losses.

V.P. Nikonov also visited enterprises and farms in Kashinskiy Rayon. The local plant for initial processing of flax attracted attention with its introduction of waste-free production technology and the use of woody fibers to manufacture structural tiles. A significant proportion of the equipment used for these purposes was developed by the collective using its own resources.

While on the "Verkhnetroitskiy" Sovkhoz, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee attended a rural gathering. There was a discussion of the need to involve more rural residents in work on supplementing food stocks through the production of produce on conditions of leasing and family contracts.

V.P. Nikonov was accompanied on his tour by N.F. Tatarchuk, first secretary of the CPSU obkom, and by Oblispolkom Chairman V.A. Suslov.

Agricultural Developments for 29-31 August

LD0109024588 [Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, unless otherwise indicated, on 29 to 31 August. GMT times of broadcasts are given in parentheses at the end of each item.

29 August

Farms in Uzbekistan have started picking fine-fibered cotton. (0204)

Altay kolkozes and sovkhozes are completing the harvest of peas, rye, and barley and have directed all their efforts now into spring wheat. Sowing of winter crops is also coming to an end.

Tselinograd oblast farmers have completed cutting and threshing grain on 1 million ha. This is one quarter of the area sown with grain. 232,000 tonnes of grain have been received by the state granaries. In the lead with threshing are the Baikashinskiy and Knakinskiy rayons (1400, 1500)

30 August

Novosibirsk Oblast has delivered its first 100,000 tonnes of grain to grain-acceptance enterprises. (0000)

Farms in Moscow Oblast have fulfilled the plan for grain sales to the state. So far 223,000 t of grain have been delivered to procurement centers. (1400)

31 August

The northern and northwestern rayons are the first in Belorussia to begin sowing winter crops. Winter grain occupies over 1,000,000 ha in the republic as a whole. (0207)

Harvesting news: In the last week most of the European part of the country had warm, dry weather. It was also warm and dry in northern Kazakhstan, but it grew a little colder in Western Siberia and Krasnoyarsk Kray. In the country as a whole, grain and leguminous crops have been cut from nearly 82,000,000 ha, and threshed on more than 77,000,000, which is 71 percent of the sown area.

Procurement of fodder continues: So far more than 70,000,000 t has been procured, which is four-fifths of the plan. Tasks for haylage have been overfulfilled. More than 30 percent of the silage needed has been procured, and is not being laid down. Mass deliveries of straw is being made to storage places. The quality of fodder over the country as a whole is considered somewhat higher than last year. Per fodder unit, 5,300,000 t more than last year has been procured.

The frontier of winter sowing is moving south, helped by rains in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussian, Moldavia, Ukraine, the central chernozem zone and the northern Caucasus. (1100)

Harvest 'in Full Swing'

PM0109144388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 88 Second Edition p 2

[Undated "USSR State Committee for Statistics Bulletin"]

[Text] The harvest is moving east. The virgin land and Siberian grain is in the state granary. By 29 August 77.2 million hectares of grain and pulse crops (excluding corn) had been harvested—71 percent of the crops. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes are replenishing feed stocks. Some 10.6 quintals of feed units have been prepared per standard head of livestock.

Harvest work is in full swing in vegetable and potato fields and in orchards. Vitamin-rich products are arriving at retail stores and storage and processing facilities. Some 6 million tonnes of vegetables, 1.1 million tonnes of fruit, and 1.5 million tonnes of potatoes have been sold to the state.

Moscow Oblast Grain Crop Down

PM0109144788 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Sep 88 p 1

[TASS report: "Grain To the State"]

[Text] Agro-industrial complex livestock units in the Moscow area have fulfilled the plan for the sale of grain to the state. A total of 223,000 tonnes of grain has been delivered to collection centers. On average 27 quintals of grain have been gathered in per hectare.

Workers in Leninskiy Rayon, where each hectare yielded on average 40.4 quintals of grain, have attained high results. Crop farmers in Domodedovskiy and Lyuberetskiy Rayons are not lagging far behind them. By and large the results for the oblast are considerably lower than last year's, when 36.1 quintals were gathered in per hectare. The severe drought at the beginning and middle of the summer took its toll. Nevertheless the crop farmers have managed to meet plan targets through extensive use of the lease contract and through the introduction of intensive technology.

The sale of grain to the state is continuing.

Scientific

'Mir' Cosmonauts Continue Mission

LD0109102788 Moscow TASS in English 0942 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—By a TASS correspondent at the mission control center:

The Soviet-Afghan space crew's second working day aboard the orbiting platform Mir began at 9 o'clock Moscow time and will last till midnight.

Research under a program of experiments codenamed Shamshad and involving visual observations and photography focussing on the territory of Afghanistan features prominently in the joint mission.

The cosmonauts perform this kind of work using a Kate-140 stationary photographic camera, hand-carried cameras and MKS-M and Spektr-256 spectrometers.

The information obtained in this way will be used in the interest of many branches of science and the national economy of Afghanistan, including prospecting for oil, gas and other minerals as well as for underground water pools.

One important aspect of the Soviet-Afghan research program is further studies of the peculiarities of human adaptation to weightlessness in space flight.

With this aim Vladimir Lyakhov, Valeriy Polyakov and Mohmand 'Abdullah Ahad are conducting a package of medical experiments to analyze the cosmonauts' capacity for work and evaluate the effectiveness of preventive means to offset the unfavorable impact of zero gravity.

A series of biological experiments has been started to study, in particular, the peculiarities of protein and calcium transfers in higher plants as well as to appraise the stability of complex ecological systems on the example of aquarium fishes and chlorella.

The resident team of Vladimir Titov and Musa Manarov yesterday launched an experiment using the Aynur installation to master technology for producing monocrystals of protein preparations under microgravitation.

Today they will purify a batch of interferon through electrophoresis and take a series of readings concerning the optical characteristics of the atmosphere of earth.

As Vladimir Lyakhov and Mohman 'Abdullah Ahad are to return to earth in Soyuz TM-5 rather than Soyuz TM-6, the individually fitted equipment in the spaceships will have to be moved from one vehicle to the other or vice versa.

According to research physician Valeriy Polyakov, all the five spacemen are in good health and feeling well.

Gorbachev Greets Soviet, Afghan Cosmonauts

PM0109143388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1

[Undated M.S. Gorbachev message to Mir cosmonauts]

[Text] To the international crew of the Mir orbital scientific research complex: Cosmonauts V.G. Titov, M.Kh. Manarov, V.A. Lyakhov, V.V. Polyakov, and A. Mohmand.

Dear comrades,

I send you cordial greetings and congratulations on the successful start of the joint flight on the Mir orbital scientific research complex.

Your flight is a convincing demonstration of the multifaceted nature of fruitful cooperation between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and opens up a shining new chapter in the history of relations between our countries and in the development and strengthening of friendship between the Soviet and Afghan peoples.

I express the firm conviction that you will prove worthy of the high degree of confidence placed in you and will cope successfully with the tasks set for this spaceflight, which are of great scientific and practical significance.

I wish you, dear comrades, successful fulfillment of the program of joint research and experiments and a safe return to earth.

M. Gorbachev

Chernobyl Fallout Still Affects Leningrad Area

PM0109150188 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 88 p 4

[V. Orlov report under the rubric "Rumors and Facts": "Mushrooms Detrimental to Health"]

[Text] Leningrad. Ligovskiy Prospekt No 29. The radiation monitoring laboratory. "Next!"—someone calls from behind the door which stands ajar. The caller enters the room, takes a jar of mushrooms out of a basket, and looks hopefully at Tanya Korneyeva. Tanya, duty officer at the laboratory, places the jar on the sensitive express-analysis instrument. A quick glance at the background radiation reading—slightly enhanced, but within the permitted range.

The line outside does not diminish. Leningrad residents, having learned through the mass media a few days ago about enhanced background radiation on the topsoil in a region ranging between 10 and 50 km in radius from Narvskiy Zaliv and Luzhskaya Guba to the borders of Volosovskiy and Gatchinskiy Rayons, keep on coming to Ligovskiy Prospekt No 29 to check mushrooms and berries picked the previous day....

Out of the 40 mushroom pickers who were the first to call at the radiation monitoring laboratory on that day, 6 were found to have "dirty" mushrooms. News also came in from Leningrad's markets—more than 500 kg of mushrooms picked in that region had already been confiscated.

"The 'Enhanced Background Radiation Zone' developed in 1986 as a result of the fallout of radioactive sediment from Chernobyl. Its effect will last for a long time to come," I was told by Yuriy Nikolayevich Shchukin, deputy chairman of the Radiation Monitoring Commission. "Our task was to accurately determine its extent, which we have done."

Readers are probably already asking: "How could this happen: Life carries on as normal, and suddenly there are reports of enhanced background radiation in Leningrad Oblast?" As a matter of fact, this also gave rise to exaggerated rumors, going almost as far as reporting an accident at the Leningrad AES.

"This has nothing to do with the Leningrad AES; the enhanced background radiation was caused by the Chernobyl cloud and has its typical isotope composition. This region was also reported earlier," Yuriy Nikolayevich said. "This is why we are honestly warning mushroom pickers for their own good.

"Normal background radiation readings in Leningrad Oblast rayons fluctuate between 15 and 20 microroentgens per hour. Readings in the zone where we advise against mushroom picking are two or three times as high. But even that, on the whole, is not all that high."